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This research is important for the determination of the basis of shipper liability, in 
particular whether the fault of the shipper is taken into account or whether the shipper’s 
liability is strict. 
The research question asks to what extent the mental element of the shipper is relevant 
to the determination of the shipper’s liability for cargo. 
The researcher seeks to prove that although the rules seek to distinguish between 
liabilities which are fault-based and those which attract strict liability, considerations 
made in the determination of liability results in an unclear line being drawn between the 
two. The minimal application and the limited existence of fault-based rules would be 



















CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
Rationale for study 
In practical terms, it is useful to determine shipper liability by inclusion of the mental 
element to distinguish between innocent, negligent, reckless or intentional acts. 
Certainty in the law on the mental element will relieve the burden on shippers of not 
knowing with what mindset they should conduct their business. It also assists judges in 
determining liability of the shipper for cargo. 
Research Questions 
Shipper liability for cargo seems to be premised on the requirement of the mental 
element. The objective of this research is to explore how this is consistent with the theory 
of imposing liability on the shipper. It involves evaluating the requirement for the mental 
element, comparing and analysing the different frameworks such as among others, the 
national law, the Hague regime, the Hamburg and Rotterdam Rules. It involves 
considering the liability of the shipper in the wider context such as contract, tort and 
third parties as well as the debate as to why and to what extent shippers should be liable 
for cargo. 
What the researcher is trying to theorize 
Shipper liability rules include both fault as a pre-requirement for liability as well as strict 
liability. The strict liability approach in contractual liability in general focuses on the 
finding of liability by taking into account the effects of the breach as part of the wider 
question of whether the commercial purpose of the adventure had been fulfilled in 
accordance with the intention of the parties, as opposed to a consideration simply of 
whether the shipper has failed to perform. This means that although it does not directly 
address the issue of the fault of the shipper in determining liability, it is argued that the 
underlying reasons for the breach is indirectly taken into account. At the same time the 
rules based on fault are very limited and applied very minimally. This would be 
consistent with overall nature of the strict contractual liabilities of the shipper. For these 






Gaps in the Literature 
Academic works on shipper liability focus on general provisions and duties of the 
shipper primarily in international conventions on the carriage of goods by sea. They 
compare the latest convention with the earlier ones and analyse the changes and 
developments which have taken place as well as the effect on the scope of shipper 
liability. 
A number of leading works on shipper liability appeared after work on the Rotterdam 
Rules commenced. This in part is due to the significant attention given to shipper 
liabilities in its provisions.1 Simon Baughen in ‘Obligations of the Shipper to the 
Carrier’2 discussed the English law position on shipper liability followed by an address 
of the provisions on obligations of the shipper in the Rotterdam Rules. His work explains 
the changes made to the existing law.  
Johan Schelin’s commentary entitled ‘Obligations of the Shipper to the Carrier’3 
explained each of the articles in the Rotterdam Rules on shipper liability and the kind of 
liability that they cover. Filippo Lorenzon wrote a chapter also called ‘Obligations of the 
Shipper to the Carrier’4 in which he noted the obligations imposed by each article in the 
Rotterdam Rules concerning shipper liability and explained in detail the scope of each 
obligation. Finally Frank Stevens wrote ‘Duties of shippers and dangerous cargoes’.5 
These works explain the content and scope of the shipper liability mainly in international 
conventions and in particular the Rotterdam Rules. They do not discuss the role of the 
mental element in establishing shipper liability in general and how it affects the issue of 
the imposition of liability on the shipper. 
 
 
                                                          
1 This will be discussed further in Chapter 4 on Shipper Liability for Cargo under International 
Conventions. 
2 Simon Baughen, ‘Obligations of the Shipper to the Carrier’ (2008) 14 JIML 555. 
3 Johan Schelin, ‘Obligations of the Shipper to the Carrier’ in Alexander Von Ziegler, Johan Schelin and 
Stefano Zunarelli (eds), The Rotterdam Rules 2008: Commentary to the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (Wolters Kluwer 2010) 151. 
4 Filippo Lorenzon, ‘Obligations of the Shipper to the Carrier’ in Yvonne Baatz, Charles Debattista, 
Filippo Lorenzon, Andrew Serdy, Hilton Staniland and Michael N Tsimplis (eds), The Rotterdam Rules: 
A Practical Annotation (5th edn, Informa 2009) 79. 
5 Frank Stevens, ‘ Duties of Shippers and Dangerous Cargoes’ in Rhidian Thomas, Carriage of Goods 
under the Rotterdam Rules (Informa 2010). 
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Scope of study 
This research encompasses the determination of shipper liability for cargo towards the 
carrier and third parties by studying the existing legal frameworks in national and 
international laws on the carriage of goods by sea.  
Methodology 
The research methodology employed is doctrinal, and the sources of research materials 
are from library, database and internet research. The research question is answered by 
firstly identifying the laws on shipper liability and the requirements for the mental 
element. The second stage is the analysis of the development and application of the rules 




This chapter contains the rationale for the study of this topic and states the research 
questions being asked. It then explains what the researcher is trying to theorize and 
identifies gaps in the literature. This is followed by a setting out of the scope of the study 
and the methodology employed to achieve the objectives. Finally a brief description of 
each chapter is then made in the chapter-by-chapter outline. 
Chapter 2 
The concept or definition of the shipper in the context of the carriage of goods by 
sea 
The researcher has written an introduction, objective of chapter, and the importance of 
the definition of the shipper. The researcher then wrote on general definitions, followed 
by a section on the definition in law which contains the legal construct of the shipper. 
This section contains an introduction, definition in international conventions, an analysis 
of the travaux preparatoires of the conventions, the history of the conventions, and a 
country-by-country case law and statutory definition of shipper in the top 20 countries 
with the highest total value of overall exports. The chapter has a section each on the 
contractual perspective, the charterparty perspective, the documentary perspective, the 
bailment perspective, analogies with the voyage charterer and owner, the multimodal 
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perspective, the industry perspective, and a definition of the shipper from shipper 
associations in the top 20 countries with the highest total value of overall exports. Finally 
it contains a conclusion. 
Chapter 3 
Shipper Liability under National or Domestic Law 
In this chapter the researcher has done an introduction, objective of chapter, a section on 
the common law on shipper liability with its own objective and methodology, which 
contains a section on each duty of the shipper under English Common Law, and in other 
countries which adopt the common law. This is followed by a section on shipper liability 
under civil law legal systems, with its own introduction, objective, and methodology. 
This chapter then goes on to cover each type of duty according to each stage of the 
shipping operation namely pre-carriage liabilities, liabilities during transit and post-
carriage liabilities. The researcher also wrote on the nature of shipper’s liability under 
civil law. This is followed by a section on concepts from religious and customary law 
with its own objective and scope. Within this there is a discussion on the Islamic Law 
concerning shipping and all the relevant shipper duties as well as the requirement of fault 
for the contractual liability of the shipper under this sub-heading. 
Chapter 4 
Shipper Liability for Cargo under International Conventions 
In this chapter the researcher has written an introduction, objective and stated the 
research questions for the chapter. This chapter explains the methodology before going 
on into the International Conventions on the Carriage of Goods by Sea. It gives a 
background of each of the four international conventions, the Hague Rules, the Hague-
Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules, and the Rotterdam Rules. The chapter then goes into 
the provisions on shipper liability in all four international conventions by grouping 
various duties under five main classifications of duties and comparing similar provisions 
in each international convention. It discusses the nature of the liabilities and the 
requirement of fault. There is also a section on the theory of liability under the 
conventions. This is followed by a section on burden of proof, category of loss or damage 
and limitation. After concluding this section, the researcher starts another section on 
other non-carriage of goods by sea international conventions relating to shipper liability. 
Here there is a further four international conventions which may create or affect the 
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liability of the shipper. The researcher goes through various forms of public law 
obligations before making concluding remarks. 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
Rules on shipper liability incorporate both the requirement of fault and strict liability. 
Even if there are rules which make liability of the shipper deemed to be strict, decisions 
made on issues of shipper liability however indicate that the finding of liability is not 
simply on the basis of deciding whether the shipper’s obligations have been performed 
in accordance with what was agreed by the parties, but goes on to assess the effects of 
the breach on the innocent party. This shows that indirectly, the fault of the shipper is 
taken into account. These rules must as a matter of principal be provided as being strict 
in order to provide certainty to the parties as to the consequences of a breach. This is in 
line with the needs of the shipping industry to have rules which are economically and 
commercially efficient. For this reason, it is very important to be clear and consistent as 
to the meaning given to the shipper, and also the basis for which their liability is 
determined. There are also fault-based rules alongside the strict liability rules but they 
are very limited and considered very minimally. This would be consistent with the 














CHAPTER 2  
The concept or definition of the shipper in the context of the carriage of goods by 
sea 
Introduction 
From the outset, the shipper appears to be an oft-cited word in any shipping or legal 
materials and sources. However in this research, the term has turned out to be a term that 
seems to have been taken for granted to be understood in ordinary parlance. 
Objective of section 
In this chapter, the meaning of the term “shipper” in the context of the law of the carriage 
of goods by sea will be defined and conceptualised. There does not seem to be any 
formalised and standardised definition of the shipper in written law, nor a consistent 
definition by the courts, but rather the term is shaped by the various roles it plays and 
the obligations imposed upon and rights afforded to it. Furthermore it appears that on 
the international landscape, a wide range of different labels have been used for similar 
roles which further add to the complication. This results in a wide variety of definitions 
and ultimately, culminates in uncertainties. This research will demonstrate and argue 
that there is a need to have a clear, consistent and comprehensive definition of the shipper 
in the law as this will have a tremendous impact on the practice of shipping.  
The importance of the definition of the shipper 
It is important to determine who is to be defined as the shipper because the shipper is 
afforded a unique position in the law of carriage of goods by sea which is not accorded 
to other parties even though they may be imposed with rights and liabilities as though 
they were in the shipper’s position. For instance the reference to the shipper in various 
places in the Hague-Visby Rules has been held to refer only to the original shipper as 
the original contracting party and not to those who are imposed with the liabilities of the 
shipper under the bill of lading by virtue of section 3 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act 1992.6 These references include the exceptions from liability for the shipper in art. 
IV r. 3 for loss or damage sustained by the carrier or the ship which are not caused by 
the shipper, his servants or agents’ act, fault or neglect; the provision in art. III r. V on 
                                                          
6 Aegean Sea Traders Corporation v Repsol  Petroleo S.A. and Another (The Aegean Sea”) [1998] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 39, 69-70. 
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the shipper’s guarantee of the marks, number, quantity and weight of the goods to the 
carrier; and also the provision in art. IV r. 6 on the duty of the shipper not to ship 
dangerous goods.7 The shipper in these rules refers only to the original shipper and deal 
with the obligations of the shipper in his capacity as the shipper and not the person on 
whom liability is imposed by s.3(1). 
The concept of who the shipper is is important to the thesis because in order to study the 
requirement of the mental element of the behaviour of a person, in this case the shipper, 
which will be used to determine shipper liability for cargo, it must first be clear, who the 
shipper is, because it is the shipper whose mental element is being discussed. Otherwise, 
the whole discussion will be skewed, unclear and distorted. The availability of a 
definition will clearly distinguish those who should be subject to the requirement of 
certain mental elements and those who should not. It would also be possible to tailor the 
discussion on the requirement of the mental element according to the nature of the person 
and his activities. For instance the distinction between a natural person and an artificial 
person such as a company requires a separate discussion as to the form of mental element 
required. 
With the emergence of the Rotterdam Rules,8 a convention which explicitly spells out 
shipper liability for specific obligations, the need to identify the shipper becomes even 
more pertinent notwithstanding the rate at which that convention is receiving 
ratifications.9 This demonstrates that there is a growing recognition or proposal for the 
formal acceptance of shipper liability whether or not the maritime world, particularly the 
parties affected and stakeholders agree with this. 
It will thus become extremely important in the eyes of the law, to determine the definition 
of who the shipper is. This is because there is a need to clarify which persons are subject 
to shipper liabilities, not only due to the requirement of the mental element being 
fulfilled, but more importantly because the person falls within the definition of the 
shipper. This enables persons to avoid the trap of being liable as shippers simply because 
of their failure to recognise and realise that they are indeed shippers under the law. This 
                                                          
7 Thomas Edward Scrutton, Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading (first published 1886, Sweet 
& Maxwell 1984) 433. 
8 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by 
Sea, adopted in Rotterdam, 11 December, 2008. 
9 To date, only four states are parties to it – Spain, Togo, Congo and Cameroon. However, the number of 
other countries which are signatories to it has grown to 25. For the latest status, refer to 
http://treaties.un.org/ as the UN website is updated on a daily basis; it is last checked on the 4/1/18. 
20 
 
leads to the need to discover also whether there is a comparison to be made if any as to 
the legal conception of the shipper and the practical conception of the shipper as 
understood in the commercial sense. If there is a large gap or discrepancy between the 
legal definition of the shipper and the commercially understood definition of the shipper, 
needless to say, this is bound to lead to difficulties especially when disputes arise. For 
this reason the importance of the term “shipper” being used and understood in a 
consistent manner from the commercial perspective becomes an understatement. 
Shipper liability will not only be important to the shipper but also to other parties who 
may consequently be affected, as some liabilities may be transferred from the shipper to 
for instance, the consignee.  
General definitions 
It is natural to think that the term “shipper” is confined exclusively to persons connected 
to the use of ships, when the word actually refers to a person who sends goods by any 
form of conveyance.10 Since the root word for shipper is “ship”, the word “shipper” 
could also give the impression that it is connected to the person who provides the 
shipping services, i.e. the shipowner or the charterer.11 The simplest way in which the 
shipper can be defined is someone who ships goods.12 Various definitions of the shipper 
may be found in the dictionaries. In one,13 it is defined in the ordinary context as one 
that consigns or receives goods for transportation. In a more business or professional 
context a shipper has been defined as a person or company in the business of shipping 
freight. 14 In a business dictionary,15 the shipper is defined as the consignor, seller or 
exporter who may all be the same or each be different parties, who are named in the 
shipping documents as the party responsible for initiating a shipment, and who may also 
be the one to bear the freight cost. It is interesting to note that from a business definition, 
a shipper can also refer to the shipping container.16 An old definition of the shipper is 
one who ships or puts goods on board of a vessel, and these goods are to be carried to 
another place during the vessel’s voyage. This definition also refers to the general idea 
                                                          
10 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/shipper 
11 This was actually thought of by a prominent consultant shipping analyst, Richard Scott, Managing 
Director of Bulk Shipping Analysis (October 2013). 
12 WordNet 3.0, Princeton University, 2012. 
13 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000, Houghton Miffin Company, 
updated 2009). 





that the shipper is bound to pay for the hire of the vessel or the freight of the goods.17 
What is even more interesting, is a definition which not only states that the shipper is the 
owner of the goods put on board the vessel, but that the shipper intrusts them for delivery 
abroad, and the arrangement for this may be by charterparty or otherwise.18 It appears as 
a form of acknowledgement or acceptance that a shipper may not only exist under a bill 
of lading as is commonly expressed. Another definition where the shipper is a person or 
company who takes on the organising of sending goods form one place to another 
conveys the definition of the shipper in a perspective with more responsibility involved 
than just delivering the goods.19 
From these general definitions above, it is already apparent that there are inconsistencies 
and discrepancies as to what a shipper can or cannot be. Among others, not only can a 
shipper be a person who sends goods in any mode of transport, he could be the person 
who sends or receives the goods. The shipper could be used to refer to the role of 
consignor, seller and exporter even though they are three different people. This cannot 
be practical if they were parties in the same transaction as there would certainly be 
confusion and a mishap is bound to occur. A shipper is also understood as referring to a 
container which again will create problems. The shipper may not be thought to be 
distinguished from a shipowner or charterer since they can all ship goods since that is 
the focus of the definition. These definitions show that in the practical sense, there could 
be many cases of misunderstandings and disagreements as to who the shipper is. 
In philosophical studies of identity, it is argued that one way of identifying something is 
by comparing it with something else and explaining what their differences are.20 Thus 
identifying a shipper could be done by comparing it with some other similar or connected 
entity for instance consignees, freight forwarders, manufacturers, carriers and etc. In this 
chapter, there are indeed sections which require a discussion of the shipper in the context 
of its relationship or similarity to such other entities. 
 
 
                                                          
17 John Bouvier, Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States, (1856). 
18 Black’s Law Dictionary Free Online 2nd Ed. http://thelawdictionary.org/shipper/ 
19 Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary & Thesaurus, Cambridge University Press. 
20 David Morley and Kevin Robins, Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural 
Boundaries (Routledge 1995). 
22 
 
Definition in Law - The Legal Construct of the Shipper 
Introduction 
In order to determine the current legal construction of the shipper, it is important to find 
the existing, if any, legal constructs in its various forms and integrate and reconcile the 
fragments where possible, and to develop a working legal definition of the shipper. In 
the various sources of law which follow, two aspects of the legal construction of the 
shipper will be considered; the conceptual form and the substantive scope. 
International Conventions 
It is apt that the definition of the shipper be provided by the various international 
conventions which have been passed in order to seek and regulate a better relationship 
between the shipper and the carrier. There are four currently in existence; the earliest 
being the Hague Rules signed in 1924, followed by the Hague-Visby Rules signed in 
1968, the Hamburg Rules signed in 1978 and the latest one being the Rotterdam Rules 
adopted in 2008. In the Hague21 and Hague-Visby Rules,22 the shipper is not directly 
defined, but is stated in the definition of the carrier, the latter defined as including “the 
owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper”.23 In the 
Hamburg Rules,24  the indirect definition of the shipper remains,25 although the carrier 
in these rules may be any person, not just the owner or the charterer. However, in the 
Hamburg Rules the shipper is also more directly defined in its own provision26 albeit in 
a rather ambiguous way, as “any person by whom or in whose name or on whose behalf 
a contract of carriage of goods by sea has been concluded with a carrier, or any person 
by whom or in whose name or on whose behalf the goods are actually delivered to the 
carrier in relation to the contract of carriage by sea”.27 This definition has been criticised 
as displaying a certain level of incertitude due to the (over) use of the conjunction “or”.28 
                                                          
21 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, signed 
at Brussels, August 25, 1924. 
22 The Hague Rules 1924 as amended by the “Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading”, adopted at Brussels, February 23, 1968. 
23 Art. 1(a) is similar in both the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules. 
24 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, signed at Hamburg on March 31, 1978. 
25 ibid Art. 1(1). 
26 This convention is said to be more pro-shipper. 
27 Hamburg Rules, Art. 1(3). 
28 Stefano Zunarelli, ‘The Liability of the Shipper’ [2002] LMCLQ 350. 
23 
 
As the seller of goods, the shipper generally complements the carrier contractually. 
However, the shipper under the Hamburg Rules would include the supplier.29 
In the Rotterdam Rules30 again the indirect definition of the shipper is to be found in the 
definition of the carrier along similar lines to the Hamburg Rules.31 However, the 
Rotterdam Rules do also provide a separate definition of the shipper. In fact, the rules 
distinguish between two types of shippers. The first is the shipper32, who is “a person 
that enters into a contract of carriage with a carrier”. The second is the documentary 
shipper, who is “a person, other than the shipper, that accepts to be named as “shipper” 
in the transport document or electronic transport record.”33 Since there may arise 
situations where the name was inadvertently or for some other cause inserted in the 
document as “shipper”, the provision has been considered as a situation where there is a 
presumption that, unless the name was inserted without authority or by mistake, the 
person named ‘accepts’ to be named as the shipper.34 However, the original wordings 
used in the draft article 33 were “accepts the transport document or electronic record”35 
and this was used as the condition upon which such person assumes the contractual 
shipper’s rights and obligations. This was changed to the current form in order to better 
convey the requirement that an FOB seller who is named as the shipper in the transport 
document accepts to assume the rights and obligations of the contractual shipper.36 The 
subject matter of acceptance being the name of the FOB seller being put down as the 
shipper in the transport document instead of merely accepting the transport document 
reinforces this perspective. The provision is then split into two where firstly the act of 
acceptance to be named as the shipper defines the documentary shipper in article 1(9) 
and secondly by default, a separate provision, now article 33 provides for the assumption 
by the documentary shipper of the rights and obligations of the contractual shipper.  
Moreover, another writer’s view is that the possibility of freight forwarders or 
forwarding agents having their names put down in the transport document and not 
knowing this means consenting to acting as principal is rather unlikely.37 The rules 
                                                          
29 Report of the First Meeting of the International Sub-Committee on Issues of Transport Law, CMI 
Yearbook 2000, p 190. 
30 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by 
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31 ibid Art. 1(5). 
32 ibid Art. 1(8). 
33 ibid Art. 1(9). 
34 “The Rotterdam Rules”, A. Diamond [2009] LMCLQ 445. 
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impose upon the documentary shipper with obligations and liabilities towards the carrier 
in the same way and to the same extent as the shipper under the rules. This means that 
the rules make no distinction between the actual shipper and the contractual shipper in 
relation to obligations of the shipper to the carrier. Likewise, the rules afford both with 
the same rights and defences.38 
The purpose of the provision on the documentary shipper is to impose upon the FOB 
seller, who is not in a contractual relationship with the carrier, with the shipper’s 
obligations. It also applies to freight forwarders and forwarding agents whose name may 
be filled in the box with the label “shipper”.39 Although this may be a matter of concern 
for FOB sellers,40 an optimistic view of this is that the provision was actually created in 
order to accommodate sellers who, not being a party to the contract of carriage, need to 
have possession of the original negotiable transport documents in order to secure 
payment.41According to Berlingieri, when the original article 35 was drafted, the term 
“consignor” which was defined as “a person that delivers the goods to the carrier or a 
performing party for carriage” was used. However, the “consignor” was only able to 
obtain a receipt from the carrier for delivering the goods to him whereas the “shipper” 
was entitled to obtain a negotiable transport document. Since an FOB seller could also 
come under the definition of the “consignor”, there was concern that the FOB seller 
would not be adequately protected. This is why the term “consignor” was changed to 
“documentary shipper”, and changes were made to the provisions of article 35 which 
enables the FOB seller to obtain the negotiable transport document. Thus it would be a 
case of the FOB seller actually wanting to be named as “shipper” in the transport 
document and requiring consent for this from the buyer.42 
Article 1(10) of the Rotterdam Rules also makes reference to the identity of the shipper 
in its definition of “holder”, which includes a person in possession of a negotiable 
transport document which is an order document and identifies him as the shipper or 
consignee or is the person to which the document is endorsed.43 
There is another group of people mentioned in the Rotterdam Rules who are not referred 
to as the shipper but who may perform the same tasks and obligations as the shipper due 
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to the shipper delegating or entrusting them with those tasks and obligations. These 
involve any persons including, but not limited to employees, agents and subcontractors. 
The rules make the shipper answerable for the acts of all these persons to whom the 
shipper has delegated his obligations.44 Thus it is quite important to whom the label of 
shipper or documentary shipper is given, rather than who actually are the persons 
performing the obligations of the shipper. 
Travaux Preparatoires to the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea - the Hamburg Rules 1978 
The Hamburg Rules is considered to be the birthplace of the statutory definition of the 
shipper45 due to the lack of such definition in the previous two conventions on carriage 
by sea.46 Although the term ‘shipper’ may be equated with ‘cargo owner’, this may not 
necessarily be the case. A discussion on whether the shipper or the consignee will be the 
cargo owner was made in the third session of the Working Group III.47 For their purpose 
the shipper is deemed to be the seller and the consignee the buyer. The cargo owner is 
considered to be the party which will commence action against the carrier as claimant 
for loss or damage of the goods. Whether the shipper or the consignee becomes the 
claimant and thus the cargo owner depends on the international terms of shipping used 
in the contract of sale for example CIF, FOB, C&F and FAS, as this determines when 
property passes and the risk is transferred to the buyer. It is said that where maritime 
shipment is used in sales transactions the risk of loss of the goods in transit is usually 
borne by the buyer, since damage or loss of the goods could only have had been 
identified and ascertained at the delivery end. 
The History of the Rotterdam Rules Relevant to Shippers 
It is not here intended to explain the complete history of the Rotterdam Rules as it is 
rather lengthy and complicated due to the rather ambitious nature of the project reflected 
in the painstaking efforts made at getting as many stakeholders involved as possible and 
producing something that could possibly satisfy as many interests in maritime transport 
in as balanced a way as possible. The historical perspectives of the rules may be found 
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in various other sources48 in more detail, but suffice here that the gist of what took place 
be laid out, in order to appreciate where the rules are coming from, in order to better 
understand the nature of the relevant provisions on the shipper and shipper liability for 
cargo for the purposes of this research. 
The Rules are a result of cooperation between two leading international bodies involved 
in commercial transport; the Comite Maritime International (CMI) and the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The CMI started work 
on it as early as the 12th April 1988 by authorising Professor Francesco Berlingieri to 
find out whether the issue of uniformity of the law of the carriage of goods by sea was 
pertinent enough to be placed on the agenda of their 1990 Paris Conference as well as to 
come up with the proposed solutions.49 This led to the publication of a report in 1991 by 
the professor50 and the establishment of a Working Group by the CMI Executive Council 
in 1994 to look at the various regimes on carriage of goods by sea which were then in 
existence as to whether they were still satisfactory or viable. The Working Group was 
also asked to prepare a questionnaire to be put to the various National Maritime Law 
Associations (MLAs) worldwide. An international sub-committee was set up which 
looked at the uniformity aspects of the law of carriage of goods by sea in particular, led 
by Professor Berlingieri (the Uniformity Sub-Committee), followed by the creation of a 
steering committee. 
On the part of UNCITRAL, at its 29th Session in 1996, it was proposed that a review of 
the current practices and law of the international carriage of goods by sea be made part 
of its work programme. When CMI found out, a meeting was held between 
representatives of the two to initiate possible cooperation in a common agenda. 
Thereafter in 1998-99 the CMI Assembly appointed a Working Group on Issues of 
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Transport Law which drew up another questionnaire for National MLAs followed by 
analysis of the responses. These became the basis for discussion by a new international 
sub-committee established by the CMI, which also prepared a draft Instrument. Although 
at first issues of liability were not included as part of the Working Group’s consideration; 
although they did form part of the work done by the Uniformity Sub-Committee, 
following request from representatives of the industry at the “Round Table” set up by 
the Executive Council and submission of the report by the Uniformity Sub-Committee, 
the CMI proposed to UNCITRAL that the issues of liability be included.51 Following 
consideration, amendments and approval by the Executive Council, that draft Instrument 
was submitted to UNCITRAL in 2001. 
In the CMI Draft Outline Instrument to be considered at the CMI Conference in 
Singapore in 2001, there were two categories of shipper; one is the shipper and the other, 
the contracting shipper. In the Draft Outline Instrument (the Draft) a shipper is a broad 
term which includes both the different types of shippers that are defined in the Draft and 
these different shippers are not mutually exclusive.52 It was also acknowledged there that 
a contractual shipper is often the consignor. The Draft also considered the definition of 
the shipper used in the Hamburg Rules53 and noted the similar inclusive nature of the 
definition there but distinguished its incapability of separating the two categories or 
“possibilities” of shipper, the term used in the Draft. It also talked about considering a 
third possibility where the party identified in the transport document as the shipper could 
also be a part of the shipper definition. It was proposed there that this shipper be labelled 
the documentary shipper. However in the Draft that category was not included within 
the definition of the shipper but instead was made part of the provisions on the holder of 
the bill of lading, namely the first holder.54 
The two possibilities of shipper in the Draft were that a shipper was either a contracting 
shipper or a consignor. A contracting shipper was proposed to mean the person who 
enters into the contract of carriage with the contracting carrier,55 whereas a consignor 
was the person from whom a carrier receives the goods.56 Both the definitions of the 
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contracting shipper and the consignor in part was imported from the definition of the 
shipper in the Hamburg Rules57; the beginning part of Article 1.3 for the former and the 
end part of that Article for the latter; combined with ideas from the CMI International 
Sub-Committee on Issues of Transport Law. It was recommended in the Draft that when 
referring to a type of shipper, the term “shipper” alone should not be used. Rather, in 
order to clearly distinguish it from another type of shipper, it should be labelled with an 
identifiable type of shipper from the role that it plays or the manner in which the role 
was assumed, and this is the justification how the label “contracting shipper” came about, 
since such a shipper enters into the contract of carriage. It was much in the same way 
parallel to the way the reference to different types of carriers was proposed in the same 
Draft. Also, the approach used in the Hamburg Rules where the phrase “in whose name 
or on whose behalf” was referred to and dismissed as superfluous since a shipper who 
enters into the contract in his own name is thus the contracting shipper, as also is a 
shipper who enters into the contract through an agent on his behalf. 
As for the other possible type of shipper, the consignor, again it was thought that it should 
be labelled as a particular type of shipper in order to be clearly distinguished as opposed 
to just using the label “shipper”. “Delivering shipper” or “consigning shipper” was what 
was thought could aptly describe their role of delivering the goods to the carrier, however 
there was concern that such terms were rather queer and unconventional in particular to 
the industry never having accustomed to such labels. Thus it was thought best in keeping 
with the commercial practice of referring to such a shipper as just consignor. Recognition 
nonetheless was made by the Working Group that such a consignor could consist of not 
only the seller of the goods whether or not he has delivered the goods to the carrier 
himself or has required an agent to deliver the goods on his behalf, for instance freight 
forwarders or trucking companies; it could also include the freight forwarders and 
trucking companies themselves since they are indeed the ones who have physically 
delivered the goods to the carrier.58 The UNCITRAL also established its own Working 
Group on Transport Law to come up with its own draft instrument.  
The dominant underlying objective of the Rotterdam Rules appear to be achieving 
uniformity above all else in the currently fragmented situation concerning the law of 
international carriage of goods by sea. This was specifically the view of UNCITRAL 
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when in 199659 it requested CMI and other organisations to look into the current state of 
the law on carriage of goods by sea. At the time when the Rotterdam Rules were being 
drafted not only were there already in existence three different conventions on carriage 
of goods by sea emerging over the years; each of which has achieved its own level of 
acceptance but all have failed to achieve the required level of global acceptance by the 
shipping community worldwide needed for a single, strong, international uniform law; 
they have each not even been universally applied in a uniform way. This problem is 
further aggravated by states resorting to producing its own version of regional solutions 
and passing national laws to suit their own needs. Thus, although the thorough process 
of getting views from as many sectors and interested parties to carriage of goods by sea 
were in effort during the drafting of the Rotterdam Rules were emphasised, the main 
objective of achieving uniformity would mean that as much as a win-win situation was 
sought after, ultimately some sacrifices almost certainly had to be made. 
 The three conventions were also considered to be outdated, the latest one being more 
than 30 years old, created at a time when so many technological advances so integral to 
efficient commercial activity today were not in existence that significant gaps have 
become evidently clear. Thus the other background against which the Rotterdam Rules 
must be understood is the reflection of the usage of modern, high technology shipping 
equipment as well as information and communication technology which marks the 
feature of shipping practice today. 
The other significant feature of the Rotterdam Rules is the widening of the ambit of the 
Rules to accommodate multimodal transportation of goods, another feature of today’s 
international carriage of goods. The Rules thus not only deal with the sea leg of the 
carriage but also covers the complete regime from door-to-door. Therefore the 
characteristics of the Rules would not be peculiar to only activities identifiable with 
carriage of goods by sea but encompasses carriage by road and rail as well. 
 
 
                                                          





Travaux Preparatoires to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea - the “Rotterdam Rules” 
2008 
The discussions in the preliminary work to the session of the Working Group III60 
regarding the two different types of freight forwarders in international transport led to 
the meaning of the shipper. Although generally freight forwarders are not regarded as 
shippers being only regarded instead as the shipper’s agent, apparently a distinction can 
be made between two basic types of freight forwarders, which led to an exception to this 
principle. The first is the description of the former type mentioned above, where the 
freight forwarder is an agent and strictly an agent, usually of the shipper but occasionally 
for the carrier. Such freight forwarders arrange transportation of the goods and handle 
the administrative process on behalf of the shipper in relation to the transport. They do 
not issue the transport document neither are they responsible for the proper performance 
of the transport. From the carrier’s perspective, the carriage contract is between the 
carrier and the actual shipper, and not the freight forwarder in this context, being purely 
the agent and thus subject to the usual agency principles. 
The second type of freight forwarder is one which is the complete opposite of the first 
type and functions instead as a principal. Such a freight forwarder consolidates goods 
from smaller shipments from various shippers and takes on responsibility for their 
transport. It may also perform part of the carriage which may involve various modes and 
issues its own transport document. For the purposes of the contract of carriage, from the 
carrier’s perspective, this freight forwarder is the shipper with whom it contracts.61 
This document also talked about the issue of the freight forwarder acting as the 
multimodal transport operator but it does not discuss whether in this context the freight 
forwarder is also considered to be the shipper.62 
In the thirty-forth session of the UNCITRAL,63 the discussion on the possible scope of 
work of the Commission regarding the issue of transport documents when demanded by 
the shipper was included. It raised the issue regarding the lack of clarity as to who may 
be described as “the shipper” having the right to make the demand. It makes a distinction 
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between the contracting shipper, who is the party against whom the contract of carriage 
is binding, and the consignor, who is the party that delivered the goods to the carrier for 
carriage, possibly on the contracting shipper’s behalf, and some other party, all of whom 
might be defined as the shipper for this purpose.64 
The commentary to the draft provisions made in the 9th session of Working Group III, in 
particular the definition of consignor is relevant. At that stage the definition referred only 
to a “person” that delivers goods to a carrier as well as has the right to demand a receipt 
for goods delivered to the carrier. The consignor may be distinguished from the shipper 
since the provisions on the shipper responsibilities would only fall on the consignor if 
they were identified as the same person.65 The definition of shipper was commented 
upon as not expressly including the party on whose behalf the contract of carriage is 
entered into.66 
The draft provisions on the obligations of the shipper provided for the extension of the 
obligations and rights of the contracting shipper to a party in the contract who is 
identified as the shipper and who accepts the transport document or electronic record.67 
This is different to the final version which requires the party to only accept to be named 
as “shipper” in the transport document or electronic transport record. The commentary 
on this is that if the person is identified in the contract particulars as the shipper, this 
would allow standard clauses to be drafted which define and identify who is to be a 
shipper including the consignee. It refers to the similar approach taken in some standard 
bills of lading which use the term “merchant” to encompass the shipper, consignor, 
consignee and holder. It is then provided in those bills that the merchant takes on the 
responsibilities of the shipper.68 
The use of standard international sale terms for instance FOB or CIF will also determine 
who the shipper is. This was referred to in the commentary on the evidentiary value of a 
freight prepaid document which may be relied on by a party who is an extended services 
buyer because when the sale is on FOB terms the consignor may be the seller but the 
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shipper is the buyer and consignee. If the sale is CIF then the seller becomes the shipper 
and consignor.69 
Under the commentary on the right of control, the shipper is the controlling party when 
a non-negotiable document is issued or no transport document is issued, unless a 
different party was agreed by the shipper and consignee.70 According to Article 1 (12) 
of the Rotterdam Rules, the “right of control” of the goods refers to the right of the party 
under the contract of carriage to give instructions to the carrier in relation to the goods 
as provided in Chapter 10 of the Rules.71 Further details as to the kind of instructions 
which the shipper is entitled to give is discussed further in Chapter 3.72 
What follows is an account of what the courts of selected countries in various parts of 
the world have described, defined or referred to as the shipper. The selection of countries 
is on the basis of statistics on the top twenty countries73 with the highest total value of 
overall exports in 2015 in US dollars.74 Not all twenty countries can be included as there 
is difficulty in gaining access to laws in some of them. This would give the basis for the 
legal construct of the shipper, together with the statutory definitions provided in the 
Hamburg Rules and Rotterdam Rules, as well as the statutory definition found in certain 
jurisdictions such as the Maritime Code of China. These countries represent a sampling 
of civil and common law jurisdictions as examples of the variation which exists globally 
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According to maritime law scholars in China,75 The Chinese Maritime Code employs 
the definition of “shipper” taken from the Hamburg Rules only omitting the word “or” 
between the two categories of persons defined as “shipper”. Hence, as the writer rightly 
pointed out, in practice the issue remains as to who between the two ought to be the 
shipper if both requirements are fulfilled each by different persons, particularly in FOB 
contracts of sale. 
In an unnamed case in 1993, the plaintiff seller entered into an FOB contract of sale with 
the buyer consignee and the defendant was the carrier. The letter of credit required the 
bill of lading to name the buyer as the “shipper” which the seller duly complied and 
requested from the defendant’s agent. The letter of credit eventually expired which 
caused the order bill of lading to be no longer negotiable. When the goods arrived at the 
port of destination, naturally the carrier followed the instruction of the “shipper” and 
delivered to the receiver without presentation of the original bill of lading, hence the 
claim filed by the plaintiff against the carrier. It was held that the plaintiff, not being 
party to the bill of lading did not have the right to sue the carrier. 
Another similar circumstance occurred in another unnamed case at more or less the same 
time. The only difference is that this time it was a sale contract on C&F terms and so the 
seller’s name would normally have been put in the “shipper” column. However again, 
the letter of credit requirements forced the seller to name the buyer as “shipper” in not 
only the bill of lading but also the shipping order and booking note. The bill of lading 
issued by the carrier was “to order of bank” but unfortunately the bank refused to 
negotiate it due to the non-compliance of the bill of lading with the “sea-sea transport” 
in the letter of credit. When the goods arrived, the buyer took delivery without 
presentation of the original bill of lading resulting in the seller suing the carrier. In 
contrast the court in this case76 held that the seller was the shipper under Article 42(3)(b) 
of the Chinese Maritime Code because the judge relied on the physical act of the delivery 
of the goods to the carrier by the seller and that the sale contract was on the basis of C&F 
terms. 
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In the United States a commercial shipper is defined as  
“any person who is named as the consignor or consignee in a bill of lading 
contract who is not the owner of the goods being transported but who assumes 
the responsibility for payment of the transportation and other tariff charges for 
the account of the beneficial owner of the goods. The beneficial owner of the 
goods is normally an employee of the consignor and/or consignee. A freight 
forwarder tendering a shipment to a carrier in furtherance of freight forwarder 
operations is also a commercial shipper. The Federal government is a 
government bill of lading shipper, not a commercial shipper.”77 
A few cases decided by the courts in the United States provide some guidance as to the 
meaning of the term “shipper”. One such case is APL Co Pte Ltd v. UK Aerosols Ltd 78 
where in the bill of lading, UK Aerosol was named “shipper” whilst two others, Kamdar 
Global LLC and UG Co Inc were named “notify party” and “also notify party” 
respectively. Under the bill of lading, the “merchant”; defined as including the shipper, 
consignee, receiver, holder of the bill of lading, owner of the cargo or person entitled to 
possession of the cargo or having a present or future interest in the goods; was required 
to indemnify the carrier if the cargo caused loss as a result of improper packaging or if 
they were unsuitable for carriage. The issue in this case was whether a notify party is a 
shipper. The court, in holding that all three were liable, referred to several provisions of 
the US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.79 The first was section 4(3)80 which provides that 
the “shipper” of goods shall not be responsible for loss or damage sustained by the carrier 
without fault on the part of the “shipper”. However the Act itself does not define 
“shipper” and the court held that the two notify parties were not “shippers” for these 
purposes. The court also referred to section 1(b) of the same Act which defines “contract 
of carriage” and makes a distinction between a “shipper” and a “holder” of a bill of 
lading. The third section referred to is section 3(3) which requires an original bill of 
lading to be issued by the carrier to the “shipper” upon demand by the “shipper”. Hence 
                                                          
77 49 CFR 375.103 [Title 49 – Transportation; Subtitle B Other Regulations Relating to Transportation; 
Chapter III Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Department of Transportation; Subchapter B 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations; Part 375 Transportation of Household Goods in Interstate 
Commerce; Consumer Protection Regulations; Subpart A General Requirements]. 
78 (2009) 582 F 3d 947; 2009 AMC 2113 (2d Cir). 
79 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936 Title 46 United States Code SS 1300-1315. 
80 Section 4(3) is equivalent to Art IV, r 3 of the Hague Rules. 
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the court views that if consignees, who are what notify parties are, are “shippers” there 
would be a burden on carriers to issue original bills of lading to multiple parties, which 
would lead to commercial inefficiency. Likewise the guarantee by the shipper under 
section 3(5) regarding information provided to the carrier as well as the responsibility to 
indemnify the carrier in case of inaccuracies was held by the court as making it unlikely 
that the “shipper” could be anyone but the person who delivers the goods to the carrier. 
The reason why UG and Kamdar were liable to indemnify the carrier was because they 
fell within the definition of “merchant” under the bill of lading.81 
Another instructive decision from the United States is Re M/V Rickmers Genoa 
Litigation82where the buyer was a parent company located in the United States while the 
seller was its subsidiary located in China. The purchase was made under a CIF contract 
and so the necessary arrangements to transport the cargo of chemicals were performed 
by the Chinese corporation. When the cargo exploded following the collision of the ship 
carrying it with another, the carrying ship and its other cargo were damaged. The carrier 
sought to sue the parent company as buyer-consignee. This is following the bill of lading 
clause which again defines the “merchant” broadly as encompassing the buyer-
consignee. The carrier argued that this, together with the broad definition of “shipper” 
in the Shipping Act83 should be used to determine who the shipper is. The court held that 
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act imposes liability on the shipper towards the carrier for 
the goods shipped but does not impose any duty on the receiver, as a purchaser is clearly 
not within the scope of its application for these purposes. The duty to warn the carrier 
about the dangerous nature of the goods comes about as a result of placing the goods for 
shipment. This act was done by the seller as the shipper and not the purchaser.84  
Although this is correct in principle, however in a case such as this, the shipment was 
instigated by the purchaser who is also a parent company. As a parent company it holds 
control over its subsidiary and arguably makes all the decisions including whether to 
warn the carrier regarding the dangerous nature of the goods. It may even, in some cases, 
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have better knowledge regarding the goods than the sender itself, who is merely 
following instructions. 
Another case which dealt with the identity of the shipper is Nippon Yusen Kaisha v FIL 
Lines85 where the defendant, FIL was named as consignee and notify party whereas LCL 
or Freight India was named as shipper in the 24 bills of lading. The plaintiff, NYK 
claimed against FIL for the freight charges. FIL denied on the basis that they were only 
acting as agents of the shipper. Clause 23(6) makes all parties defined as the Merchant 
jointly and severally liable to the carrier for freight charges. The definition of the 
Merchant in Clause 1 includes among others the shipper, consignee and any other person 
acting on their behalf. This is a very common clause in bills of lading. Although FIL did 
not take actual delivery of the cargo, the ultimate consignee being LCL and Freight India, 
they were invoiced by the plaintiff for the freight. FIL was held liable for the shipper on 
the basis that it was not clear in the bill of lading that they were acting as agents for the 
shipper. 
In the case of MSC Mediterranean v Metal Worldwide,86 the term shipper was not used. 
Instead, throughout the judgement the term “Merchant” as used in the bill of lading 
referred to Metal Worldwide, the person who contracted with the carrier to transport a 
cargo of shredded steel in containers that were purportedly loaded and sealed by the 
supplier of the shredded steel scrap. 
From these cases, it can be seen that there are many reasons why a party can be liable as 
a shipper. It may depend on whether it would lead to convenience or commercial 
inefficiency, the construction of the terms of the contract as evidenced by the bill of 
lading, the act of placing goods for shipment, the relationship between the shipper and 
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Section 513 87 of Book 5 88 of the Handelsgesetzbutch 89 deals with the entitlement to 
the issuance of a bill of lading. In subsection(2)” The “Ablader” shall be defined as the 
party which delivers the goods to the carrier for carriage and which has been designated 
as Ablader by the shipper so as to be recorded as such in the bill of lading. If a party 
other than the Ablader delivers the goods for carriage, or if no party has been designated 
as Ablader, then the shipper shall be deemed to be the Ablader.” 
This provision makes the shipper involved in the procedure since the basis for 
determining the Ablader is delivery of the goods plus nomination by the shipper. 
Otherwise the shipper will be the Ablader by default if he does not nominate the person 
who delivers the goods or, if someone apart from the nominated Ablader delivers the 
goods. Either way the shipper has to be involved in the process which requires proper 
consideration by the shipper. 
The Nordic Countries 
Under Article 13:1 of the new Swedish Maritime Code,90 a distinction is made between 
the shipper and the sender. The sender is the one who enters into the contract for carriage 
of general cargo with the carrier whereas the shipper is the one who delivers the goods 
to the carrier for carriage. The terminology in the Scandinavian maritime law is quite 
peculiar in itself as even the parties to a charter party are not the owner and charterer as 
in English law but are rather referred to as the carrier and the charterer. The Nordic 
Maritime Codes go back a long way to the late 19th century and drafted as common 
Nordic legislation.91 This is probably why in the bills of lading the term merchant is used 
and it encompasses all the different terms used in different countries including shipper, 
sender and consignor or consignee. 
                                                          
87 Chapter 2 Transport Contracts, Subchapter 1 Contracts for the carriage of goods by sea, Title 1 Contract 
for carriage of general cargo, Subtitle 3 Accompanying documents, Section 513 Entitlement to issuance 
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The Norwegian Maritime Code92 also employs the same distinction. Section 25193 
provides that the sender is the person who enters into a contract of carriage with the 
carrier for the carriage of general cargo by sea, while the shipper is the person who 
delivers the cargo for carriage. The Code uses the same definition for the shipper whether 
the carriage is made under a bill of lading or a charterparty. Section 321 provides that 
the shipper is the person who delivers the cargo for loading.94 It is noted that although 
this section sits in the chapter on chartering of ships, there is no definition given to 
charterers. This may give the impression that the charterer is the shipper since the 
meaning given to it resembles in part to charterers and there is no other definition of 
charterer. The term “charterer” is however, used in the subsequent provisions instead of 
the term “shipper”. Also, the definition of the carrier in this section makes reference to 
the charterer as the person the carrier contracts with in chartering out a ship. In section 
251 the carrier is also the person with whom the sender enters into a contract for the 
carriage of general cargo by sea.95 
The code also speaks of the “cargo owner” in its provisions but it is not defined.96 A 
clear and careful understanding of each of these persons is thus required since although 
they are seemingly similar, the roles and duties which each one is subject to is quite 
different from the other.97 This however takes into account the likelihood that the 
shipper, sender, charterer and cargo owner could well be different people and makes 
clear each of their responsibilities. 
In Denmark the position is slightly different. The Danish Merchant Shipping Act 
(Consolidation),98 section 25199 provides the definition of the shipper and the consignor. 
                                                          
92 Act No. 39 of 1994. 
93 This section is on definitions. It can be found under Part IV. Contracts of Carriage, Chapter 13. Carriage 
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to the carrier when the cargo owner cannot be contacted for obtaining specific instructions on how to deal 
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97 This will be discussed in the following chapter on Shipper Liability under National Law, Chapter 3. 
98 Consolidation act no. 75 of 17 January 2014. 
99 This section sits under IV Contracts, Part 13 Regarding Carriage of Goods. 
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The shipper is the person who enters into a contract of carriage100 with the carrier 
whereas the consignor is the person who delivers the goods for carriage.101 The Act 
however also makes mention of the cargo owner102 much in the same way as the 
Norwegian Maritime Code.103 
In the Finnish Maritime Code,104 they have the contracting shipper and the actual 
shipper.105 The contracting shipper is considered as the sender and this is the person who 
concludes the contract for the carriage of goods by sea with the carrier.106 The actual 
shipper is the person who delivers the goods to the carrier for carriage.107 Again the term 
cargo owner is used but not defined. Presumably it is literally what it is described to be. 
The provisions relating to the cargo owner are similar to the ones in the Norwegian 
Maritime Code as well as the Danish Merchant Shipping Act (Consolidation), where in 
there are two sections that deal with cargo owners. The first section108 deals with 
situations where necessity arises to take special measures to protect the cargo and the 
cargo owner’s interests, the carrier should attempt to obtain instructions from the cargo 
owner first. If this is not possible, then the carrier is authorised to act on behalf of the 
cargo owner to take those special measures. The second section 109will create liability on 
the cargo owner to reimburse the carrier for the special measures taken by the latter. 
From the above it can be observed that, even within the same region, there can be 
multiple ways in which the shipper can be defined or other terms used to describe the 
characteristics of the shipper, but yet not put together as part of the meaning given to the 
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term “shipper”. This naturally raises the concern for the likely chances of dispute if the 
terms are not properly understood especially by parties unfamiliar with the system.110 
Netherlands 
In the Dutch Civil Code,111 the definition of the shipper can be found in the definition of 
a ‘time or voyage charter’. According to article 8:373 paragraph 1: 
 
“1. A time or voyage charter in the sense of the present Section (Section 
8.5.2) is a contract of carriage of goods under which the carrier has 
engaged himself to transport goods on board of a ship, which he, other 
than by way of bareboat chartering, places in its entirety or in part, and 
whether or not on a time base (time charter or voyage charter), at the 
disposal of the consignor (shipper).” 
Then paragraph 2 goes on to say: 
 
“2. In the present Section (Section 8.5.2) the term ‘lessor’ shall mean 
‘carrier’ as mentioned in paragraph 1, and the term ‘charterer’ shall mean 
‘consignor’ (‘shipper’) as mentioned in paragraph 1.” 
This would mean that in this jurisdiction, a voyage charterer or a time charterer is 
expressly within the definition of the “shipper”. This is contrary to the common 
understanding given to the term “shipper” under a charterparty as the charterer, even if 
sending goods himself, is governed by the charterparty and referred to as the charterer, 
whilst the shipper is someone other than the charterer who sends goods within the same 
arrangement but is governed by the bill of lading. Charterers are normally taken out of 
the ambit of the definition of “shipper” in international conventions and left to national 
law to regulate its liability. 
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S.3(3) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 preserves the liability of the shipper as 
the original party to the contract of carriage notwithstanding the imposition of the same 
liabilities on other persons subsequent to shipment by the Act. There is no direct 
definition to be found within the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 112 nor in the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act 1971 since it applies the Hague-Visby Rules. 
Leggatt J in the English case of MSC Mediterranean v Cottonex 113 referred to Clause 1 
in the bill of lading which referred to the shipper as one of the persons included within 
the term “Merchant”. This is a common term found in bills of ladings. Since Clause 2 
made all the persons defined as merchant jointly and severally liable to the carrier for all 
the liabilities of the merchant, the shipper could therefore take on all of the liability of 
the merchant. 
It is interesting to note that even a party which is only technically responsible for loading 
the cargo onto the ship for the FOB seller has also been referred to as the actual shipper. 
In another English court decision of The Crudesky,114 the FOB seller of crude oil, Vitol 
had failed to comply with procedures of loading at a Nigerian port due to the act of the 
terminal operator, Total, in loading the cargo without compliance with the Procedure 
Guides. Teare J referred to Total as the actual shipper through which Vito’s obligation 
as FOB seller to ship the cargo could be performed.115 Here the words ‘to ship’ and 
‘actual shipper’ apparently refer to the act of delivering cargo to the carrier and loading 
the cargo onto the ship. 
Canada 
In the case of Boutique Jacob Inc. v Pantainer Ltd.,116 the plaintiff, Boutique Jacob Inc 
purchased textile pieces from a Hong Kong supplier. In order to transport the cargo from 
Hong Kong to Montreal, the plaintiff through Panalpina Inc, contracted with Pantainer 
Ltd, a non-vessel operating carrier and was issued bills of lading by the latter. Pantainer 
Ltd then contracted with Orient Overseas Container Line Ltd which in turn contracted 
with the Canadian Pacific Railway to carry the cargo from Vancouver to Montreal by 
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rail. A train derailment caused the loss of all the cargoes. Boutique Jacob brought claims 
against all of them and all but one were able to rely on limitation of liability clauses 
directly or indirectly.  
At trial, the Canadian Pacific Railway was prevented by section 137 of the Canada 
Transportation Act117 from limiting its liability against the shipper if there was no written 
agreement signed by the shipper, which there clearly was not between Boutique Jacob 
and the Canadian Pacific Railway. The latter then appealed to the Federal Court of 
Appeal which referred to section 6 of the Canada Transportation Act for the definition 
of the “shipper”. It held that “shipper” within section 137 of the Canada Transportation 
Act means the “one that, given the possibilities available, made a concrete decision to 
call on a rail carrier rather than another carrier” and has a direct connection and real 
control over the negotiations made with the carrier in coming to an agreement. The 
shipper in this case therefore, is the entity that contracted directly with the rail carrier; 
Orient not Boutique Jacob. Since there was a written agreement between Canadian 
Pacific Railway and Orient, the former could limit its liability.  
This definition of the shipper relies solely on whether the party directly entered into a 
contract of carriage with the carrier, much like the definition in the Rotterdam Rules. 
Hong Kong 
An interesting case which offers guidance in determining the identity of the shipper is 
Foshan Sundy Trade Co Ltd v Air Sea Transport (HK) Ltd.118 The plaintiff seller sued 
the defendant carrier for misdelivery of the cargo to the buyer, BSL without presentation 
of the bill of lading nor taking instructions from the plaintiff. The defendant had done so 
because BSL informed them that they had lost the bill of lading and provided the carrier 
with a letter of indemnity and guarantee in exchange for the release of the cargo. The 
defendant claimed that they regarded BSL as the shipper because they dealt only with 
BSL. They took instructions from the latter since it was BSL who placed the shipping 
order and informed them that one Ms. L would collect the bill of lading and pay the 
freight charges. Ms. L was actually the plaintiff’s representative who had come to the 
defendant’s office for the above purposes, but the defendant claimed to not know this. 
In the bill of lading the plaintiff is named as the shipper whereas BSL is the notify party. 
Nevertheless, the defendant asserted that since it had followed the instructions of the 
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‘shipper’, even though it had released the goods without presentation of the bill of lading, 
it was not in breach of its obligations in the contract of carriage. 
The court held that the identity of the shipper is indisputable since the plaintiff is named 
in the bill of lading as the shipper and it is the defendant who issued the bill of lading as 
carrier. Whether or not Ms L had properly identified herself as a representative of the 
plaintiff is immaterial. The bill of lading is also consistent with other communication by 
fax from BSL to the defendant which indicated that the plaintiff is the shipper. The court 
thus made its decision based on all the documentary evidence as to whom the ‘shipper’ 
label was given rather than the conduct of the parties and how the business was 
conducted. 
In an unreported judgment of the case Kind Respect Ltd v Apex Logistics Ltd,119  the 
defendant was a freight forwarder whereas the plaintiff was an associated company of 
PH, the supplier of the goods, in charge of sales transactions. A sales transaction was 
entered between the plaintiff and PE on FOB terms. PE then through the freight 
forwarder on the receiving side, S, engaged the defendant to transport the goods and so 
the plaintiff handed the goods to the defendant for shipment. The defendant issued the 
bills of lading to the plaintiff which named the plaintiff as the shipper and signed by the 
defendant as agent of the carrier. However since the amount of cargo shipped was small, 
it had to share the space in the container with goods belonging to someone else. In this 
situation, the carrier issued the defendant with a master bill of lading wherein the 
defendant is named as ‘shipper’ and S is named the ‘consignee’. It can be observed here 
that the term ‘shipper’ refers to different parties in different documents even though it is 
for the shipment of the same goods. That would mean that in this circumstance a person 
is regarded as a ‘shipper’ only by the person to whom the goods were directly delivered 
to. When the latter delivers the goods to the next person, he in turn becomes the ‘shipper’. 
In BDP Asia Pacific Limited v Longtex Apparel Group (HK) Company Limited120, the 
defendant agent was found liable despite claiming it was not the contracting party and 
that its name did not appear as “shipper” on the shipping documents. The defendant was 
a trader who procured shipping services of the plaintiff for the manufacturer of the goods 
shipped. The practice of putting the manufacturer’s name in the shipping order as the 
“shipper” was said to be common. 
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The case of Red Chamber Co. v Lau Siu Man121 described the shipper in relation to one 
of the purposes of the bill of lading as a document of title and an important safeguard to 
the interest of the seller in being paid for the goods sold in the context of international 
trade where payment is made against delivery of documents. Upon receiving the goods 
the carrier issues the bill of lading to the seller or the shipper who then sends it to the 
buyer after the purchase price has been paid. The defendant, a cargo delivery service 
provider, was held to owe the shipper a duty of care to deliver the cargo to the person 
who can produce the bill of lading.122 There are many similar cases such as this where 
the shipper is identified by the parties as the owner of the goods, the seller of the goods 
or the manufacturer of the goods. 
A freight forwarder defendant was held liable as “shipper” in the case of Italia Marittima 
v Translink Shipping123 even though it was not named as shipper in the bill of lading 
because it was bound by the corresponding antecedent contracts contained in or 
evidenced by the respective shipping order and corresponding booking confirmation 
made on behalf of its customers, the named shipper in the bill of lading. The court held 
that ‘if the defendant does not fall within the definition of “shipper” in the “Merchant” 
definition, it would be against commercial reality to infer that the plaintiffs intended that 
the guarantee by the defendant in the antecedent contracts should be discharged and 
replaced only by an indemnity from a party (the named shipper) with whom the plaintiffs 
as carriers had no direct dealing.’124 The defendant was held to have contracted with the 
plaintiffs as a principal and not the named shipper’s agent in the antecedent contracts. 
The shipping order contained a guarantee by the “shipper” to indemnify the carrier 
against any claims by any other party as a result of inaccurate information provided by 
the “shipper” in the shipping order. Since the defendant freight forwarder was liable as 
a principal, this implies that it is deemed to be the shipper in the shipping order. The bill 
of lading also contained similar clauses but in there it was the “merchant” who has to 
indemnify the carrier. The carrier relied on the inclusive definition of “merchant” which 
included among others, the shipper. Here also the freight forwarder was deemed the 
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shipper as the court held that no supersession of the antecedent contracts was intended 
due to the reasons stated above. 
The Contractual Perspective 
The shipper is one of the persons with whom the carrier, whether it be the shipowner or 
the charterer, may enter into a contract of carriage. This is often concluded before loading 
commences and in the absence of express agreement may be implied from the acts of the 
shipper in surrendering the goods for carriage.125 Where the ship is under charter, the 
shipper may be a third party from the shipowner-charterer relationship or the charterer 
himself. If the charterer himself is the shipper, the charterparty governs his rights and 
obligations regarding the goods he ships, and not the bill of lading, so long as the bill of 
lading remains in his hands. The shipper may be the head time charterer who voyage 
charters the ship, or even the sub-charterer or sub-sub-charterer. However, if the shipper 
is a third party to the charterparty, the bill of lading governs the relationship between the 
shipper and the carrier, regardless of the terms of the charterparty, unless properly 
incorporated otherwise, and that the terms of the charterparty are not repugnant or 
contradictory to the terms of the bill of lading; otherwise the terms of the bill of lading 
will prevail.126  
Where the ship is not under charter, the shipper and the carrier are usually considered to 
be the original parties to the bill of lading contract. The shipper is named in the bill of 
lading. However, since the bill of lading is only evidence of the contract of carriage 
which is concluded before the bill of lading is issued, the named shipper may not be 
privy to the bill of lading contract.127The shipper may contract instead with a third party 
who then contracted with the carrier as principal, for example a freight forwarder. The 
shipper, as the original party to the contract evidenced by a bill of lading, is entitled to 
all the rights contained in the contract until he transfers them to another lawful holder of 
the bill.128 Upon transfer the shipper loses his rights under the bill of lading contract129 
apart from those which are not evidenced by the bill of lading itself, for example if he is 
also a charterer, his rights under the charterparty remain. However, a shipper under a sea 
waybill or a ship’s delivery order does not lose his contractual rights and these become 
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additional to the rights of the person named or identified in the sea waybill or delivery 
order.130 A person who is not the shipper but becomes a holder of the bill of lading would 
succeed to the rights and obligations of the shipper.131 
Although the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 created a mechanism for the transfer 
of contractual rights and liabilities under bills of ladings, it does not change the rule in 
The Giannis N.K.,132 where the House of Lords held that the shipper is not divested of 
his liability for shipment of dangerous goods, even after transfer of the bill of lading. 
Neither is the shipper, as the original contracting party, freed from his other liabilities 
under the contract after the bill of lading is transferred.133 
Since the shipper is the contracting party, he is the person with the right to sue for breach 
of contract, until he transfers the bill of lading. The shipper may also be liable to pay 
freight. 
The Charterparty Perspective 
The bill of lading names the shipper but the charterparty does not. This is because 
although both are documents relating to the carriage of goods, the former deals 
specifically with the contract to carry cargo whereas the latter deals specifically with the 
hire of the vessel. Nevertheless, by reference to the general meaning given to the shipper 
of goods as one who delivers the cargo to the shipowner134 for carriage, then although 
the term ‘shipper’ is not used in the charterparty to refer to the charterer specifically, the 
charterer who leases a vessel for the carriage of their own cargo would also qualify as a 
shipper. Even though there is a charterparty agreement between the charterer and the 
shipowner, a bill of lading would still be issued to the charterer for the receipt of the 
goods and in the bill of lading the charterer would be referred to as the shipper. However, 
this does not mean that there is a shipper only when there is a bill of lading. The issue 
then is whether the charterer will be imposed with dual obligations as both the charterer 
and the shipper, or only one or the other at one time depending on different 
considerations. It has been held that the bill of lading, when in the hands of the charterer 
acts merely as a receipt, and that the relationship between the charterer and the shipowner 
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is governed by the terms of the charterparty.135 This however, does not preclude the fact 
that the charterer remains to be the shipper. Since the terms of the charterparty and the 
bill of lading are not identical in entirety, and since they govern different aspects of the 
parties’ rights and duties, whenever issues are raised in relation to the shipper, although 
some of the charterparty terms may be referred to in order to resolve the issue as to their 
applicability, judges tend to deal with the role, rights and duties of the shipper separately 
from the position between the charterer and the shipowner, even though they may be the 
same person.136 For instance in The “Mata K”,137 the plaintiffs were the charterers of the 
defendants’ vessel under a voyage charter who also shipped cargo under bills of lading. 
The effect of terms in the bill of lading was dealt with by the judge from the aspect of 
the relationship between the plaintiffs and defendants as shippers and shipowners 
whereas the relationship between them as charterers and shipowners was expressly 
sidelined. However, when a time charterer instructs the master to receive certain cargo 
on board and the cargo is loaded at the charterer’s expense, then the cargo is loaded by 
or on behalf of the charterer for the purposes of the charter-party and the third party 
shipper is to be regarded as the charterer’s agent.138  
The Documentary Perspective 
The issue of the bill of lading 
The shipper is the person to whom the bill of lading is issued by a carrier by sea for 
goods shipped. In the Jordan II it was held at first instance that where the contracts are 
contained in or evidenced by bills of lading the reference to shippers is obvious since the 
person to whom the bill of lading is issued at the port of loading is the shipper, and that 
if the shipper was also the charterer the relationship between the shipper and the 
shipowner would be governed by the charterparty.139  
The shipper of goods can demand an issue of a bill of lading to record or evidence the 
contract of carriage.140 In the bill of lading the shipper may sometimes be referred to as 
‘the merchant’.141 Under article III rule 3 of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, the 
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shipper is the person to whom a carrier is imposed a contractual duty to issue on demand 
a bill of lading which shows certain specified information such as the goods’ apparent 
order and condition. One of the roles being played by the bill of lading at this stage is to 
fulfil the need for a receipt since an acknowledgement of receipt of the goods into 
custody is required. Deriving from this, it may be said that the shipper is defined as the 
person who presents the goods into the custody of the carrier for loading and carriage. 
The shipper may sometimes also be the seller of the goods.142 
The shipper may also be the person to whom the carrier will deliver the goods when they 
arrive at the place of delivery, if the shipment was specifically consigned to the former, 
or if the shipper never transferred the bill of lading to another person, for example where 
the goods were simply sent abroad by the shipper to its own factory. In practice the 
shipper decides whether to put the words “to order” in the “consignee” box,143 only after 
which it becomes transferable.144 Thus from here it can be seen that the shipper wears 
many hats according to the different roles that it plays. 
It is now common that in modern trade, details required by an underlying letter of credit 
are frequently set out in the bill of lading, since shippers are also the persons who fill in 
the bill of lading forms and present them to the master or carrier’s agent for signing and 
issuing.145 The shipper proposes the draft statement of the description and the apparent 
order and condition of the cargo in the draft bill of lading and mate’s receipt and submits 
them to the master and ship’s mate respectively for signing. The description is given by 
the charterer or the shipper on the charterer’s behalf under the charterparty.146  
In a voyage charter, the shipper acts jointly with the shipowner in the process of loading. 
The shipper must bring the cargo alongside the ship and lift it to the ship’s rail.147 The 
shipper is one of the persons to whom notice of readiness to load at the loadport must be 
given if the charter provides as such.148 A shipper may also be the charterer’s agent for 
the purpose of designating and procuring a loading or discharge place.149 The shipper is 
one of the persons to whom the master must give notice of inaccessibility to the port of 
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loading or discharge due to ice and the shipper is obliged to give fresh orders to an ice-
free port.150  
Where a straight bill of lading is used, delivery of the goods under this type of bill of 
lading is to the named consignee only and it is not transferable. Under such bills of 
lading, there may be an inference that the shipper is only acting as the agent of the 
consignee and that the named consignee is actually the shipper.151 This would be the case 
where goods are consigned with the agreement that property and risk passes upon 
shipment and not when the bill of lading is transferred. 
Definition in Bills of Lading 
In The Starsin the shipper was defined in one of the Makros Hout bills of lading as 
including the consignees, the receiver, and the owner of the goods, also the endorser and 
holder of the bill of lading, as well as the endorsee and holder of the bill of lading.152 
This shows that there is no one particular meaning given to the term ‘shipper’ as 
understood in the commercial sense since it can refer to any one of those persons. 
Likewise, many bills of lading employ the term “Merchant” to include the shipper and a 
combination of consignor, consignee, holder of the bill of lading, receiver of the goods, 
owner of the goods among others, and provide that they are all jointly and severally 
liable.153This has the potential of making the shipper liable for the failings of others 
named as merchant and vice versa.154 
Reference in standard charter forms 
In clause 33(5) of the Shellvoy form, the charterer is treated as though it were the shipper 
for the purposes of the rules in Article III rule 3 and 5 of the Hague-Visby Rules which 
are incorporated into the charterparty so as to make them applicable to particulars of the 
bills of lading issued under the charterparty, with regard to the rule on guarantee and 
indemnity applicable to the description of the cargo furnished by or on behalf of the 
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charterer.155 Perhaps the term ‘shipper’ is not used directly here possibly in order to avoid 
the Rules from applying comprehensively as opposed to selectively. However, this 
should not be the case since the Rules do not apply to charterparties unless specifically 
incorporated by the parties voluntarily. 
Mate’s Receipt 
The mate’s receipt also identifies who the shipper is in the document.156 However, 
notwithstanding the statements in contemporary documents including the mate’s receipt, 
where there is a conflict with the bill of lading, the conclusive evidence is to be found in 
the contract of affreightment evidenced by the bill of lading.157 
Shipper under a Sea Waybill 
In a sea waybill, there is also a shipper but the shipper is not defined exclusively. The 
term ‘shipper’ however, may be found in the definition of the term ‘merchant’. This term 
in the sea waybill encompasses not only the shipper but also the “consignee, receiver of 
the goods, any person owning or entitled to the possession of the goods or of this sea 
waybill and anyone acting on behalf of any such person”.158 This is then followed by a 
clause on the merchant’s obligations and liabilities jointly and severally to the carrier.159 
However there are other clauses providing defences and limits for the carrier where the 
term ‘shipper’ is used separately from the other persons defined as ‘merchant’.160 This 
makes the term ‘shipper’ an important term to be exclusively defined. 
In the CMI Uniform Rules for Sea Waybills, the term ‘shipper’ is only defined together 
with the ‘carrier’ as “parties named in or identifiable as such from the contract of 
carriage. It thus seems to leave the definition of the shipper to the contracting parties 
themselves. 
Documentary Credit 
The meaning given to the term “shipper” is very important not only in the shipping 
documents but also in the letters of credit since these accompany or complement the 
shipping documents for the international sale of goods. The discrepancies in the 
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reference to the shipper between these documents could cause much confusion and 
hinder commercial efficiency. There may also be a huge risk of losing the credit and 
insurance covering the goods. The operation of letters of credit is governed by the 
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 600 (UCP 600).161 The standard 
for the examination of documents under the UCP 600 provides that “the shipper or 
consignor of the goods indicated on any document need not be the beneficiary of the 
credit.”162 This is understood by the industry to mean that there is no real difference 
between a shipper and a consignor, because both can be an entity other than the 
beneficiary under the letter of credit, the person understood as the exporter. However, 
this will depend on the nature of their activity or role at the time of shipping. The person 
who arranges shipping with the carrier is considered the shipper or consignor, whether 
it be an agent of the beneficiary or the beneficiary itself.163  
This shows that the reference to the meaning given to the shipper from traders in 
international sale of goods’ point of view refers to the type of shipper which enters into 
a contract of carriage with the shipper i.e. the contractual shipper. At the same time they 
equate “shipper” with “consignor” which in certain cases may be reflective of the actual 
situation since the person entering into the contract of carriage with the carrier may also 
be the one delivering goods to the carrier. However, as already been mentioned, this may 
not be the case when the sale contract is on f.o.b. terms. Also, if the beneficiary i.e. the 
exporter can be someone else other than the shipper and consignor, then the term 
exporter does not necessarily equate with the shipper, although membership of shipper 
associations, which will be discussed in the section on the industry perspective below, 
are also made up of exporters. This shows that there is clearly a need to define exactly 
what or who a shipper is in contrast with a consignor or an exporter, because all three 
can be different persons. This is especially so when the juxtaposing of shipper and 
consignor is quite common even for others in the trade, who work by the definition given 
to the shipper as the person or company who supplies or owns the commodities shipped, 
which is reflective of the actual shipper rather than the contractual shipper.164 
As for insurance, coverage depends on who has insurable interest. This usually follows 
the person who has technical ownership over the goods, rather than the label “shipper”. 
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Depending on the terms of the contract of sale, if the goods were lost or damaged in 
transit, the shipper can recover from the insurer the cost of the goods if it were considered 
to still be or have become the owner of the goods. 
The Bailment Perspective 
A shipper is also a bailor since he entrusted the possession, whether physical or 
otherwise, of the goods to another, the bailee, who may be the charterer or the shipowner, 
to be delivered to the shipper or to his order or assigns. The bailment and contractual 
relationship can co-exist side-by-side.165 They are compatible with the shipper-carrier 
relationship because of the basic principles of the English law on bailment which are 
neatly summarised as follows by Sir Richard Aiken: 
“1) A bailment arises when a person, the bailee, takes exclusive possession of a 
chattel which is either the property of another, the bailor, or to the possession  of 
which that other has the immediate right.  
2) The relationship and its consequent obligations arise because the taking of 
possession in the circumstances involves an assumption of responsibility for the 
safekeeping of the goods.  
3) A bailment can be for reward or gratuitous.  
4) Reservation by the bailor of the right to require that the chattel be ultimately 
restored to his own possession or his order is not necessary in either a contractual 
or a gratuitous bailment.”166 
The basic principles of bailment summarised above resembles very much the 
relationship between the shipper and the carrier. A shipper may also have a sub-bailment 
relationship with a third person so called the sub-bailee if the bailee delivers possession 
of the goods to the third person with consent from the shipper as the bailor, for instance 
a subsequent holder of the bill of lading or the consignee. Lord Hobhouse in The 
Starsin167 stated that a contract of carriage was a contract of bailment. Thus if the shipper 
makes a claim in bailment under the bill of lading contract, the law that applies to the 
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contract contained in or evidenced by the bill of lading also governs the claim in 
bailment.168 
Analogy with voyage charterer 
A voyage charterer has also been described as having a likeness to a shipper, wherein 
both have no involvement in the management or operation of the vessel in any sense and 
merely pays the freight to the shipowner for carriage of his own goods or that of others 
in a defined voyage.169 A voyage charter is also generally defined as a contract where 
the owner agrees to proceed to a certain loading port where he will collect cargo provided 
by the charterer, and then deliver them to the port which the charterer nominates. In this 
sense, the charterer’s function of entering into a contract to ship cargo and providing the 
cargo is identical to that of the shipper. In fact, if this basic straightforward relationship 
is seen in the modern day commercial context, the needs of the charterer which takes 
into account the fact that he is also working in parallel to an international sale of goods 
contract, requires flexibility in the charterparty in order to accommodate his obligations 
under the sale contract. The charterer is likely to also be the buyer or seller of the goods 
who has also taken on the responsibility of delivering them.170 This further enhances the 
identity of the charterer in such a context to be seen as the shipper. 
Analogy with owner 
In the “Chevron North America”171 Lord Clyde referred to section 3 of the Zetland 
County Council Act which defined “owner” “when used in relation to goods” and 
extended its ordinary meaning to include among others, the shipper. This may suggest 
that the term ‘shipper’ has a proprietary connotation to it. 
The Multimodal Perspective 
In the United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods172, 
there is no definition for the term ‘shipper’, but a definition similar to that of the shipper 
may be found in the definition of the ‘consignor’. In art. 1(5), the consignor is defined 
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as “any person by whom or in whose name or on whose behalf a multimodal transport 
contract has been concluded with the multimodal transport operator, or any person by 
whom or in whose name or on whose behalf the goods are actually delivered to the 
multimodal transport operator in relation to the multimodal transport contract”. This 
definition resembles that of the shipper in the Hamburg Rules.173  
There are also provisions in the Multimodal Convention which impose an obligation on 
the consignor towards the multimodal transport operator in much the similar way as the 
provisions in the conventions on the carriage of goods by sea impose obligations on the 
shipper towards the carrier. In the Multimodal Convention the consignor is “deemed to 
have guaranteed to the multimodal transport operator the accuracy, at the time the goods 
were taken in charge by the multimodal transport operator, of particulars relating to the 
general nature of the goods, their marks, number, weight and quantity and, if applicable, 
to the dangerous character of the goods, as furnished by him for insertion in the 
multimodal transport document”.174 This is followed by an indemnity provision in the 
second paragraph of that article which covers inaccuracies and inadequacies of the 
consignor’s guarantee which is imposed on the consignor towards the multimodal 
transport operator.  The combination of the first and second paragraphs of this article is 
also similar to the provision in the carriage of goods by sea conventions on the shipper’s 
guarantee towards the carrier of the marks, number, quantity and weight and the 
corresponding duty of the shipper to indemnify the carrier.175  
Apart from this, the provision of the Multimodal Convention on the liability of the 
consignor to the multimodal transport operator for loss caused by the fault or neglect of 
the consignor his servants or agents again bears a striking resemblance to the provisions 
of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules on the same issue imposed on the shipper towards 
the carrier,176 although the former is worded in a more positive way.177 Finally, the other 
similarity is to be found in the provision concerning dangerous goods delivered for 
carriage. Both the Multimodal Convention178 and the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules179 
as well as the Rotterdam Rules180 provide for the duty of the consignor/shipper to inform 
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the multimodal transport operator/carrier respectively, regarding the shipment of 
dangerous goods and for the consignor/shipper to be liable to the multimodal transport 
operator/carrier for any loss or damage and expenses resulting from such shipment, albeit 
to a different extent and manner.  
Thus, it is arguable that the concept of the consignor in the Multimodal Convention is 
equivalent to the concept of the shipper in the carriage of goods by sea conventions. 
Furthermore, during the drafting stage of the Rotterdam Rules, the word ‘consignor’ 
appeared in the Draft Instrument181 and is defined as the “person that delivers the goods 
to a carrier for a carriage”. However in the adopted final draft, the term was dropped, 
and the duty to deliver the goods ready for carriage is borne by the shipper. This shows 
that the shipper and the consignor’s roles have been assimilated. 
The Industry Perspective 
This section relies on information provided by various organisations as found in their 
published websites. Specific questions were also posed to representatives of a shipper 
council in order to gauge the industry’s perspective as to the term “shipper” and how this 
has affected them in practice. As mentioned in the section on documentary credit above, 
there are many conflicting views coming from the industry as to who is defined as a 
shipper. Various individual sources in the trade, transport and logistics industry offer 
their own version of what the term means. One example is that the shipper is the entity 
which owns the goods and initiates the shipment of goods process by means of issuing 
a shipping instruction to either a freight forwarder or dealing direct with the carrier. The 
name of the shipper will appear on the ocean bill of lading. If the owner of the goods is 
the consignee, then the consignee can also be the shipper on the bill of lading. However, 
even if the shipping instruction was issued by the consignee to the freight forwarder, 
under Federal Regulations of the United States, where ocean shipments are concerned 
the shipper is the person responsible for payment of freight to the carrier because the 
freight forwarder acts as an agent of the shipper. This shows that the “shipper” on the 
bill of lading and the actual shipper are considered as two different persons.182 From this 
definition it seems that the identity of the shipper is linked to ownership of the goods, 
status as well as contractual relationship with the carrier rather than mere delivery of the 
goods to the carrier. 
                                                          




International bodies which have been formed for the purpose of advising and providing 
resources which guide the industry would perhaps offer a more reliable definition 
because they were created for the purpose of universal acceptance and achieve 
uniformity within the international trade community and also because they represent a 
cross section of the shipping community compared to individual companies and persons. 
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) publishes various publications for the 
use of the international trade community including the latest Incoterms 2010, a standard 
set of commercial terms for contracts in international sale of goods. In the guidance notes 
and general interpretations of common issues within Incoterms 2010, when it comes to 
the question of who should be the shipper in the transport document in a particular type 
of contract of sale under the Incoterms 2010, the view from ICC is that the contract of 
sale does not usually govern this issue. Rather, it is governed by the transport law regime 
relevant to the mode of transport selected. It also refers to the two commonly known 
types of shipper; the contractual shipper, the person who enters into a contract of carriage 
with the carrier and the actual shipper, the person who hands the goods over to the carrier. 
These two categories are not mutually exclusive and a shipper can be both the contractual 
and the actual shipper. 
It clearly establishes that the issue of definition is not to be determined within the 
contract of sale but to be found only within the realm of transport law and regulations. 
However, it also acknowledges the difficulty of finding consistency within these rules. 
Nevertheless, generally for the ICC where the FCA183 Incoterms 2010 is concerned, it is 
the actual shipper who is affected. The same situation would occur when the goods 
involved are dangerous.184 
Shipper Councils are created to unite shippers and provide them with the bargaining 
strength against carriers especially in the liner services where comparable or higher 
bargaining power is wielded by the act of liner operators forming liner conferences.185 
The Asian Shippers’ Council acts for cargo owners and exporters in 18 Asian countries 
except Japan, whereas the Global Shippers’ Forum is an international organisation which 
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represents retailers, manufacturers and wholesalers from more than 50 countries all over 
the globe being the largest trade group.186 
The European Shippers’ Council (ESC) is the voice, “eyes and ears” for freight transport 
interests in Europe187 covering a broad scope including import from and export to Europe 
as well as intra-continental. It also speaks for not only the sea transport but also all other 
forms of transportation. For the ESC’s purposes, a shipper is an all encompassing term 
that includes wholesalers, manufacturers and retailers. Membership of ESC comprises 
of national transport user organisations, national shipper councils, key European 
commodity trade associations and corporate members. It opens membership not just to 
anyone who is directly or indirectly involved in the movement of freight, but also those 
who procure freight transport and logistics services. The ESC has quite a strong voice as 
it represents more than 100,000 freight transport interests.188 
The existence of Shippers Associations is said to have begun in various forms in the mid-
1970s189 and now there is a multitude of them across the globe representing national, 
regional, as well as specific trade business interests. It is useful to refer to their 
membership requirements as they give an idea of how the shipper industry perceives and 
defines itself. Comparisons can then be made between them which can be used to 
determine whether there is uniformity in how shippers regard themselves in the industry, 
as well as further to compare whether that practical self-definition reconciles with the 
legal construct of the shipper, as discussed in the earlier part of this chapter. Nevertheless 
the membership of shipper associations is not limited by law and so this allows 
membership to be opened to non-shippers, depending on the memorandum of the 
individual shippers’ association. In such a case, careful sifting has to be done to pick out 
potential shippers from among the broad categories of diversified membership. Since 
membership can range from as little as two to as many as thousands,190 this is also an 
indication of how well they truly represent shippers. 
A Shippers’ Association is defined by section 3(23) of the Shipping Act 1984191 as “a 
group of shippers that consolidates or distributes freight on a non-profit basis for the 
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members of the group to obtain carload, truckload or other volume rates or service 
contracts.” The American Institute of Shippers’ Associations defines it as “Non-profit 
membership cooperatives which make domestic or international arrangements for the 
movement of members’ cargo. They are a means by which the small and medium sized 
shipper, and even the large shipper, can obtain economies of scale without the mark-ups 
charged by other transportation intermediaries who perform consolidation services in 
order to obtain volume discounts.”192  
Under the law, shipper associations are separate legal entities in international trade and 
hence are able to negotiate and enter into volume service contracts. However shipper 
associations are not subject to regulation or licensing,193 neither are they common 
carriers. Since they only serve their members and not the general public, they enjoy a 
great deal of confidentiality about their business information and protection from 
publishing requirements. They themselves are considered as shippers under the law and 
thus enjoy all the rights and subject to all the liabilities of the shipper.194 
What follows is a brief outline of the definition of the “shipper” found in selected 
Shippers’ Associations formed in various regions, countries and some specific trades all 
over the world. The selection of these countries again, as was done in the section on the 
legal construct of the shipper above, is based on the top 20 countries with the highest 
total value of overall exports in 2011 in US dollar. Again for some countries in the top 
twenty, it is not possible to gain insight due to many of them employing their national 
language to document the activities of their shipper associations. The inclusion of 
Malaysia is merely as a comparison with the top twenty countries. 
China 
The China Shippers’ Association is a social organization with a corporate legal status. It 
maintains and promotes the rights and interests of various import and export corporations 
and enterprises of foreign trade all over China.195 
While it might seem antithetical with the inclusion of import interests, this loose 
definition allows the inclusion of the possibilities that the importer could be the 
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contractual shipper, the one who actually enters into the contract of carriage with the 
carrier. This would be the case where the sale contract was concluded on FOB terms. 
United States 
The United States International Shippers Association196 relies on the legal definition of 
the shipper as provided by section 3, paragraph (21) of the Shipping Act of 1984197 as 
amended by the Ocean Shipping Reform Act 1998198 for the purpose of membership. 
Section3/SS 40102 (22) provides that there are five persons who are within the definition 
of a shipper and they are ‘a cargo owner’;199 ‘the person for whose account the ocean 
transportation is provided’;200 ‘the person to whom delivery is to be made’;201 ‘a 
shippers’ association’;202 ‘or an ocean transportation intermediary, as defined in 
paragraph (17)(B) of this section, that accepts responsibility for payment of all charges 
applicable under the tariff or service contract’.203 
Paragraph (22) of section 3 goes on to define a shippers’ association as ‘a group of 
shippers that consolidates or distributes freight on a non-profit basis for the members of 
the group in order to secure carload, truckload or other volume rates or service contracts.’ 
Whereas paragraph (17) of section 3 provides the definition of an ocean transportation 
intermediary to be either of two things; ‘an ocean freight forwarder or a non-vessel-
operating common carrier’. To be an ocean freight forwarder, is to be a person that (i) 
‘in the United States, dispatches shipments from the United States via a common carrier 
and books or otherwise arranges space for those shipments on behalf of shippers’;204 and 
(ii) ‘processes the documentation or performs related activities incident to those 
shipments’.205 A non-vessel-operating common carrier is ‘a common carrier that does 
not operate the vessels by which the ocean transportation is provided, and is a shipper in 
its relationship with an ocean common carrier.’206 
According to Med America, a shippers’ association corporation established to obtain and 
distribute beneficial ocean and inland transportation freight rates, the Federal Maritime 
                                                          
196 Founded in April 1999 and headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia. 
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198 46 App. U.S.C. 1701. 
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200 ibid s 3(21)(B). 
201 ibid s 3(21)(C). 
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204 ibid s 3(17)(A)(i). 
205 ibid s 3(17)(A)(ii). 
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Commission has established, under the Shipping Act 1984207 certain purposes for which 
“shipper” includes ‘individuals, corporations, partnerships, and associations existing 
under or authorized by the laws of the United States or of a foreign country.’208 
Other shippers’ association such as Gemini Shippers Association and Fashion 
Accessories Shippers Association offer membership to importers and exporters of all 
kinds of products in the United States.209Likewise the American Import Shippers 
Association serve small and medium sized U.S. importers and overseas exporters.210 
It appears that as far as the United States is concerned, the factual concept is not self-
defined but is reliant on an external definition by the law. A search into the United 
Kingdom contemporary211 reveals no equivalent provisions. It is also interesting to note 
that the writers of the US Maritime Law case commentary described the issue of the 
shipper definition as arcane.212 This reaffirms the argument that the term “shipper” has 
been neglected of a proper and formalised definition which is needful and commonly 
understood. 
United Kingdom 
In the British Maritime Law Association’s paper,213 the term ‘shipper’ is used 
interchangeably with ‘cargo-owner’ and is identifiable with two possible capacities; as 
cargo owner or as party to the contract of carriage. Thus the two classes of shippers 
employed by them rely on the basis of ownership and contractual relationship but leaves 
out the class of persons who deliver the goods to the carrier. 
Hong Kong 
The Hong Kong Shippers’ Council protect and promote the interests of Hong Kong 
importers and exporters, traders and manufacturers regarding transportation of cargo 
issues whether by sea, land or air.214 Founder and ordinary members comprise of trade 
associations while associate members comprise of individual companies.215 
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The Western India Shippers Association is made up of two classes of members; 
institution members and ordinary members. The former comprises of corporate and other 
organisations, trade, commerce or industry institutions or associations located in 
Western India which are engaged in import and export trade. Ordinary members may be 
any person, firm, joint Hindu family, company, society, or association involved in trade, 
commerce or industry in Western India or has a head office located there.216 
Malaysia 
A trade body known as Malaysia National Shippers’ Council which galvanizes 
commodity and trade associations with several government ministries and shipping-
related agencies, opens ordinary membership to individuals, associations and 
organizations of importers and exporters, producers and manufacturers which are 
established in Malaysia and have interest in international trade.217 Associate members 
are made up of other companies, associations, societies and individuals who subscribe 
to the council’s objectives but do not qualify for becoming ordinary members. It has a 
wide membership not exclusively to shippers due to its functions and objectives and thus 
does not enable a solid meaning given to the term ‘shipper’ to be found within its 
memorandum of membership. 
Africa 
Four states in the east of Africa218 are members to a regional organisation called the 
Intergovernmental Standing Committee on Shipping (ISCS), a body to safeguard the 
common interests of the member states in keeping transport costs imposed by liner 
shipping operators within reasonable bounds. The stakeholders of ISCS include shippers 
which are understood as importers and exporters. 
In concluding this part, although the various memorandum of membership may not be 
limited to just shippers, it may be deduced that where the possible “shipper” member is 
concerned, it is simply defined by way of status as buyer or seller, importer and exporter 
etc. 
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It seems that there are various terms used in different contexts to refer to persons who 
perform the same tasks as the shipper. Due to the diversity and scattered definitions 
found in various sources, there is no one definition of the shipper. As for legal sources, 
again it is difficult to say that there is one single legal construct of the shipper. There is 
a mixture of both functional definitions as well as proprietary based definitions since 
there are plenty discussions both on the roles and obligations of the shipper which shape 
the meaning given to it as well as discussions attached to the ownership of the goods. It 
depends entirely upon the issue being adjudicated and the context in which the decision 
was made. The latest statutory definition in the Rotterdam Rules, on the other hand go 
for the status, label and relationship definition as does the industry perspective. This 
would mean that there is a tendency for conflict to arise due to the difference between 
the legal definition and the industry’s definition.  
Even if the term ‘shipper’ is not used, it does not mean that the person may not be 
imposed by the law with the obligations and liabilities of the shipper and vice versa. 
Thus it is very important for a person to know whether he is or is not a shipper in order 
to avoid being inadvertently liable by failing to fulfil duties imposed upon the shipper 
without the shipper realising it. This makes the definition and conception of shipper very 
important whether in the law or in commercial usage. A clear and consistent definition 
of the shipper needs to be available to both the persons who may be characterised as 
such, as well as the other parties dealing with them as this will facilitate better and more 
efficient working relationships and assist in the avoidance of pitfalls, especially costly 
ones. It is also important for judges to develop a consistent definition of the shipper in 
the law especially in specific legal contexts which is reflective of the realities in the 
industry in order to accommodate and promote the efficiency in commerce which the 









Shipper Liability under National or Domestic Law 
Introduction 
Shipper liability for cargo is not a novel concept in law. Even so, by the look of the way 
the international conventions on carriage of goods by sea is expanding, in terms of not 
merely widening the nature and scope of the liability of the shipper, but in making 
express provisions in positive terms which enable and empower carriers to bring causes 
of action against them, it seems as though the idea of shipper liability for cargo is now 
being brought sharper into focus and being looked at under a new light. This growing 
phenomenon may be a notion that is perceived with distaste by those who view 
shippers219 as infinitely being the underdogs without a level playing field. How far ahead 
this phenomenon can develop in the future depends upon how far back the seeds for this 
phenomenon has been sown and how deeply entrenched it is in the legal background 
which makes up the bedrock for the relationship between the shipper and carrier, as well 
as so many other parties intertwined in the network of international sale and carriage of 
goods. Before looking at the progress this phenomenon has made in the international 
conventions, it is useful to look at the national arena as it is reflective of what goes on in 
the international arena, being a meeting point where all domestic concepts converge. 
This makes the question of shipper liability under domestic law an issue of utmost 
critical importance. 
In chapter 2 the concept or definition of the shipper in the context of the carriage of 
goods by sea had been discussed. The discussion in this chapter and the following 
chapters are made on the basis of all the different ways in which the concept of the 
shipper has been understood in the legal construct of the shipper. It was recognised in 
chapter 2 that there is no one single definition of the shipper and that it depends on the 
context in which it is used. Bearing this in mind, it is therefore very important to 
recognise the context in which the shipper is being discussed when considering the laws 
regarding liability of the shipper in this chapter and the following chapters. 
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Objective of chapter 
There are two general objectives of this chapter. The first is to look at the recognition of 
shipper liability in various categories of national or domestic law. It is proposed in this 
chapter to determine the premise of shipper liability under national law as to whether it 
is on the basis of contractual, bailment, tortious, fiduciary, criminal or other form of 
liability structure. The thematic approach of this chapter is to look at the broad legal 
systems of common law, civil law, customary and religious law, and how they deal with 
each of the premise of shipper liability. The approach taken in researching each legal 
system will naturally be different as the source of the laws for the respective systems are 
different in nature. The specific objectives and methodology for each one will be 
discussed below in their respective sub-headings.  
There will definitely be differences between these legal systems but the broader purpose 
of researching this is to determine whether there are similarities, common themes and 
approaches within them which could then be integrated and thus arguably become more 
acceptable by the same community. The discussion will also revolve around the question 
of whether shipper liability if not recognised, should then be recognised by these 
different legal systems. 
The second objective would be to discuss what should in fact be the content of shipper 
liability. Having looked at the various forms, degree and structure of shipper liability in 
the different legal systems, a proposition will be made as to what should be the most 
appropriate form and substance of shipper liability that could be supported by the law as 
well as the industry. 
Although the chapter is concerned with the duties of the shipper, reference to persons 
included within the meaning of the shipper in the first chapter will be made, including 
voyage charterers so as not to lump together all the duties as being common to all types 
of shippers, since certainly this is not the case. Where possible the distinction between 
the role and status of the parties will be noted. Another reason why it is important to 
keep them clearly distinguished is that each type of shipper has its own particular 
economic strength or rather the lack of it.220 This makes the analysis on why the law has 
                                                          
220 For example, a shipper under a bill of lading is considered to have less bargaining power in comparison 
to a shipper who is a charterer under a voyage charterparty. The former usually has less room to negotiate 
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developed in such a way for each different category of shipper to be better understood 
and the proposal for what should be the content of shipper liability more justifiable. 
The Common Law on Shipper Liability 
Objective 
The objective of this section is to identify and analyse the various forms of shipper 
liability found in common law jurisdictions. Although some of the liabilities may have 
been codified in various statutes, most of the liabilities remain embodied in the decisions 
of the courts for more than three centuries. Even the provisions in the statutes themselves 
are subject to application and thus interpretation by the judges in solving disputes 
regarding the application of the statutory provision. It is then a requirement in this section 
to extract the principles from the judgements and categorize them before they can be put 
into the classification of the different premises of liability. In order to extract the 
principles and perhaps more importantly, to comprehend the justification and purpose of 
the law, these judgements need to be analysed in the light of all the underlying factors 
and paradigms which influence as well as are affected by the decisions, for example the 
needs, practice and usage of the industry, commercial efficiency, commercial certainty, 
commercial fairness, flexibility as well as social fairness. 
Methodology 
The study of common law decisions requires an intricate analysis of judgements on 
various aspects of the shipper’s duties. While the facts of the case may provide the basis 
for the outcome of the case, there is a further underlying reasoning of the judges which 
need to be brought to the surface to justify not only the decision, but the impact it will 
have on and how it will be useful for, the industry and the legal construct of shipper 
liability. 
English Common Law 
Pre-carriage liabilities 
The duty to provide cargo 
The voyage charterer has the duty to provide the agreed type and amount of cargo to be 
loaded on the vessel. It does not matter to the shipowner as to how or where the charterer 
has to procure the type and amount of cargo agreed to be carried or how they are to be 
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transported to the place of loading, so long as the cargo will be ready to be loaded at the 
place and time agreed. This duty to provide cargo is absolute and the charterer will not 
be absolved from breach of contract even if the cause of delay was beyond his control.  
In The Aello221 the charterer had agreed to provide a cargo of maize from Buenos Aires 
port. At the charterparty date, vessels were not permitted to enter the dock area until a 
‘giro’ or permit was received by the ship from the customs authority. For this purpose 
the shipper has to obtain a certificate from the Grain Board which certifies that cargo has 
been allocated. Later on, when the movement of maize to the port slackens and results 
in congestion, the traffic control system was changed which added a further requirement 
that there has to be an availability of cargo ready to be loaded before the permit could be 
issued. The shipper was able to obtain the certificate from the Grain Board but there was 
no cargo of maize ready to be loaded. In this case, the named shipper under the contract 
is a different person from the charterer, but the charterer is the buyer of the cargo FOB. 
The non-availability of the maize resulted in the inability of the ship to obtain permit to 
enter the dock area and hence could not become an arrived ship. The House of Lords, 
following the case of Ardan Steamship Co. Ltd v. Andrew Weir & Co.222 held that the 
charterers were under an absolute obligation to provide the cargo or part of it in time 
where the failure of performing such an obligation would prevent the ship from 
performing the obligation of becoming an arrived ship. This absolute obligation could 
not be relieved by showing that the charterer had taken all reasonable steps to provide 
the cargo. The House of Lords in Ardan’s case distinguished the case of Little v. 
Stevenson & Co.223 where it was held that the shipper’s or charterer’s obligation is to 
have the cargo ready when the vessel is prepared to receive them in the ordinary course 
of things but not to the extent that the shipper must be prepared for every contingency or 
fortuitous circumstance which were not contemplated by both parties. It was also 
distinguished in Krog & Co. vs Burns and Lindemann224 where the Lord Ordinary stated 
that the duty of the charterer is to do his part which is necessary to enable the vessel to 
get in berth according to what is custom in that port, the only exception being when the 
contingency is only remote and improbable. Thus even when the reason for the failure 
to provide cargo on the part of the charterer was caused by the port authority imposing 
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certain traffic rules, this will not absolve the charterer of his breach of an absolute 
contractual duty. 
Ardan’s case was about an appeal for damages for detention of a ship, the Ardandearg 
which was chartered to load “in the usual and customary manner a full and complete 
cargo of Australian coal as ordered by charterers” from Newcastle, New South Wales. 
The exception to this in the charterparty was for “riot,… strike,… or any other accidents 
or causes beyond the control of the charterers, which may delay her loading.” Although 
the vessel could have arrived earlier if the master had not delayed, it had arrived before 
the cancelling date. However by the time it arrived there were two other vessels which 
had arrived before her and thus she could not be berthed to load the cargo. The custom 
of the port was such that a vessel was not allowed to berth unless she had received a 
loading order from the colliery which supplied the coal. The colliery selected by the 
charterer was a small one and had a small output with no storage facilities at the port. 
The coaling of vessels thus had to be done in turns. Being third in line, the Ardandearg 
thus had to wait and be removed twice before she could be berthed and fully loaded, 
there not being sufficient coal ready to be loaded. The charterparty did not fix the time 
within which the cargo had to be loaded. The shipowners claimed damages for the 
detention of the vessel from the charterer arising from the delay in providing the cargo. 
The House of Lords in deciding that the charterers were liable for damages for the 
detention, restored the decision of the Lord Ordinary that it was their primary duty as 
charterers to provide the stipulated cargo and that nothing in the charterparty or the 
evidence put forth provided for an exception from their absolute obligation. The delay 
in loading was caused by a failure of the charterer to perform this absolute duty rather 
than the congestion in shipping at the port. The words “as ordered by charterers” in the 
charterparty were construed by the courts in such a way that the charterers could not 
escape this absolute obligation merely by showing that they had ordered the cargo to be 
provided for loading; the cargo has to actually be ready for loading. The words “to load 
in the customary and usual manner” was also narrowly construed as referring only to the 
custom of the port system in requiring a loading order before berthing is allowed as 
opposed to or as well as including the custom of the colliery in issuing coaling orders in 
turn. If the charterer wanted it to be construed as such it must be provided expressly for, 
even if the colliery turn formed part of the custom of the port. The risk that the cargo is 
not ready to be supplied to the charterer, the court held, was to be borne by the charterer 
rather than the shipowners. 
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There are two possible strands of theory intertwined within the courts’ construction of 
the charterparty being very much in favour of the shipowners rather than the charterer. 
The first is what has just been pointed out above, in that the law places this absolute 
obligation on the charterer on the basis that when the charterer enters into the 
charterparty and agrees to provide cargo, he voluntarily assumes the risk of the cargo not 
being available regardless of fault on his part or those under his control, unless he brings 
it to the attention of the shipowner. Although it is true that the charterer did expressly 
agree to provide the cargo, the manner in which this duty was construed was strict. The 
absolute obligation on the charterer places a heavy burden on the charterer who bears 
the risk of the cargo not being ready although its cause was not through the fault of the 
charterer nor anyone who the charterer is able to control. In this case the House of Lords 
did point out that the charterer had the freedom to choose a more efficient supplier of 
coal or a bigger colliery which could coal the ship within a matter of days or to select 
more than one colliery in order to speed up the process of providing the cargo, but instead 
had left it to chance that the colliery they had selected would be able to do the job. 
Although this is all implying or subtly pointing to the fault of the charterer in not making 
proper and adequate inquiries, it only further demonstrates that the burden of fulfilling 
the obligation of providing cargo rests squarely on the shoulders of the charterer with no 
room for recourse from the shipowners save in very limited clearly expressed 
circumstances. This is supported by the way the judges interpreted the exception to the 
absolute obligation narrowly as being irrelevant in this case since it was said to only 
apply to the actual loading process and not the process of getting the cargo from 
wherever it is stored or produced to the side of the ship.225 
Secondly, the smooth running of shipping operations stand to benefit from such a strict 
construction of the charterparty would be the shipowners in the way that no matter what 
it takes, the law ensures that the vessel must be loaded and it must be loaded within the 
lay-days if such was agreed or otherwise, within a reasonable time. The earliest authority 
for this may be traced back to the case of Postlethwaite v Freeland226 where it was said 
by Lord Blackburn that he was not aware of any case which contradicted the doctrine 
that the merchant is under an absolute obligation to furnish the cargo unless there was 
something to qualify it. What would be the justification for having such a strict rule? It 
is true that an idle vessel is a cost to the shipowners who have to continue paying the 
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debt owed for purchasing or mortgaging the vessel regardless of its activity or lack of it. 
Without being in service there would be no income from which the shipowners could 
pay off the debt and they then incur the risk of losing the ship or worse, go bankrupt. It 
is fair to say that the domino effect of this is that it will affect the economic and 
commercial efficiency of the shipping industry. The only case where there was an 
expression by the courts that the duty of the charterer to provide cargo was of a lesser 
than absolute one was in the case of Little v Stevenson above, but it has been quickly 
isolated as an exceptional decision restricted to the facts of that particular case, the 
potential interpretations and effects to the observations made in that case by the Earl of 
Halsbury L.C.227 and Lord Herschell228 being played down by later cases and have not 
been followed since. By consistently staying within the course of this pattern of 
decisions, the law ensures that the economic and commercial efficiency is secured 
because the law is clear and certain about the expectations of the industry towards the 
shipper. 
In Bunge y Born Ltda v Brightman229, it was emphasised that a charterer in a charter 
party has prima facie an absolute obligation to provide cargo and bring it ready to the 
loading site. Exceptions in relation to laydays may not be invoked unless it was expressly 
and distinctly provided or may be necessarily implied. In this case, the vessel had already 
arrived at the port of loading but the charterer’s cargo of wheat had not fully arrived by 
rail due to the strike held by the railway workers. This was followed by a government 
ban on the export of wheat which resulted in the charterer having to stop loading wheat 
and load maize instead. Ultimately the laydays were exceeded and the charterers sought 
to rely on an exception clause worded to cover workmen strike and obstruction or 
stoppages on the railway or loading places. The House of Lords held that for an 
obstruction to trigger the exception clause, it must be an obstruction which prevented the 
loading and not the conveying of the cargo to the place where loading is to take place. 
This case shows also that there is no excuse for the charterer in not having the cargo 
ready for loading even when an extraneous strike which was beyond their contemplation 
occurred.  The case of Hudson v Ede230 was distinguished since in the latter case there 
was no other way in which the cargo could have been brought to the ship as the river 
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through which the lighters brought the cargo had frozen over, and there were no 
storehouses at the port itself, and thus there was no other place from which the cargo can 
be brought. The grain were carried by lighters which would come down the river from 
places higher up the river, go alongside the chartered ship waiting in sufficient depth of 
water to load, and empty the grain directly into it. It was held that the exception of 
detention by ice in the charterparty covered the situation. The legal principle here is that 
if the location from where the cargo is taken is not specified, the charterer has to exhaust 
every practical mode of loading before being excused from his obligation of bringing the 
cargo to where it can be loaded onto the particular ship. 
The case of Grant v Coverdale231 is the most commonly referred to authority for the duty 
of the charterer to provide cargo regardless of fault on the charterer’s part. In this case 
the cargo was transported to the loading dock by lighters from a wharf where the cargo 
was stored upriver. Upon arrival of the chartered ship, part of the cargo was loaded. 
Unfortunately frost set in rendering the canal impassable and this impeded the loading 
of the remainder of the cargo. It was impractical for the charterer to bring the cargo to 
the specified ship by other modes such as carting due to unreasonable cost, although the 
dock itself was not frozen and if all the cargo were already at the dock, loading would 
not have been prevented. The charterer sought to rely on an exception covering among 
others, frost and unavoidable accidents preventing loading. Naturally the House of Lords 
held that the charterer was not entitled to do so. Furthermore an important principle 
derived from this case is that the operation of loading may be separated into two parts; 
the actual physical loading of cargo onto the ship, and the process of bringing the cargo 
from the place where it is stored to the place of loading. The two can only be seen as one 
overall process of loading if there was an inevitable necessity that a certain process of 
bringing the cargo from the only place where it can be stored had to precede the actual 
physical loading in order for it to be possible for the physical loading to take place at the 
location where the parties have agreed, and there was no other way in which this could 
be done, even though there may be a great distance between the place where the cargo 
is stored and the agreed loading place. This was the situation that occurred in Hudson v 
Ede above and in that case although such a system was unknown to the shipowner, it 
was a well-known custom within the grain trade, and thus it was held that it must have 
been contemplated as the basis of the contract.232 If there was another way but it would 
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incur unreasonable costs on the charterer, it would be a failure of the charterer’s 
obligation to bring the cargo to its loading place alongside the ship if the charterer 
chooses not to do so, and the charterer would not be able to seek protection from a clause 
which exempted delay in loading, even for causes beyond the charterer’s powers or 
control to avoid. 
Cleary here the obligation of the charterer is absolute and the only way in which the 
gravity of the duty could be mitigated especially where such a need is highly anticipated, 
is that it would be best if the charterer ensures that clearly worded express terms which 
excludes his liability in the event of delay in procuring the cargo are inserted in the 
charterparty. An example is the labour clause relied on by the charterer in the case of 
Gordon Steamship v Moxey Savon233 where there was a national coal strike which 
impeded the conveyance of coal to the loading dock for several days. The charterer 
sought to rely on a condition which covered strikes and stoppage of hands connected 
with the delivery of the coal. If such a situation should occur and prevent loading from 
commencing, the charterparty would become null and void. The court upheld the 
arbitrator’s decision that the condition was triggered rendering the charterparty void. 
The duty to provide cargo is a general duty which encompasses the various other sub-
duties which requires to be fulfilled by the shipper before the general duty to provide 
cargo can be said to have been fulfilled. For instance, it is not enough to have the cargo 
physically present on the side of the ship within the time agreed if the cargo has not been 
properly marked with the required identification as specified, or properly and safely 
packed in a way that makes it fit for loading and the voyage. In providing the cargo, the 
shipper also needs to provide the accompanying documents and any important and 
relevant information to the master regarding the safe handling and carriage of the goods 
to ensure the safety of the goods themselves as well as the safety of other cargo, the ship 
itself and the crew. This is particularly important in relation to the shipment of dangerous 
goods which will be discussed in more detail in a separate sub heading below dedicated 
specifically to liability for dangerous goods. 
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The duty to load 
The duty to load encompasses several aspects of the shipper’s duties including 
participating in the loading operation, the duty to load a full and complete cargo and the 
duty to load alternative cargo. These are discussed below. 
The loading operation 
The duties to load, stow and discharge are actually the duties of the shipowner under the 
common law, however by agreement the parties may displace these duties onto the 
charterer by inserting clearly expressed words.234 Otherwise at the beginning of 
shipment, it is the duty of the charterer in a voyage charter party to bring the cargo 
alongside the ship and within reach of the ship’s tackle. The shipowner then has the duty 
to load the cargo onto the ship. This is the traditional rule regarding division of 
responsibility for the loading operation under the common law between the shipowner 
and the charterer and is known as the ‘alongside rule’. Similarly at the end of shipment, 
there is a division of responsibility between the consignee and the shipowner regarding 
the discharge operation. It is the duty of the consignee to receive the cargo after the 
shipowner has put the cargo over the side of the ship and released it from the ship’s 
tackle. In some circumstances, it may be implied in the bill of lading that the shipper has 
the duty to perform the discharge operation.235 
This is a very neat and tidy division of physical boundaries of location, labour and 
ultimately cost which clearly outlines the duties of each party involved in the operation 
of loading. However in practical terms, things are usually a little bit messier than the 
ideal theoretical picture. Much of course depends on the agreement between the 
shipowner and the charterer, but the practical reality is also inclusive not only of other 
parties who may take part in the operation of loading on a professional level, for instance 
stevedores contracted by shipbrokers who serve both the shipowner and the charterer, 
but also the fact that loading and discharge do not rely solely on the ship’s tackle as its 
tool. The mark of modern day shipping is identified by the use of all kinds of-land based 
mechanical equipment such as cranes, elevators and grabs which usually belong to the 
charterer or controlled by it rather than the shipowner. The shipowner and charterer may 
therefore agree that the charterer is to undertake and bear the cost of the whole operation 
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of loading and discharge. This kind of agreement is commonly known as a contract on 
FIO terms. This or any other kind of agreement which stipulates the respective duties of 
both parties involved in loading must be expressly agreed upon, otherwise the common 
law ‘alongside rule’ will apply. This includes the duty of the charterer to employ and 
bear the cost of the use of lighters to bring the cargo alongside the shipowner’s vessel 
where the vessel is unable to come to berth in port236 for whatever reason. The case of 
Grant v Coverdale237 discussed above has established that if there was a delay by the 
charterer in bringing the cargo alongside the vessel, even though the delay was caused 
by matters which are covered by an exclusion clause which was worded to cover delay 
in loading, the charterer is not protected since the operation of loading does not include 
the process of bringing the cargo from another location where it was stored to the area 
alongside the ship. 
This does not mean however, that the obligations for performing, paying and taking 
responsibility for loading and discharge must all fall on the same person. The case of 
Jindal Iron238 is authority for the principle that if the charterer agreed to pay for the 
loading, it does not follow that he is also the person to bear the responsibility of 
performing the loading or of any damage which ensue as a result of loading. 
If the charterer does decide to take on the loading and discharge operation as well as bear 
the expenses for them and a clause to such effect is inserted into the charterparty, the 
charterer then has a duty to load, stow and trim the cargo and discharge with due care. 
Problems of construction may arise when the terms of the charterparty stipulate that 
although the loading and discharge operation is to be carried out by the charterer, by 
appointing stevedores and labourers, the process is still to be supervised and is the 
responsibility of the captain, thus reverting liability back to the shipowner. Even where 
there is no clause to such effect, the master of the vessel has the legal right and 
corresponding duty to intervene in the process of loading since not only is he, as agent 
of the shipowner, responsible to ensure the safety and stability of the ship and cargo, and 
hence ensure its seaworthiness and cargoworthiness, but also because as the person 
intimately aware about the special technicalities and needs of the ship whilst the 
stevedores being strangers to it, he is assumed to know better and they would not, about 
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what to do and what not to do. Furthermore, it enables the ship to avoid inefficient use 
of space leading to wastage and loss of freight due to bad stowage. So if he does not 
intervene when he can clearly see that something is not quite right, the shipowner will 
be answerable. However, if the master does intervene and this results in damage, again 
the shipowner has to bear the loss. Even to be neutral and neither intervening nor 
omitting to intervene when clearly needed is no guarantee, as the shipowner takes on 
liability even if the master merely agrees with the particular stow.239 Unfortunately there 
is no sure place where the master can stand where it can safely be said that liability is or 
is not incurred on the shipowner and apparently neither is the charterer safe. Everything 
turns on how the terms of the charter is construed. 
In the case of The Argonaut240 a cargo of granite was to be carried by trip charter from 
Durban to Marina di Carrara (MDC) and Sete. The New York Produce Exchange form 
was used which provided in clause 8 that the ‘charterers are to load, stow and…discharge 
at their own expense under the supervision and responsibility of the Captain.’ Upon 
discharge at MDC and Sete, the vessel was found to be damaged. In the course of 
unloading, tank tops were pierced by falling granite blocks caused by the stevedores, 
engaged by the charterers dropping the blocks. 
The court held that although the charterer’s obligation to load, stow and trim the cargo, 
and discharge requires him to perform such obligation with due care, the primary 
responsibility for stowage remains with the master. Clause 8 creates a primary duty on 
the shipowner and only an actual intervention by the charterers rather than the act of the 
stevedores engaged by them could displace this liability. For there to be liability on the 
part of the charterers, there has to be an officious intervention by them. Leggatt J also 
raised the question of what would be the result if the charterer had directly caused the 
damage which was not within the power of the shipowners to prevent unless unusual 
precaution were taken. He surmises that perhaps the doctrine of estoppel could be relied 
on by the shipowners to avoid liability. 
In the The Santamana241 a cargo of onion was damaged by being placed in stacks of 15 
to 16 tiers high without sufficient dunnage with the leave and licence of the shipper. It 
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was clear that that was bad stowage and that the ship was unseaworthy in not providing 
for proper stowage and lacking in proper equipment such as dunnage and temporary 
decks to support the heavy weight of the upper tiers. However, the court held that if a 
shipper takes an active interest in the stowage and only complains of some defects but 
not others which are patent to him, he cannot later complain about them since he made 
no objections to the way they were stowed. The shipowner cannot be liable for that which 
the shipper allowed to occur. 
The charter may transfer responsibility to the charterers for lashing the cargo in such a 
way as to make sure seaworthiness is attained. This was held in The Imvros242 when the 
charterparty provided that the charterers would load, stow and lash at their expense under 
the master’s supervision and to his satisfaction, some of the cargo were lost overboard 
due to lashing which did not conform to the IMO requirements, and caused damage to 
the vessel. 
The duty to load a full and complete cargo 
The voyage charterer has the duty to fill the chartered vessel with as much cargo as she 
can possibly carry safely in order to allow the shipowner to earn as much freight as he 
possibly can for every ton of cargo loaded. The tonnage of the ship is not an indication 
of how much cargo can be loaded and loading cargo of equivalent amount to the 
registered tonnage of the ship as described in the charterparty would be a failure of the 
charterer to perform his duty to load a full and complete cargo. The registered tonnage 
of the ship is only material to an allegation of fraud in the description of the vessel in the 
charterparty. This was held in the case of Hunter v Fry243 where the shipper had loaded 
cargo equivalent to the tonnage of the ship mentioned in the charterparty. The shipper 
was held liable to pay the difference between the freight he had actually paid and the 
amount which he would have paid if a full and complete cargo had been loaded. In this 
case the voyage charterer was referred to as the shipper and freighter by the court. 
The duty to load alternative cargo 
Under the charterparty, the charterer may be given a few options of the type of cargo to 
load. When the word ‘option’ is used in the charterparty however, it expressly gives the 
charterer the right of choice in loading the type of cargo which are the subject of an 
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option, and it is a choice for the charterer to take or to leave. Vice versa if the word 
‘option’ is not used for any or a particular type of cargo, that cargo becomes the basic 
cargo which must be loaded. In Reardon Smith v Ministry of Agriculture244, the court 
also referred to the charterer as the shipper when laying down the principles from the 
Bunge y Born245 case. The charterparty in the Reardon Smith case allowed to charterer 
to choose whether to load ‘a full and complete cargo…of wheat in bulk…and/or barley 
in bulk, and/or flour in sacks as below…’ The words ‘as below’ were typed and 
following this there were also typed words inserted into the print stating that ‘the 
charterer has the option of loading up to one-third cargo of barley in bulk……..one-third 
cargo of flour in sacks’, both subject to an increased freight rate. When the vessel arrived, 
the charterer was not able to load a full and complete cargo of wheat due to an elevator 
strike which was an excepted cause in the charterparty, but did not choose to load the 
other types of cargo which were not affected by the strike. The House of Lords held that 
the charterer was not obliged to exercise the option of loading a full and complete cargo 
consisting of a mixture of the different types of alternative cargo even though that would 
have meant a full and complete cargo could have been loaded without delay, the real 
promise of the charterer in the opening words of the charterparty being only the 
obligation to load a full and complete cargo of wheat, unless the charterer makes an 
affirmative decision to vary the load content.  
In contrast, in the Court of Appeal case of Bunge y Born Ltda v Brightman discussed 
above, the charterparty provided that the charterer was to provide ‘a full and complete 
cargo of wheat and/or maize and/or rye.’246 The court held that the shipper was bound to 
have ready at the port of shipment a full and complete cargo consisting of cargo within 
the range of the alternative commodities if the shipper has undertaken to ship a full and 
complete cargo of such alternative commodities. If one of the types of commodity was 
unavailable for loading due to an excepted cause, he may not invoke the exception 
covering the cause of the delay unless each of the other commodities was also covered 
by the exceptions clause. The primary duty to provide a full and complete cargo in one 
form or another cannot be converted into a simple duty to provide a cargo of a single 
type chosen by the shipper by the act of the shipper choosing from the variety provided 
for in the charterparty. A choice to load a particular type of cargo from the range agreed 
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is not carved in stone and the shipper may opt to change his mind until a full and 
complete cargo has been loaded. However the Court of Appeal is of the view that if an 
excepted cause has prevented the shipper from completing loading, the delay consequent 
upon this cause may fall within the exception so as to afford the charterer a reasonable 
time to either reconsider his position and change cargo247 or deal with the conditions 
which have changed248 or to just change over.249  
The House of Lords250 in Reardon Smith above however is of the view that the time for 
adjustment should come from the general position of the charterer under the charterparty 
terms rather than stemming from the exceptions clause. The case was distinguished on 
the basis that the charterer in Reardon Smith did not have a primary obligation to ship a 
mixed cargo as in Bunge y Born.251 The primary obligation was to ship wheat only as 
the basic cargo with an option to ship a proportion of other cargo. The exceptions clause 
thus covers delay in loading wheat and will not be lost simply because the charterer does 
exercise his option to load other cargo. The charterer has no duty to switch to other cargo 
even though they may be available for loading a full and complete mixture of cargo as 
an overriding obligation. The word ‘option’ clearly requires a positive exercise on the 
charterer’s part before the option is deemed to have been taken. 
Liability for dangerous goods 
There is no question that if the shipper ships cargo which is of such a dangerous nature 
that they are capable of causing physical damage252 to the vessel and other cargo, or 
cause delay or detention, he will be answerable if he failed to disclose the dangerous 
nature of the cargo to the shipowner. The duty of the shipper is to not ship dangerous 
cargo without first notifying the carrier of the dangerous nature of the cargo, and the only 
time when the shipper is relieved from this duty is when the carrier or his crew knows 
or ought reasonably to be aware of the cargo’s dangerous character.  
As Tetley pointed out, the shipper’s rights and liabilities as well as that of the carrier 
may vary depending upon this. The warranty that the shipper is sending only goods 
which are suitable for carriage will be influenced by whether the carrier knew or should 
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have known that the shipper is sending dangerous goods.253 If both the carrier and the 
shipper were not aware or should have been aware of the dangerous nature of the cargo, 
the common law provides that regardless of this, the shipper is deemed to have 
knowledge that the cargo is dangerous. The warranty of the shipper that the goods are 
safe for carriage is absolute as held by the majority in Brass v Maitland.254 
Once the shipper has notified the carrier, he is no longer liable under common law unless 
there is a provision in the charterparty or bill of lading which provides to the contrary.255 
This undertaking by the shipper is implied by common law and does not depend on the 
knowledge and means of obtaining knowledge that the goods were dangerous. The 
modern authority for this principle is the case of The Giannis NK256 which endorsed the 
majority decision in Brass v Maitland.257  
This implied obligation of the shipper arises regardless of whether the shipment was 
made under a charterparty or a bill of lading, but may be reinforced by express terms to 
that effect especially in the charterparty. Dangerous cargo includes those goods which 
are inherently dangerous and are commonly regarded as such to the extent that official 
lists have been drawn up in statutes, regulations and codes to categorize them. Cargo can 
also be regarded as dangerous if the danger emanates from the placing of the cargo in its 
surrounding circumstances rather than the nature of the cargo in itself, for instance how 
packing or different temperatures or contact with other substance affect the nature of the 
cargo. 
The nature of this liability is strict as it does not depend on whether the shipper has 
knowledge or otherwise of the dangerous nature of his cargo or the means of obtaining 
that knowledge, for instance when cargo was received from a third party without 
intermediate inspection.258 Apart from this form of liability, there is also a possibility for 
liability in tort for negligence, breach of statutory duty under the Merchant Shipping 
Acts259 and Regulations260 which contain a list of goods which are considered to be 
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dangerous. Apart from that the contractual duty to ship goods which conform to the 
contractual description is also a possible basis for liability.261 Other forms of liability 
include breach of an implied warranty to ship only safe goods or a collateral contract to 
reveal the identity and nature of goods shipped, or to pack goods properly. There could 
also be liability in the form of express, implied or statutory agreement to indemnify the 
carrier should the dangerous cargo cause damage to the vessel or other cargo.262 
Liability for container demurrage 
The post-transit duties of the shipper include collecting the goods from the discharge 
port. The shipper remains liable under the bill of lading as an original party to it, but the 
obligation would be performed by the consignee. If the good were containerised, the 
shipper also has the obligation to unpack the containers and return them to the carrier in 
its original state within the free time allowed by the carrier. Failure to do this within the 
timeframe given will cause the shipper to incur liability for container demurrage.263 
This was what happened in the recent Court of Appeal decision of MSC Mediterranean 
Shipping Co SA v Cottonex Anstalt264 where the shipper as buyer had a dispute with the 
consignee buyer when the price of the goods, being raw cotton collapsed. The consignee 
refused to pay for the goods and take delivery but the shipper had already presented the 
documents to the confirming bank and received payment. For this reason the shipper 
believes that it no longer has title to deal with the goods. The cargo thus remained at the 
port since the customs authorities would not allow the carrier to unpack and dispose the 
goods without permission of the court.   
The bills of lading contained a clause which provided for a period of free time which 
may be used at the discharge port beyond which a daily rate of demurrage is payable. 
Since neither the shipper nor the consignee could or would deal with the goods, the free 
time came and went without the container being returned. The carrier of course wanted 
the demurrage for as long as they were not returned and they never were. The questions 
among others, for the court were whether demurrage was incurred265, and for how long 
before the contract is frustrated and brought to an end. 
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In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Moore-Bick agreed that the demurrage clause was 
triggered upon discharge of the goods on the plain language of the clause. The demurrage 
continued to run until the delay was not only long enough to constitute a repudiatory 
breach by the shipper, but in refusing to take the offer by the carrier to purchase the 
containers, the consequent indefinite deadlock meant the performance of the contract 
became something radically different from what the parties originally undertook, the test 
essentially of frustration. This was much later than the point in time when the shipper 
had written to the carrier to inform them of their inability to deal with the goods once 
they had obtained payment, as held by the trial judge, Leggatt J.  
What is clear here is that the basis for the decision on the extent of the shipper’s liability 
was the point of time at which the commercial purpose of the adventure was frustrated, 
and this involves an assessment of the effect of the delay in the circumstances rather than 
a consideration of any fault on the part of the shipper. For this reason, the lack of such 
an assessment by the trial judge in coming to his decision on the earlier date for when 
the right to be paid demurrage ended was deemed unjustifiable.266 
This would be consistent with the strict liability nature of contractual obligations. The 
relevant clauses which stipulated the shipper’s obligations indicate the strict nature of 
the requirement for performance in definitive terms.267 In such a case there would not be 
a need to discuss the fault of the shipper but rather to focus on the construction and 
interpretation of the terms to give effect to what was promised. 
Shipper liability in other countries which adopt the common law 
Liability for dangerous goods 
Countries which adopt the common law system such as the United States, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia have adopted similar rules on the liability of the 
shipper for dangerous goods. Many statutory laws in common law countries have 
codified provisions which similarly provide that the warranty of the shipper that the 
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goods delivered to the carrier is suitable for carriage is absolute.268 Where third parties 
such as seamen, stevedores and owners of other cargo are concerned, liability of the 
shipper is to be found in tort or delict rather than the application of article 4(6) of the 
Hague-Visby Rules.269 
The shipper’s warranty to the carrier that the goods are suitable for carriage was in the 
United States also an absolute one in the 19th century270 but later in the 20th century was 
considered to be only qualified.271 The shipper is now only liable if he has actual or 
constructive knowledge that the goods he sends is dangerous.272 
Liability towards third parties 
It appears from Tetley’s work that although in dealing with liabilities of the shipper to 
third parties, reference would be made to article 4(6) of the Hague-Visby Rules when it 
involves the necessity to land the goods due to its dangerous nature, liabilities towards 
third parties would in general be dealt with by the law of tort and delict. Therefore 
principles in tort such as the duty to use reasonable care is applied against shippers to 
take reasonable care to those who would affected by his acts and omissions, for instance 
a failure to give proper warning of the dangerous nature of his goods to the stevedores, 
the carrier, the crew and any other third party who may be involved in handling and 
transporting the goods.273 
This was what happened in Harrison v. Flota mercante274where there was danger of 
inhalation of industrial chemical from the shipper’s cargo which the shipper was in fact 
aware of but had failed place adequate labels on them in order to warn of the danger. 
During loading some of the containers ruptured but the stevedore’s personnel had 
actually noticed the warning label but had failed to provide proper masks and other safety 
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equipment to those clearing up the spill. Both shipper and stevedore were held liable in 
this case as was the carrier of the cargo. 
Conversely in Pitria Star Nav. v. Monsanto275 since the shipper had properly labelled 
the containers of chemicals and provided proper documentation to identify the dangerous 
nature of the cargo as poison and holding an IMCO status, it was held not liable for the 
three seamen who were killed. 
Liability for defective cargo 
In the United States, the shipper may also be liable for cargo which causes damage due 
to being defective rather than dangerous.276 In S.W. Sugar & Molasses Co. v. E.J. 
Nicholson277 the cargo of defective molasses had contaminated other molasses and this 
caused the carrier to be held liable to the consignee. The carrier sued the shipper in turn 
and the shipper was held liable under the general maritime law as well as implied under 
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act to indemnify the carrier for the defective cargo. 
Liability for personal injury and damage to property 
Crew members and third parties may be injured or suffer property damage caused by the 
shipper’s act but the requirement for liability of the shipper for this type of damage in 
the US comes under delict or tort.278 Article 4(3) of the Hague-Visby Rules would only 
apply if the crew member or the third party had a valid claim against the carrier which 
the carrier in turn could bring against the shipper.279 However, section 4(3) of the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act requires the plaintiff to prove negligence of the shipper. 
In Williamson v. Cia. Anon. Venezolana de Navigacion280 a longshoreman was injured 
when he walked on a defective crate belonging to the shipper. Since no fault of the 
shipper could be proven, the plaintiff lost his case. Thus it is likely that the shipper would 
just be directly sued in delict or tort while at the same time the crew member or third 
party would be suing the carrier in contract.281 
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In N.V. Stoomvart Maatschappij “Nederlands” v. GTE282, another longshoreman had 
fallen through the top of the crate and the Second Circuit judge held that the liability of 
the shipper is determined under the common law principles of tort and agency. There 
was no need to rely on section 4(3) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and furthermore, 
section 4(3) requires the proof of fault of the shipper.283 
Demurrage 
The case of Leeds Shipping v. Duncan, Fox284, a charterparty incorporated the Australian 
Sea Carriage of Goods Act of 1924, even though the delay in the discharge of the cargo 
at the port of arrival was caused by the deliberate idleness of the stevedore rather 
employed by the shipower than through any fault of the shipper, the shipper was still 
held liable for demurrage since article 4(3) does not affect the demurrage clause agreed 
in the charterparty or bill of lading for excess laydays.285 This indicates that the 
contractual liability of the shipper under national law supersedes the immunity afforded 
to it under the Hague-Visby Rules. 
This is supported by the case of Hellenic Lines Limited v. The Embassy of Pakistan286 
where there was a clause which imposed liability on the consignee in the event of non-
continuous discharge of the cargo, it was held that carriers and shippers are free to agree 
on matters concerning delay in discharging cargo by themselves, and that they are not 
violating section 4(3) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act should liability be imposed 
on the shipper in this matter.287  
Shipper liability under Civil Law Legal Systems 
Introduction 
Civil law legal systems are observed and applied by many countries in the world, notably 
countries in continental Europe excluding United Kingdom, countries in South America 
and some countries in Africa and Asia.288 It is a system of law which originated and 
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evolved from Roman law and the main feature of this system is that all the laws are 
written and codified as opposed to being determined by the decision of judges289 in cases 
before them by applying or changing a judicial precedent or by interpreting a provision 
of statute as they think appropriate. The latter situation is what is being practised in 
common law systems or also known as Anglo-Saxon law.  
In contrast, the judges in a civil law jurisdiction do not create new laws by their decisions 
but merely follow whatever has been provided in the written collection of laws, so called 
civil codes, which have been published to the people at large so that it is assumed fairness 
is achieved since the law is publicised before being enforced. Certainty is thus very much 
identified with civil law systems as compared to common law systems where there is a 
certain level of uncertainty as far as the ability of the judges to change the application of 
the law in the future is concerned. This may be a manifestation of the public interest 
element in civil law systems. The interest of the public at large in being able to rely on 
certainty of the law outweighs any consideration of the judge in making radical changes 
to the way the law is understood as being applicable. 
Nevertheless, in common law countries there are also written laws such as statutes but 
they are subject to interpretation by the judges in its application to particular cases. That 
is not to say that there is no interpretation of statutes being done by judges in the civil 
law systems when applying the law to the case before them. In fact this is where 
similarities lie as between the judicial functions of both systems, although in the civil 
law system the principal source of authority are the codes whereas in the common law 
system it is the judicial precedent.290 In the civil law judicial functions however, 
interpretation is not merely of a judicial nature but also doctrinal and authentic, the 
former being the work of scholars and the latter coming from the legislature.291 
Although there are codes in force in the civil law jurisdictions, it is said that where the 
European code jurisdictions are concerned, the proportion of the main codes themselves 
are minute compared to what makes up the so-called non-codified legislation. Out of 
these non-codified legislation much of which are considered fragmentary and on an ad-
hoc basis, those termed “special legislation” make up for the expansion of the codes and 
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supplement their basic provisions.292 Having said that, these legislations are not the only 
composition of the civil law system. Much of the law is said to be uncodified.293 Where 
Codes do exist, there are usually several in every legal system, each one encompassing 
a broad classification of law. The Italian Code of Navigation294 for example, is one of 
five codes in force in Italy.295 
Objective 
The objective of this section is to identify some of the various forms of shipper liability 
spelt out in the codes of various jurisdictions which apply the civil law system. Some of 
the codes offer clearly expressed provisions on shipper liability whether or not by using 
the specific term ‘shipper’, but as discussed above, the difference will be noted but still 
included as part of the wider notion of shipper used in the first Chapter. Other civil 
jurisdictions may not have specifically expressed provisions on shipper liability but the 
concepts akin to some form of shipper liability may be found between the lines of 
provisions directed at other forms of commercial liability or even public laws. 
The issue then becomes a question of whether these jurisdictions then, actually deal with 
shipper liability since they do not spell it out specifically, or that the issue of shipper 
liability is dealt with by using general provisions which apply to all forms of commercial 
contracts, tort, bailment, fiduciary, crime or other premise of liability. 
The approach used in this section will naturally be different than that used in the section 
on the common law concepts on shipper liability as the main source of the law are the 
Codes. It is therefore very important to look at the legislative intent and purpose of 
passing the Codes and so whatever materials that can be found which contain the debates 
and discussion on the proposal of the Codes will be relevant, as are materials which 
document the outcome of the Codes. These will be indicators of whether the Codes 
reflect the legislative intent and in their application have achieved their purpose. To this 
extent it is useful to look at some of the way the Codes have been applied by the 
respective local tribunals in resolving disputes concerning shipper liability. 
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What follows is a study of various examples of the law in civil law systems on shipper 
liability in order to unearth how the domestic law deals with shipper liability in these 
legal systems. The purpose of doing this is not merely to compare the laws in different 
countries on shipper liability but to study on a wider perspective, the concepts used in 
the civil law legal systems to determine shipper liability for cargo. The approach taken 
in this section is to look at jurisdictions which are considered as progenitors in the civil 
law system for example France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain in order to 
obtain the overall picture of how traditional civil law systems treat shipper liability. 
There are other civil law countries which are considered as being traditional maritime 
nations but are not selected because they are not considered to represent the progenitors 
of the civil system. The focus as the section suggests, is to project the civil law position 
rather than the civil maritime nation position. Latvia is included in order to compare a 
recently modernised civil law system which emerged from a socialist background.296 
Germany for example, is a signatory to the Hague Rules 1924 but nevertheless 
implements and applies the Visby protocols in German law except where the bill was 
issued by a state also applying the Hague Rules. Being a civil law state, Germany’s 
maritime trade law is embodied in a code known as the Commercial Code. The 
provisions of the code on maritime trade law has not undergone any major changes for 
the past 150 years but recently there have been moves to significantly reform it to suit 
the needs of modern shipping practices as well as to simplify the bulky old maritime law. 
The bill had been approved by the German parliament297 and The Act on the Reform of 
Maritime Trade Law was published in the German Official Journal and entered into 
force on 25 April 2013.298 There are many important aspects of German maritime law 
which have been revamped under the new maritime trade law including among others, 
the law on ship arrests, owner’s liability for damages, provisions on time and bareboat 
charterparties, abolition of the liability exclusions for damage due to fire and 
navigational fault, and most importantly for the purposes of this research, shipper 
liability. 
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The aspect of shipper liability concerned which has been reformed is regarding damages 
arising as a result of false cargo declarations. Liability for damage which occur as a 
consequence of giving false declarations on dangerous goods and improper packaging is 
now no longer based on the fault of the shipper. The shipper is therefore now directly 
liable regardless of fault if he has made a false declaration on those matters.299 
Nevertheless the German code balances this by imposing the same no-fault based 
liability on the owner of the ship for damage caused by his crew or other persons on 
board his ship. However, there must also be a corresponding claim for damages against 
the crew member by the plaintiff before the owner can be liable without fault for the 
damage caused by the former.300 
The Reform of Maritime Trade Law Act revamps Book 5 (Maritime Trade)301 in 
Handelsgesetzbuch, the German Commercial Code and reduces the bulk of its 
provisions.302 The Fifth Book now begins with §476 which deals with the definition of 
the ‘reeder’ or shipowner in German, and ends with §619 which deals with service of 
documents such as notices of legal action against or court orders for arrest of a ship. As 
a consequence, a number of provisions relevant to shipper liability have either 
disappeared, been moved elsewhere, or merged with other provisions. These include 
provisions on liability for distance freightage303 and how it is computed,304 loss of ship 
or goods before the voyage,305 shipper liability when the consignee refuses delivery,306 
liability of the shipper after the goods are sold307 and claims of the carrier against the 
shipper after delivery.308 There is a reshuffling of the arrangements of all the sections 
including those dealing with shipper liability. 
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The relevant provisions to shipper liability in the Italian Code of Navigation may be 
found in Title V Charter and Carriage, Chapter III Carriage, Section II Carriage of goods 
in general. 
Under the Dutch Civil Code, provisions may be found in Book 8 in particular Title 8.2 
which covers general provisions relating to transport and Part II Maritime Law. 
The French law on shipper liability may be found in the Transport Code created by the 
Ordinance No. 2010-1307 of 28 October 2010. 
The Maritime Code of Latvia for example, regulates the private and administrative legal 
relations between legal entities in their legal relations which are connected to maritime 
matters.309 The law regarding carriage of goods is provided by Part E Carriage of Cargo 
and Passengers, from Chapter XIX on General Provisions for Carriage of Cargo to 
Chapter XXVI on Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage. There are quite extensive 
provisions on the rights and duties of each party and in particular those relevant in 
considering shipper liability that may be found scattered all over this Part and they cover 
various aspects of the shipper’s duty. Some are not very obvious and need to be combed 
out of intertwining duties of the carrier.  
The first point to be noted is that the legal relations between the parties to a contract for 
the carriage of goods by sea is determined by agreement between the parties subject to 
the provisions of this Code.310 Even if a bill of lading is not issued, the provisions in this 
part of the Code are applicable to all such relations.311 The form in which legal relations 
between three specifically mentioned parties, namely the carrier, consignor and receiver 
of cargo are to take is the bill of lading other similar document of transport. However 
where a receiver is concerned there are mandatory conditions of the contract of carriage 
if those conditions are found outside of the bill of lading or other similar transport 
document and it is indicated as such in the latter documents.312  
The provisions of this code mention two common types of shippers, the cargo-owner 
and the consignor, and make a distinction between them. For instance in section 123, if 
the cargo is lost, damaged or is delayed, or if the carriage cannot be completed, the carrier 
has to inform the person indicated by the consignor, but if the carrier is unable to do so, 
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he may then notify the cargo-owner. However, if the latter is unknown to the carrier, he 
may then notify the consignor. There is also reference to the receiver and the voyage 
charterer, both of whom may be included within the definition of shipper in the first 
chapter and provisions regarding their respective duties will be discussed below. The 
voyage charterer is also distinguished from the consignor in this Code. For example in 
section 176(3), the carrier is to submit the notification of readiness of the ship to load to 
the consignor but if he is not available, then to the voyage charterer. 
Pre-carriage liabilities 
The duty to provide cargo 
Provisions in the civil law systems focus on the shipper’s duty to provide cargo within 
the time set by the carrier as well as the accompanying documents and necessary 
information. The following are some examples of such provisions. 
Under Book 5 of the German Commercial Code, §486(1) focuses on the duty of the 
shipper to ensure timeliness in effecting delivery of the cargo the carrier. The shipper 
must do so within the time agreed in the contract. This indicates that the duty is of a 
contractual nature. Prior to delivery of the cargo to the carrier, the shipper must also 
provide the accompanying documents and information which would be required for 
customs clearance and any other official processing.313 
In relation to the duty of the shipper to deliver the cargo, under §482(1) the shipper is to 
provide written information on the goods which is required for carriage, before the goods 
are delivered to the carrier for carriage, specifically information on the quantity, number, 
weight, the leading marks and the nature of the goods. However, if delivery of the goods 
to the carrier was done by a third party named by the shipper, the carrier may demand 
that such information be provided by the third party instead.314 
Under the Dutch Civil Code, article 8:26 provides generally that the consignor has the 
duty to provide all the information about the cargo and its handling which the consignor 
is able to provide or ought to be able to provide, and the importance of the information 
to the carrier of which the consignor knows or ought to know. The consignor is released 
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from this duty only if there is an assumption that the carrier already has this 
information.315 
The consignor also has the general duty under article 8:27 to provide the necessary 
documents which are required in order to perform the transport. If the required 
documents are not adequately available and as a consequence the carrier suffers damage, 
the consignor must compensate the carrier regardless of the reasons for the 
inadequacy.316 
Article 8:394 provides specifically for the shipper’s duty which is similar to the general 
provision in article 8:26. The shipper has the duty to provide all indications about the 
goods and information on the handling of the goods that he is able to provide or ought 
to be able to provide. Both the indications and information which the shipper has to 
provide are those which he knows or ought to know will be of importance to the carrier, 
unless they are the kind of information which the shipper may assume the carrier already 
knows.317 
Under the Italian Code of Navigation, in the section on carriage of specific goods318, 
section 452 provides that the shipper has the duty to present the goods for loading within 
the customary time after the ship is ready to receive the cargo. After the expiry of the 
time within which the shipper must deliver the cargo, the consequences would be that 
the Master has the option to set the ship to sail without waiting for the cargo any longer 
but the shipper will nevertheless still be required to pay the full freight. 
Where carriage of goods in general is concerned,319 Section 434 of the Italian Code of 
Navigation provides for the situation when the shipper delivers a lesser amount of goods 
than what was actually agreed. The shipper would still be required to pay the full freight 
but the expenses saved by the carrier in not completing loading will be deducted from it. 
If the contract had provided that the shipper was to deliver a full and complete cargo, if 
the shipper consents, the Master may now be able to load other cargo since the space 
was not taken up by the shipper. However the shipper may collect the profit which is due 
as a result of freight being paid on the goods which complete the cargo loading to the 
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extent that it was due by him. If the same situation occurs on the return voyage, the same 
provisions apply to the shipper. 
Under the Maritime Code of Latvia, in section 116 the consignor has a duty to deliver 
the cargo at the time and place indicated by the carrier and the cargo must be delivered 
in such a way and condition which enables it to be loaded, carried and unloaded 
conveniently and safely. If the consignor is late in delivering the cargo at the specified 
time and the delay affects the performance of the contract to a significant extent, the 
carrier may withdraw from performing the contract. However if the consignor still wants 
to continue with the contract, the consignor has the right to request from carrier a 
confirmation as to whether he is withdrawing from the contract or not. The carrier has 
to exercise this option by notifying the consignor promptly. If the carrier withdraws 
according to this procedure, the consignor is liable for the freight not acquired plus 
compensation for the carrier’s losses.320 
If the charterer does not deliver the cargo which was agreed in the contract, the charterer 
has to pay compensation for the losses or provide security within a reasonable period of 
time which may be set by the carrier failing which the carrier may withdraw from the 
contract and be compensated for losses by the charterer in accordance with section 196 
unless the charterer was not liable for the cargo not being delivered.321 Likewise the 
provisions of section 196 and 197 creates liability on the charterer if there was an 
agreement regarding demurrage and after expiry of the loading time period, the charterer 
has failed to deliver the cargo or did not deliver the complete cargo.322 However, if there 
was no agreement on demurrage, the liability of the charterer under section 196 and 197 
will depend on whether the carrier suffered substantial losses or inconvenience as a result 
of the delay and may wish to withdraw from the contract even though he has been 
compensated for the demurrage, or where the cargo has not been fully delivered, to give 
notification that loading is completed.323  
Under Book 8 of the Dutch Civil Code, in the general provisions relating to transport324 
article 8:24 provides that if the agreed cargo was not placed at the disposal of the carrier 
at the agreed time and place, the consignor has the obligation to pay compensation to the 
                                                          
320 Maritime Code of Latvia, s 122(2). 
321 ibid s 197(2). 
322 Maritime Code of Latvia, s 198(1). 
323 ibid s 198(2). 
324 Book 8 of the Dutch Civil Code, Title 8.2. 
92 
 
carrier for the damage suffered by the carrier as a consequence. This obligation to 
compensate arises regardless of the reason for the consignor in not delivering the cargo 
as agreed. 
Article 8:25 then goes on to provide that so long as the consignor does not place the 
cargo at the carrier’s disposal, the consignor has the right to terminate the contract but 
must then compensate the carrier for the damage accruing to the carrier as a result of 
termination.325 
For liabilities specific to the shipper in maritime law, the Dutch Civil Code echoes the 
earlier general provisions relating to transport and provides similarly in article 8:391 that 
the shipper has the duty to place the cargo at the carrier’s disposal at the agreed time and 
place, failing which the shipper has to compensate the carrier for the damage suffered 
by the carrier as a consequence of not fulfilling the duty to provide cargo in time. This 
liability accrues regardless of the reason for the shipper’s non fulfilment of this duty.326 
Similar to the general provision in article 8:25 above, the shipper is entitled to terminate 
the contract as long as he has not placed the cargo at the disposal of the carrier.327 The 
carrier is likewise entitled to terminate the contract without giving any formal notice if, 
after the end of the period of time during which the cargo should have been placed at his 
disposal plus an extended time for demurrage, no cargo whatsoever has actually been 
placed at the carrier’s disposal, regardless of the reasons why this has occurred.328 
If, again for whatever reason, a part of the cargo has been delivered at the end of this 
period, the carrier has the option of either to terminate the contract without giving formal 
notice or to accept and continue with the voyage.329 If the carrier opts to terminate, the 
shipper then has to compensate the carrier for the damage suffered by the carrier as a 
result of termination of the voyage or the carrier partially accepting the voyage, subject 
to article 8:383 paragraph 3.330 
Other liabilities of the charterer in relation to delay are connected to the period of time 
after loading and during the voyage. For example under the Maritime Code of Latvia, if 
the delay was due to the fault on the part of the voyage charterer or persons he is 
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responsible for, again compensation is due to the carrier for losses. Similarly where the 
ship’s delay during unloading is caused by the carrier’s inability to deliver the cargo for 
storage in a warehouse according to the provisions in section 190 on the right of the 
carrier to storage of cargo, he is to be compensated by the charterer.331 Another liability 
of the charterer to compensate for losses which is based on his fault or the fault of persons 
for whom he is responsible is the liability for damage to the carrier or other cargo caused 
by the cargo.332 
Under Chapter XXIV on Carriage of Cargo Quantity, the charterer has a duty under 
section 206(1) to prepare and submit in due time a schedule for the carriage of cargo to 
the carrier which takes into account the relationship between the specific voyage to the 
total operative period of the contract. The charterer also has a duty to use care in ensuring 
that the cargo provided for is divided proportionately over the whole contract duration 
by taking into account the parameters of the ship.333 This duty appears to resemble the 
tort duty of care although it does not deal with foreseeability of damage. 
There is also a duty on the charterer to give a notice of loading which is a notice that 
specifies the period of time within which the cargo will be prepared for loading in good 
time to the carrier.334 If this is not done in good time, the carrier may set a specific time 
for the charterer to submit it. If it is still not submitted, the carrier may choose either to 
issue a notice of the ship’s particulars or to withdraw from that specific voyage.335 This 
option may be exercised by the carrier for subsequent voyages if this delay provides a 
basis to believe that further delays in giving the notice of loading are likely.336 For all 
these delays the charterer has to pay compensation for losses unless the delay was caused 
by the circumstances provided in section 196(3) above.337 If the cargo carriage schedule 
is not submitted by the charterer in good time, again the carrier may set a specific time 
in which it has to be submitted. If the charterer fails to submit after the specified time, 
the carrier may withdraw from the remaining voyages, and claim for compensation as 
provided in section 210(3) above.338 
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Further duties which may be considered to be connected as sub-requirements to fulfil the 
duty to provide cargo are the corresponding duty to mark the cargo, the duty to notify 
the shipment of dangerous goods as well as the duty to provide adequate instructions to 
deal with the cargo and these are discussed below. 
The duty to mark and pack the cargo 
The packing and marking of the cargo is an area of shipper liability which is also covered 
by the provisions in civil law systems. For example in the Italian Code of Navigation, 
Section 422 actually provides for the carrier’s responsibility, but in detailing the process 
in which liability is determined it is mentioned therein the possibility of the shipper being 
blamed by the consignee for insufficiency of packing or insufficiency or imperfection of 
the marks on the cargo or any act or omission in general of the shipper, his servants or 
managers which resulted in the damage or loss to the goods carried or the delay.339 
Section 425 provides for the duty of the shipper to place marks of countersign on the 
goods or its packaging which are delivered to the carrier, which will remain the same 
and visible until the end of the voyage. Otherwise the shipper will be liable for damage 
caused to the carrier as a result of imperfectly placing the marks.340 
Under Book 5 of the German Commercial Code, where packaging of the goods is 
needed, the shipper has the duty to pack the goods properly according to its nature and 
the type of carriage required, so as to protect the goods from physical damage or loss as 
well as to prevent detriment towards the carrier.341 Here we see encouragement of an 
active participatory role to be played by the shipper to ensure the safety of its own goods 
from physical damage and loss without relying solely on the carrier, bearing in mind that 
it is the shipper who knows its own goods and what they need to be protected against 
damage or loss. This is done not only to protect the shipper’s interest but also that of the 
carrier. The new law clearly expresses the reciprocal duty of the shipper to protect the 
carrier. 
This is reminiscent of the current trend in the Rotterdam Rules where the shipper is given 
a more active role, a seemingly bigger responsibility or rather, taking on more of the 
share of responsibility in the safety of its own cargo, the ship and other cargo on board 
to minimise the risks and ensure the success in the venture for all. 
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This is further reiterated in the second line of §484 of Book 5 of the German Commercial 
Code where the section further emphasises that where any article of transport is used to 
consolidate cargo units such as containers and pallets before they are delivered for 
carriage, the shipper has to ensure that the cargo is properly and carefully stowed and 
secured in or on the article of transport in such a way that ensures the cargo does not 
cause harm to persons and property. This indicates that the shipper owes a duty of care 
towards other persons and property to not cause harm to them whether they may be the 
carrier, other cargo owners, or third parties.  In as far as the shipper may be contractually 
required to handle the cargo, this section also provides that the shipper has the duty to 
ensure that the cargo is properly identified with leading marks.342 
Liability for dangerous goods 
There are usually very specific and focused provisions on liability of the shipper for 
dangerous goods in civil law systems. For example under the German Commercial Code, 
there is a separate provision in §483(1) which specifically imposes a duty on the shipper 
to inform the carrier if the shipper intends to ship dangerous goods. The shipper must 
provide information regarding the precise dangerous nature of the goods and this must 
be done in a timely manner and in writing. The shipper should also include any necessary 
precautionary measures to be taken. If the shipper had named a third party to deliver the 
goods, this duty is imposed on the third party as well. However, if when taking over the 
goods the danger was unknown to the carrier or it was not informed, and neither were 
the master nor the ship’s agent, the goods may be unloaded, stored, returned, destroyed 
or made harmless by the carrier to the extent necessary without incurring any liability 
towards the shipper.343 It is interesting to note that although the shipper has the duty to 
inform the carrier regarding the dangerous nature of the goods under §483(1), the 
consequences of §483(2) may be avoided if the information was given to the master or 
the ship’s agent. It may be implied here that since the master and the ship’s agent are 
clearly the carrier’s agents, information provided to them, is equivalent to informing the 
carrier. 
Nevertheless, even if the carrier, master or ship’s agent were informed or knew about 
the dangerous nature of the goods, the measures in §483(2) may still be taken if, without 
any fault or neglect of the carrier, the goods were likely to become a danger to the ship 
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or cargo, which was not a requirement for when the shipper does not inform the carrier, 
master or ship’s agent about the danger, or if the danger was unknown to them. Another 
way therefore in which this may be construed is that in the latter situation, the carrier 
may take action in the various forms provided in the first part of §483(2) whether or not 
the cargo presented or was likely to become a danger to either or both the ship and cargo. 
In both situations where the reactive measures for safety were taken, the carrier would 
not be liable to the shipper. Another point to note is that the provision makes a distinction 
between situations where the carrier, master or ship’s agent is informed, and where the 
carrier, master or ship’s agent knows about the danger. The carrier’s knowledge about 
the dangerous nature of the goods may thus come from another source apart from 
information provided by the shipper. 
Not only is the carrier absolved from liability to the shipper if such reactive measures 
were taken in the circumstances where the carrier, master or ship’s agent were not 
informed or knew about the dangerous nature of the goods, the shipper and the third 
party may also have to reimburse the carrier for any expenses which the carrier may have 
incurred in taking the necessary measures to ensure the safety of the ship and other cargo 
on board, if the third party delivering the cargo did not providing accurate and complete 
information about the goods when they were handed over to the carrier.344 It is not clear 
however what the consequences are if it was the shipper who did not provide accurate 
and complete information about the goods. 
According to section 118(2) of the Maritime Code of Latvia, the consignor has a duty to 
label dangerous goods appropriately and to inform the carrier in good time about the 
dangerous nature of the goods being delivered as well as the safety measures in which 
they are to be handled by the carrier. For the purpose of the Latvian Maritime Code, 
dangerous goods refer to those which comply with the definition of dangerous cargo as 
specified by the Law on Circulation of Dangerous Cargo.345 However, according to 
section 118(3) if the consignor has other reasons to believe that carriage of the cargo 
may give rise to danger or significant inconvenience to persons, the ship or cargo due to 
the characteristics of the cargo, there is a duty upon the consignor to inform the carrier. 
This shows that what amounts to dangerous cargo does not solely rely on the list 
specified above but also on the judgement of the consignor’s beliefs. If the cargo needs 
special provisions for its carriage, the consignor must notify the carrier in good time this 
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fact as well as the necessary measures to be taken, and if necessary to label the goods as 
such.346  
Provisions on the general liability of the consignor, his employee or representative is 
provided by section 150 which is worded in the negative sense whereby these parties are 
not liable if the loss or damage to the cargo was caused by the fault of the carrier. In 
relation to liability for hazardous cargo provided in section 118 above, the consignor 
would be liable for the losses and expenditure incurred by the carrier if the consignor 
had failed to observe the rules in section 118. In this case, the carrier is also able to 
dispose of the hazardous cargo by unloading it, rendering it harmless or destroying it and 
the carrier would not need to compensate for the losses.347 However, if the carrier was 
aware at the time he accepted the cargo that he will be carrying is dangerous, the liability 
of the consignor for the hazardous cargo provided above is no longer applicable.348 
Tetley349 wrote that where French maritime law is concerned a shipper is required to 
declare the nature of all dangerous, inflammable and explosive cargo which is delivered 
to the carrier for carriage. This is not expressly provided for, rather the implied obligation 
stems from the right of the carrier to dispose of cargo for which the shipper did not 
declare to the carrier its dangerous nature.350 The provision in the French law resembles 
the provision in Article 4(6) of the Hague-Visby Rules. The shipper’s liability for this 
has been held to include damages and expenses incurred against and by not only the ship, 
but also other cargo on board the ship, and injury which may have been inflicted upon 
the crew and third parties, as a result of the failure of the shipper to make disclosure.351 
Just as in the common law principles, the law in France adopts the rule that the 
determination of whether the carrier knew or should have known about the dangerous 
nature of the goods will influence the rights and liabilities of both the shipper and the 
carrier. According to Tetley,352 the obligation of the shipper stems from the duty to 
provide security to the carrier which is implied in the contract of carriage. This is 
provided by art. 1135 c.c.353 Again, the warranty of the shipper that the goods are suitable 
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for carriage will vary depending on whether the carrier knew or should have known that 
the shipper is sending dangerous goods.354 Art 1135 c.c. also raises an implied 
contractual duty upon the shipper to inform the carrier that the goods are dangerous.355  
From this, Tetley concludes that where the carrier is concerned, the nature of the 
shipper’s liability for dangerous goods in civil law is absolute and the basis of liability 
is contractual.356 However, where third parties are concerned, the basis of liability is 
delict or tort, and because of this article 1383 and 1384 c.c. of France requires that fault 
of the shipper be established. Apart from this, the liability of the shipper is also 
dependent upon the experience and knowledge of the shipper relative to the 
manufacturer of the goods.357 
Tetley also believes that France has a regulatory scheme for dealing with issues of 
packing, marking and stowing of dangerous goods which is intricate and detailed.358 One 
of them is by way of reliance on article 4(5) of the Hague-Visby Rules359 which governs 
any misstatements which was done knowingly by the shipper regarding the nature and 
value of the cargo and its own provisions in art. 31 of Law No. 66-420 of June 18, 1966 
which is used to deal with cases concerning dangerous goods which was not disclosed 
by the shipper.360 
The duty to load 
Section 180(1) of the Maritime Code of Latvia provides for the duties of loading and 
stowage wherein the charterer is only to deliver the cargo along the ship’s side and that 
loading is to be performed by the carrier unless they have agreed otherwise in the 
charter361 or if it is not stated in the contract, that there are relevant customs of the port 
to be applied.362 The charterer has to ensure the delivery of the cargo to the ship is 
without delay and in such a way that it may be safely and easily loaded, stowed, carried, 
and unloaded in accordance with the provisions above in section 117-120 of the Code 
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regarding dangerous goods and cargo for which special provisions for carriage are 
necessary.363  
As far as unloading is concerned. The charterer has the duty to pay for the increase in 
costs if such an increase was due to the cargo being damaged or the cost of disposal of 
the damaged cargo, and that this damage to the cargo was due to the hazardous nature of 
the cargo or that the charterer was at fault.364 
In relation to unloading, if there were increased costs as a result of the cargo being 
damaged or that as a consequence, costs had to be incurred to dispose of the damaged 
cargo, this has to be borne by the charterer if the damage was caused by the hazardous 
nature of the cargo or if the voyage charterer was at fault.365 There is no liability for 
freight for goods which no longer exist at the end of the journey unless it was due to the 
nature of the goods or the fault of the voyage charterer, inappropriate packaging of the 
cargo, or where the carrier has disposed of the cargo by selling it at the owner’s expense, 
unloading or rendering it harmless or destroying it in accordance with provisions on 
carriage of hazardous cargo in section 186.366 Liability of the receiver for freight as well 
as fulfilment of the requirements in section 130 which deals with the duty of the receiver 
to pay freight arises upon the receiver accepting the cargo.367 
Under the Italian Code of Navigation, the shipper has a duty to deliver to the carrier 
during loading and before sailing, the bills of entry and will be liable to the carrier for 
damage occurring as a result of non-delivery.368 If after loading impediments to sailing 
due to force majeure arise resulting in cancellation of the contract, or the option to cancel 
arises due to delay as a result of the same impediments, the shipper has to bear the costs 
of unloading.369 If the impediment to sailing is only temporary and was not caused by 
the fault of the carrier, the contract remains intact. During this time, the shipper may 
unload the goods at his expense but will be obliged to reload the same or to indemnify 
the damages. If the temporary impediment occurs after the ship has set sail, the shipper 
must provide a guarantee for the fulfilment of the abovementioned duties.370 
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Another duty connected to the duty to load is the duty to nominate the loading port and 
this is discussed below. 
Liabilities during transit 
The duty to provide instructions to deal with cargo 
The cargo-owner has the duty under the Maritime Code of Latvia to give relevant 
instructions to the carrier if his cargo requires special measures in carrying, preserving 
or otherwise protecting the interests of the cargo-owner.371 The carrier may take the 
necessary measures on behalf of the cargo-owner and where there are issues in relation 
to the cargo, the carrier may represent the cargo-owner if the instructions were not 
received by the carrier in ample time or there were obstacles in delivering the instructions 
to the carrier. These measures are binding on the cargo owner where third parties have 
acted in good faith even though the measures were not necessary.372 If the carrier has 
undertaken the measures as well as incurred expenditures for the cargo, the cargo-owner 
is liable for these. However where the measures were taken without instructions from 
the cargo-owner, there is a limit to the cargo-owner’s liability to the value of the cargo 
at the commencement of the voyage.373 
The duty to nominate the loading port 
The voyage charterer may be given the right under the Maritime Code of Latvia to 
choose the port of loading and unloading, and if so the charterer has a duty to direct the 
ship to a port which is freely accessible in order that the ship may safely lie afloat, enter 
the port of loading, and depart on its voyage with cargo. The notification by the charterer 
of where unloading will take place has to be done before loading is completed.374 If the 
port which the charterer had instructed the ship to be taken to, turned out to be an unsafe 
port, there is liability on the part of the charterer for any losses which were caused by 
this reason unless those losses were not caused by the fault of the charterer or persons 
he is responsible for.375 Where the right to choose the voyages in consecutive voyage 
charters is concerned, the charterer has the duty to ensure that in using the right, the 
length of the voyages for carrying cargo in total and the length of ballast voyage do not 
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differ too significantly. Otherwise the voyage charterer will not earn freight and has to 
be liable for losses which are incurred as a result.376 Section 179(1) provides for the 
liability of the charterer to pay special compensation for demurrage time to the carrier. 
The amount to be paid is to be agreed by the parties, otherwise it is provided by this 
section that it is equivalent to the charter time the carrier would have received if it was 
not lost due to the occurrence of the demurrage. The special compensation must be paid 
on demand,377 and is likewise imposed on the receiver upon unloading of the goods.378 
Post-carriage liabilities 
Liability for freight 
The liability of the shipper to pay freight is another common area which is focused upon 
by provisions in the civil law system. For example under the German Commercial Code, 
the general liability of the shipper to pay the agreed freight as a primary duty is now 
provided by §481.379 
Under the Dutch Civil Code, a general provision under article 8:29 provides for the 
payment of freightage is due and may be demanded only after the goods have been 
delivered at their destination.380 
Where liability for freight is concerned, section 121(2) of the Maritime Code of Latvia 
provides that there is no liability for freight if the cargo no longer exists at the end of the 
carriage unless the cause of this was the nature of the cargo itself, packaging defects or 
error or carelessness on the consignor’s part, or that the carrier had taken steps to sell the 
cargo on the owner’s expense or unloaded or rendered it harmless or destroyed the cargo 
in accordance with section 151. Section 122(1) deals with the liability of the consignor 
to pay freight otherwise acquired as well as compensation where the carriage contract 
was not performed due to the withdrawal of the consignor from the contract before the 
carriage commences. Where the right of withdrawal was exercised by the carrier in 
accordance with the procedure discussed above381 as a result of the failure of the 
consignor to deliver the cargo at the time and place stipulated by the carrier, the 
consignor is nonetheless liable for freight not acquired and compensation for other 
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losses.382 This duty to pay otherwise acquired freight also arises if the carriage was 
interrupted or the place of delivery of the cargo was changed at the request of the 
consignor.383 If part of the carriage has already been performed before the carrier 
exercises his right of withdrawal, or the contract is no longer in effect, or for some other 
reason the cargo was taken off the vessel at a port other than the one at which it was 
contracted to be unloaded, freight is due to the carrier in proportion384 to the distance 
which has already been performed, but not more than the value of the cargo itself.385 
Where the interruption of the carriage was due to a force majeure, and the ship then is 
unable to enter the port of unloading, the carrier has to immediately inform the consignor 
and the consignor must not significantly delay in giving instructions as to the action to 
be taken with the cargo, otherwise the carrier has the right to exercise his discretion to 
unload the cargo at the nearest port or to return the cargo to the port of loading.386 
In Chapter XXIII on Voyage Chartering, there are detailed provisions on the duty of the 
voyage charterer. Section 170(1) provides that the charterer has a duty to pay freight as 
set on the day the charter agreement was entered into if the freight was not specified in 
the contract itself. If the cargo loaded is in excess of or of a different type than what was 
agreed, the charterer has to pay freight at the tariff rate specified by the carrier which 
must not be lower than the contracted rate.387 There is a liability on the charterer to pay 
distance freight in proportion to the distance already covered to the carrier even though 
the journey was not completed due to withdrawal from the charter contract or unloading 
is done at the place not contracted for due to some other reason.388 Distance freight 
includes the actual duration covered by the journey and special costs incurred by the 
voyage, however the total must not be in excess of the value of the cargo.389 
The charterer has the duty to pay the freight, compensation for demurrage time or other 
payments stipulated in the contract in good time, otherwise the carrier may set a specific 
time within which it must be paid. Failing payment within this time will allow the carrier 
to suspend performance of the contract or to withdraw from the contract if substantial 
breach results from the delay.390 Section 212(2) provides that the holders of bills of 
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lading who are not the charterer are also bound by the provisions of this section regarding 
the payments above if the duty to pay was provided for in the bill of lading in accordance 
with section 169. So if the shipper is not the charterer, but the cargo owner, this liability 
to pay may still arise. 
Under the Italian Code of Navigation, interruption of the voyage may occur after 
commencement of the sailing due to force majeure and if the repairs to the vessel cannot 
be done of requires excessive time or the voyage excessively delayed, the shipper has a 
liability to pay freight for the proportion of the voyage which was usefully covered, if 
the Master had done everything possible to forward the goods to its destination by means 
of another ship.391 
The duty to receive cargo 
Where the meaning of shipper includes the consignee or receiver, the provision in section 
129 of the Maritime Code of Latvia regarding the duty of the receiver to collect the cargo 
at the port of destination is relevant. Reception of the cargo by the receiver must be at 
the time and place indicated by the carrier. Where delivery of cargo is against production 
of the bill of lading, the receiver has the duty to pay freight and other claims by the 
carrier arising from the bill of lading.392 If another form of carriage contract is used, 
liability of the receiver for such payments still arises if the receiver was aware of the 
claims at the time of delivery or that such payments had not been made.393  
Liability for withdrawal 
If the shipper was a voyage charterer, the provision in section 196(1) of the Maritime 
Code of Latvia which deals with withdrawal from the charter contract before the loading 
of cargo commences is a useful provision. If withdrawal was due to the fault of the 
charterer or if upon loading it turns out the charterer had not provided sufficient cargo 
as was agreed in the contract, the charterer is liable for the freight otherwise acquired as 
well as compensation for losses incurred by the carrier. The measure of the carrier’s 
losses takes into account any mitigating steps taken by the carrier when carrying other 
cargo.394 However, if the inability to load, carry or deliver the cargo to the receiver was 
due to circumstances unforeseeable by the voyage charterer on the day the charter was 
                                                          
391 Italian Code of Navigation, s 429. 
392 Maritime Code of Latvia, s 130(1). 
393 ibid s 130(2). 
394 ibid s 196(2). 
104 
 
entered into, the carrier may not claim compensation for his losses. Examples of 
unforeseeable circumstances which hinder performance of the various stages of the 
contract of affreightment are provided in the section as ranging from restrictions on 
import, export or other restrictions imposed by state institutions, to destruction of the 
whole subject matter of the contracted cargo by accident, or anything similar to these 
examples. Compensation claims by the carrier against the charterer is not only lost when 
destruction of all of the cargo occurs since accidental destruction of cargo specified 
individually is also covered here.395 However to benefit from this the charterer has a duty 
to notify the carrier without delay, otherwise the immunity will be lost and the charterer 
then will be liable to compensate the carrier.396 This provision appears to be a tortious-
like liability where liability of the charterer is dependent upon foreseeability of the 
fortuitous events resulting in losses to the carrier. 
Section 201 provides for the duty of both the charterer and the carrier to give notice 
without delay if they wish to withdraw from the contract without having to cover the 
losses even though the voyage has commenced due to substantial danger arising from a 
war or similar risk if they choose to do so. If there is delay in giving appropriate notice, 
the party seeking to withdraw will be liable for the losses. 
Section 213 is a similar provision to section 201 above regarding the ability to withdraw 
from the contract without being liable for losses if a war risk emerged during the 
execution of the contract which significantly affects the performance of the contract 
subject to the withdrawing party giving adequate notice without which he will be liable 
for losses. 
Nature of shipper’s liability under civil law 
Under the civil law, the provisions clearly separate those liabilities which require fault 
and those which are strict. For example under Book 5 of the German Commercial Code, 
the various types of liabilities of the shipper which require  compensation to be due to 
the carrier for damages and expenditures incurred by the latter are reiterated and 
consolidated in §488 together with third parties’ liabilities. These include liability for 
inaccurate or incomplete information provided about the goods that were required of the 
shipper,397 or if the shipper failed to disclose the dangerous nature of the goods to the 
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carrier,398 or if the packing or the marking of the goods were insufficient,399 or if the 
shipper failed to provide the documents or information needed for official processing or 
had provided those which were insufficient or inaccurate.400 There is however, a proviso 
in this section that if the shipper was not responsible for the breach of duties enumerated, 
there will be no liability on the shipper. This provision clearly prescribes that the nature 
of liability of the shipper for these failings is fault-based.  
This position however, is only true if a bill of lading was not issued. Where such a bill 
was issued, the liability of the shipper becomes a little bit more complicated. The nature 
of the shipper’s liability is strict as the shipper will be liable regardless of fault for two 
matters; incomplete or inaccurate provision of information in the bill of lading regarding 
the cargo’s quantity, number or weight, or the leading marks provided for 
identification;401 or if the shipper had failed to inform the carrier regarding the dangerous 
nature of the goods.402 The nature of the shipper’s liability in relation to the first matter 
in the new German maritime law is viewed by a writer403 as reflecting that of the Hague-
Visby Rules in article III (5) where the shipper is deemed to have guaranteed to the 
carrier that the marks, number, quantity and weight in the bill of lading are accurate, 
failing which the shipper has to indemnify the carrier for any resulting losses, damages 
and expenses. 
What is interesting in the Code is the concept of the Ablader which is somewhat similar 
to the “documentary shipper” in the Rotterdam Rules, but with a very important 
distinction. The Ablader is now defined in the new Book 5 as the person who delivers 
the goods to the carrier for carriage and designated by the shipper to be recorded as the 
Ablader in the bill of lading. If someone else other than the Ablader delivers the goods, 
or if the shipper does not nominate anyone to be the Ablader, then the shipper becomes 
the Ablader.404 The rules in the Code regarding the Ablader’s liability however, are not 
similar to the rules regarding the documentary shipper in the Rotterdam Rules. Where 
the service of an Ablader is utilized, the shipper is not liable for inaccurate or incomplete 
information provided by the Ablader or the failure by the Ablader to inform the carrier 
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regarding the dangerous nature of the goods, and vice versa. They are each responsible 
for the failures on their own part, although both perform almost similar obligations.405 
The Ablader would be liable to the carrier if it was the one delivering the goods to the 
carrier for carriage if the information it provided was inaccurate or if it failed to inform 
the carrier about the dangerous nature of the goods.406 Liability of the Ablader here is 
also subject to fault,407 but likewise if a bill of lading was issued, this will turn into strict 
liability.408 
Furthermore, if the carrier had contributed to his own loss, the liability of the shipper 
and the Ablader to compensate for the will be adjusted according to the extent the 
carrier’s conduct had contributed to the damages and expenditures.409 
What is interesting though, is that all these provisions in §488 on liability of the shipper 
except in relation to contribution to the damage by the carrier, may be excluded by way 
of a clearly worded agreement which was negotiated in detail. This has to be done on 
the basis of each individual contract regardless of it being similar to another previous 
agreement between the same parties which allowed for this to happen. Similarly, the 
liability of the shipper here may be limited.410 
Although the shipper may terminate the carriage contract for general cargo anytime,411 
he will be liable to the carrier for one of two things. The shipper has to either pay the 
agreed freight, a refund of expenditures incurred by the carrier which have been offset 
by expenses which were saved by the termination or anything which was acquired or in 
bad faith, was not acquired;412 or to simply pay one third of the agreed freight which is 
called dead freight or Fautfracht.413 However if the termination was made due to reasons 
within the scope of risks which were to be borne by the carrier, then he cannot claim for 
Fautfracht. In fact if this was the case, the carrier may not even claim under the first 
option. 
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The goods may have already been loaded and stowed before the shipper opt to terminate 
and if this was the case, the carrier shall be entitled to take measures set out in §492(3) 
and the cost of this must be borne by the shipper.414 These measures include discharging 
the goods from the ship and storing them, entrusting the goods to a third party for storage, 
returning the goods, sell the goods if they are perishable or their condition warrants this 
or if to do otherwise would incur costs which would be out of proportion to the value of 
the goods, or if they cannot be sold to even destroy them.415 Again, if the termination 
came about as a result of reasons within the scope of risks to be borne by the carrier, then 
the carrier must bear the cost as a result of the termination by the shipper.416 
As mentioned above, under Book 8 of the Dutch Civil Code, article 8:24 provides that 
the consignor is liable to pay compensation to the carrier if as a result of the consignor 
failing to deliver the cargo at the agreed time and place, the carrier suffers damage. The 
nature of the shipper’s liability here is strict as the shipper is liable to the carrier 
regardless of the reason for which he was unable to deliver the cargo as agreed.417 
Article 8:27 also provides for strict liability of the consignor where the consignor does 
not provide adequate documents required for the transport and as a consequence the 
carrier suffers damage. The consignor has to compensate the carrier regardless of the 
reasons for the inadequacy of the documents.418 
Another strict liability provision in the Dutch Civil Code is in article 8:391 which 
resembles article 8:24 where the shipper has to compensate the carrier if it fails to deliver 
the cargo at the agreed time and place and this results in damage being suffered by the 
carrier. The reason for the failure of shipper in delivering the cargo is irrelevant and the 
shipper is strictly liable regardless of fault.419 
In concluding this part, it is observed that there is a mixture of contractual and tortious 
duties in the civil law on shipper liability. For example, the duty in §486(1) of Book 5 
of the German Commercial Code resembles the contractual duty to effect delivery of the 
cargo to the carrier within the time stipulated in the contract. Another example is the 
nature of the liability of the shipper for dangerous goods in §483 which resembles that 
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of a warranty in a contractual relationship. It is arguable that this provision creates a 
warranty by the shipper to not ship dangerous goods without first informing the carrier, 
master or ship’s agent. If this warranty is breached, the shipper is then required to 
reimburse the carrier as a result of the expenditures incurred by the carrier for measures 
taken by the carrier to rectify the breach as provided by §483(2). The section on 
reimbursement in §483(3) however, only covers the situation where the incorrect or 
incomplete statement was made by the third party handing over the goods. The provision 
for compensation to be provided by the shipper for the shipper’s own breach in not 
providing accurate and complete information regarding the goods or a failure to disclose 
its dangerous nature is found in a separate section namely §488. It also arguable that 
under §483 it is agreed that the carrier may take certain actions if the shipper breaches 
its warranty towards the carrier to not ship dangerous goods without giving notice. 
 There are also duties which resemble those found in tort for example the duty of care of 
the shipper found in §484 of the same Code to not cause harm towards other persons and 
property when packing the goods in or on an article of transport such as a container.  
It would be interesting to look at how the courts apply these rules in resolving disputes 
and shed more light on whether it can be classified as contractual, tortious or merely a 
statutory offence. What is also interesting is that there is an enormous amount of 
provisions in certain Codes such as the Maritime Code of Latvia dealing with a wide 
area of almost all aspects of liabilities and specific duties which can be argued to regulate 
shipper liability, and this reveals that there already are in some national law, rules which 
expressly create causes of action against the shipper for failure to fulfil their obligations. 
Concepts from religious and customary law 
Objective 
The objective of this section is to identify principles and derive concepts from religious 
and customary law which may be relevant in conceptualizing shipper liability for cargo 
and providing it with a more holistic and complete picture, since religious and customary 
laws have been recognized to be an important aspect of acceptance of laws created in 
modern civilisations. Religious laws may have influenced and helped shape the making 
of civil laws420 on shipper liability and so it is important to discover how and to what 
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extent religion has influenced civil laws. There may also have been cases influenced by 
religious or customary laws which have come before tribunals or have been decided 
based on religious or customary laws. 
Scope 
It is not intended in this research to delve into the detailed intricacies of the principles 
and authority for various concepts within the religious and customary laws. However a 
basic explanation of the basis for the rules will be made in order to appreciate the nature 
of the rules. The research in this section is limited to looking at only those concepts and 
principles which have a more direct bearing over, relevance to or applicability on shipper 
liability for example those concepts dealing with shipping, commerce, trading and 
bailment where private transactions are concerned, and certain crimes where public 
interference is concerned. The existence of rules within religious laws which relate to 
shipper liability also indicate a certain level of morality that can be found within shipper 
liability rules. Reference is made primarily to Islam because it has a structure and 
established legal principles. 
Although Islam has the fundamental provisions in its first primary source of law, the 
Quran, and supplemented by the second primary source, the prophetic traditions or 
hadith,421 the gaps in these provisions were later further developed by the Muslim 
scholars and jurists’ study and interpretation of the primary sources during the period of 
the spread of the Islamic civilisation across the world between the 7th and 13th century 
and in themselves have become important sources of law, known as fiqh or Islamic 
jurisprudence, consisting of reasoning by analogy with the primary sources or known as 
qiya’ and consensus of the jurists on rules derived from the primary sources or ijma’. 
Collectively, these four sources make up the shar’iah.422 Another important source 
where commercial transactions are concerned is custom or ‘urf.423 Islam thus covers all 
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aspects of life from the simplest act of having a meal or visiting the lavatory to the 
etiquettes of engaging one’s enemy in battle. Concepts in commercial, contract or even 
maritime law are therefore definitely to be found within the realm of Islam, although it 
may not be spelt out specifically as such. 
The development of commercial concepts emerged probably as a result of the expansion 
of the Islamic civilisation across a vast expanse of the area under its conquest across the 
world wherein trading took place and prospered. As Islam deals with every aspect of 
human life, it must then recognize the needs of traders and merchants alike and provide 
rules for their guidance and to solve disputes between them.424 During this time, and 
while they lasted, the Islamic commercial laws in place were considered to fulfil the 
needs of commerce in order for it to be able to function properly and efficiently, and it 
is commented by Mallat as quoted by Foster425 to consist of three elements which are 
considered to be fundamental requirements for a robust commercial law regime; 
“certainty, flexibility and pragmatism”. 
Panzac argues that since there were historical accounts of Muslim traders contracting 
with European merchants to charter the latter’s ships during the Ottoman empire, the 
agreement entered into implies the consistency between rules in Islam and the charter 
terms employed by the European counterpart, and that possibly also there was influence 
from the Islamic law over the ‘Christian’ maritime law which made acceptance of the 
terms of the charter for the Muslim traders more likely.426 Therefore consistency between 
different sources is another important feature of any law which need to be commercially 
viable and easier to be accepted by the industry players. 
Another important aspect of shar’iah is that as stated above, it takes into account the 
custom or ‘urf and usages of mankind, and for the shipping community, custom of the 
trade is definitely an important source in resolving disputes and many if not most of the 
laws in shipping are derived from customs practised by mariners and merchants from 
long ago which have been recognised and adopted as law. In fact according to Mallat as 
quoted by Foster,427 there were times when the ‘urf preceded the strict provisions of fiqh 
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‘in favor of the merchants’ customs’. Therefore an important concept that can be 
extracted is the importance and priority of custom of the trade over the substantive law, 
and this shows how important conformity of law to business practice is to the participants 
in commerce.  
As stated above, Islam governs the life of a Muslim from the moment he wakes up in the 
morning, applies to everything that he does during the course of the day whether at home 
or outside, and whether it concerns a private or public course of dealing, until he goes to 
bed at night. In this sense, Islam does not categorize and separate its rules from those 
which are personal, private or public, and regardless of the location or relationship of the 
persons in the same way Western law prescribes a different rule for persons dealing in a 
business relationship and those in a domestic relationship. In Islam, the same standards 
of morality and ethical behaviour apply to all situations. Nevertheless there is some form 
of categorization of the sharia’ by the jurists in clustering specific rules on transactions 
or mu’amalat. The rules mainly deal with finance, sale of goods, contracts and 
economics.  
The general principle in mu’amalat is permissibility or ibahah, in that everything is 
permissible unless it has been specifically prohibited by the divine rules. This was the 
first fatwa or resolution of the First Albaraka Seminar 1981428 as referred to by 
Ahmed.429 The shar’iah clearly provides a list of prohibitions but neither should it be 
expanded. The most important of these prohibitions are riba’ which is usury or the taking 
of interest over a debt (preserving the value of the thing from beginning to end), maysir 
which is gambling (one person win-everyone else loses) and gharar which is ambiguities 
in a contract (uncertainties in value). While the prohibitions are clearly stated by 
shar’iah, according to Kamali, as quoted by Ahmed, 430  the interpretation of those 
provisions may differ according to the needs of different time and place through a 
process known as ijtihad. The rules therefore are not rigid and may be adapted in 
accordance with its suitability with the changing needs of the people over time. Kamali, 
as quoted by Ahmed stated that the principles used in practising ijtihad are by 
considering the effective cause or ‘illah, rationale or hikmah and benefit or maslahah 
that such a rule would confer.431 Another important factor that is also taken into account 
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is the custom of the locality.432 Where custom is concerned, there is therefore consistency 
in the concept used in applying the rules of the general overall principle of shariah’ 
discussed above with the specific rules on a particular section within the shariah’. 
Another concept in Islamic law which may be relevant in discussing shipper liability is 
the concept of Al-Wadi’ah. This is a concept used in Islamic banking and denotes the 
idea of entrusting one’s assets or wealth in another’s custody. Its principle is used in 
Islamic banking obviously refer to the safekeeping of deposits made by customers to the 
bank but it is arguable that since the root word for Al-Wadi’ah is wada’a which means 
to deposit, lodge or leave, this concept can be also used in shipping where the shipper 
delivers its goods to the carrier, in the same way perhaps the concept of bailment can be 
used for the shipper-carrier relationship. 
The relevant authorities from the Quran about wada’a are Surah An-Nisa verse 58 which 
provides that God commands the human to entrust their belongings to whom they are 
due, and Surah Al-Baqarah verse 283 which provides that when a person makes a 
security deposit and trusts the other person with it, the depositor should let the person 
entrusted with the item discharge the trust faithfully by reason of the fear of God. It goes 
on to say that testimony must not be concealed because doing so would be sinful and 
God is Knowing of all that we do. 
These are a few very interesting concepts within these authorities which could be applied 
to shipper liability since it conveys the basic rules that firstly, the shipper must deliver 
its goods to a carrier to whom it has agreed or promised to deliver to whether in terms 
of time, space and amount. Secondly, the shipper should allow the carrier to properly 
carry out its responsibility of taking care of the cargo because it has been entrusted with 
it and this can only be done if the shipper cooperates by taking all the necessary steps 
required for the smooth transit of its cargo including proper packaging, labelling and that 
carrier is provided with all the necessary information about the goods, which is a point 
connected to the third rule. The third rule provides that the shipper must therefore not 
conceal any information which is relevant or even vital in ensuring that the carrier will 
be able to transport the cargo safely and properly without delay, danger or other 
complications which could be caused by the shipper in not fulfilling certain duties 
towards the carrier and other third parties. 
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Islamic Law concerning shipping 
As mentioned above, the first primary source of Islamic Law is the Quran. Where 
shipping is concerned, there is no specific verse in the Quran which prohibits against 
participation in maritime activities, although during the rule of certain Muslim caliphs, 
maritime expeditions were prohibited.433 In fact there are many verses in the Quran 
which may be interpreted as depicting sea voyages as a necessity for human beings 
without which we would be left disadvantaged.434 This can be deduced from the verses 
in the Quran which relate that the ability to traverse the sea is actually considered as a 
favour given by God to mankind, as well as a sign if His existence. For example in Surah 
Yunus, the Quran mentions the ability to board ships is by way of God enabling 
humankind to traverse the sea through His permission,435 and also in Surah Ibrahim, 
where the power of man to control ships on the sea is also due to God allowing this to 
happen,436 whereas in Surah Al-Baqarah, the fact of ships sailing on the seas is 
specifically included in a list of God’s wondrous creations as a sign of His existence 
indicated to mankind to ponder upon.437 In Surah Al-Fatir, it is stated that the ships we 
see cleaving the seas in order that we may search from God’s bounty, is a gift from God 
and this indicates a divine encouragement for man to engage in international commercial 
trade by means of carriage of goods by sea and also sea-related activities of import and 
export for the benefit of mankind.438 
An analogy can also be drawn from one of five compulsory obligations of a Muslim 
which is the pilgrimage to Mecca or Hajj. In order to perform this obligation, each year 
Muslims from all over the world need to travel to Mecca in whatever mode of travel 
necessary to arrive at this destination. That would mean that those who are not connected 
by land to Saudi Arabia would need to travel by sea or by air. By implication of this 
obligation, sea travel is definitely allowed and encouraged in order to facilitate 
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performance of this obligation. Although the period of Hajj is mainly to fulfil a spiritual 
obligation, it does not prevent the Muslims from engaging in trade and commerce. In 
fact, during a period in history when the Muslims restrained themselves from conducting 
business during the Hajj period for fear that the intention to perform their spiritual 
compulsory obligation is tainted by desires to make profits, a verse was revealed to 
assure the Muslims that it would not be wrong for them to do so alongside their 
pilgrimage.439 Therefore the international trade which is thus created out of the 
compulsory obligation makes the travel by sea for that purpose impliedly an act that is 
endorsed by the religion.440 
From the second primary source of law in Islam, the hadith and prophetic traditions of 
Prophet Muhammad s.a.w.,441 there are various hadiths which promote commercial 
activities in particular trades. Among them are “An honest and trustworthy merchant will 
be with the martyrs on the Day of Resurrection”,442 and “An honest and trustworthy 
merchant will be with the prophets, the truthful and the martyrs.”443 Equating a merchant 
with a prophet or even a martyr is considered exalting a person to the highest level 
possible in the eyes of God. Undoubtedly, this indicates that engaging in trading is very 
much approved and encouraged, as long as it is performed with sincerity and honesty, 
and that the merchant does not allow greed to prevent him from fulfilling his spiritual 
obligations as well. In fact Islam discourages its followers from being a recluse or a 
hermit who resign themselves to only going to the mosque and performing spiritual 
obligations without having any interaction with the worldly matters. What more, a 
merchant who is able to contain his greed and is able to release himself from the 
temptation of endless profits simply to fulfil his spiritual obligations at the assigned times 
is revered with a higher status than a recluse who simply spends his day and night praying 
at the mosque, even though the latter person appears holier to society. 
There is however a hadith narrated by Abdullah ibn Amr ibn al-‘As444 which states that 
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“No one should sail on the sea except the one who is going to perform hajj 
(pilgrimage) or ‘umra (minor pilgrimage) or the one fighting in Allah’s path, for 
under the sea there is a fire, and under the fire there is a sea.” 
Although this hadith clearly prohibits sea travel for purposes other than performing the 
pilgrimage or military expeditions, which would exclude commercial purposes, this is 
contrary to everything that has been revealed in the Quran regarding sailing being 
described as a favour endowed upon humans. Furthermore there are those who view that 
the hadith above may probably be a weak445 hadith which thus should not be taken as an 
authoritative principle.446 
Khalilieh wrote447 that according to Ibn Taymiyyah, who is a notable Muslim scholar, a 
merchant who dies at sea is considered a martyr if his death occurred during a voyage 
which the merchant had undertaken at an appropriate time. An appropriate time may 
refer to a time when it is considered safe to commence the journey because otherwise, a 
person who disregards the signs of danger and commences sailing without a valid reason 
which necessitates him to do so, is obviously embarking on a suicidal mission which is 
prohibited in Islam.448 Ibn Taymiyyah had also affirmed this when he continued to state 
that sea travel is only permitted when all the safety measures have been taken and that it 
is prohibited to sail when conditions do not permit it. 
This emphasis on safety measures may reconcile the contradicting hadith discussed 
above449 which limited sea travel, and the encouragement to sail in the Quran, in that the 
reason for the prohibition being mentioned in the hadith is in connection with dangers in 
the sea. If safety measures have been taken, the danger element would have been 
eliminated as far as possible and this technically lifts the prohibition from applying. The 
requirement for safety also applies to sea journeys made for the purpose of pilgrimage 
or military expeditions. 
An interesting point to note from this is that the Islamic rule for the requirement for 
safety in any shipping expedition is consistent with the non-religious or civil rules on 
safety in shipping. Where the shipper is concerned, this would surely involve the duties 
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of the shipper which involve and ensure the safety of its cargo, other cargo, the ship and 
the crew on board. 
Again an important thing to note at this point is that the reference often used in the 
Islamic law on shipper liability is to both the shipper as well the “merchant”. To some 
extent it is not often clear whether the “merchant” always means the shipper in the 
narrow sense i.e. the person who delivers the cargo to the carrier for carriage but since 
in the chapter on the definition of the shipper, all the various possible meanings given to 
a shipper had been included in the discussion of the meaning the term “shipper”, and it 
is clear that a shipper may not only be the person delivering the goods to the carrier. 
Therefore any reference to the “merchant” will be included in this section and retained 
as such so as to keep the context from where it was taken to enable a wider scope of 
discussion to be made. 
According to Khalilieh, the primary sources of Islamic law i.e. the Quran and Prophetic 
Traditions, as well as the jurisprudential literature which followed in the centuries 
following the publication of the former two sources, there are expressly specified rules 
regulating commerce and trade, but there is no mention of maritime law in particular.450 
This is hardly surprising since the first Arab Muslims, to whom the Quran and Prophetic 
Traditions were first revealed, being from the inlands and deserts, were not habitually a 
seafaring nation. It was only upon the spread of Islam and the Muslim Empire into the 
Mediterranean that existing seafaring nations in the Mediterranean who had become 
Muslims or were ruled under Islamic rule imparted their established maritime laws.  
Khalilieh further alludes to the possibility that the practice of the Muslim jurists were 
simply to continue with the pre-Islamic maritime laws already in use in the 
Mediterranean as a source of law in the form of custom.451 It was not until the 8th century 
when the first treatise in Islamic law of the sea was compiled by a Maliki jurist.452 This 
may indicate that Islam endorses the pre-exisiting maritime laws established in the 
former Persian and Byzantine territories which apply the Rhodian Sea Law. Khalilieh 
refers to various other sources453 as data to support the Islamic jurisprudence. All of this 
is collectively referred to reflect on the principles and application of Islamic law.  
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The duty to provide information and pack properly 
In general, when the shipper leases space on a ship under Islamic law, the shipper has 
the duty to specify the nature of the transported shipment.454 Both the carrier and the 
shipper have mutual duties towards each other in order to safeguard their own and the 
other’s interests. A shipper has the duty to protect his cargo by adequately packing his 
cargo using appropriate materials and containers depending on the type of cargo being 
transported.455 The merchant has the duty to properly pack his goods to prevent them 
from being damaged in transit whether due to handling or natural phenomenon. For this 
purpose, during the days when Islamic law governed merchants, different types of 
material were used to wrap the cargo depending on the type of cargo.456 
What is interesting here is the similarity to be found here to the duties found in the section 
above on the civil law of shipper liabilities in particular the German Commercial Code 
where the shipper is required to play a more active participatory role in ensuring the 
prevention of loss or damage to its own cargo as well as damage to other cargo and the 
vessel. 
The duty to load and unload 
Where loading is concerned, since the carrier has to ensure that the ship is not 
overloaded, which may not only cause the sinking of the ship but also strain the man-
power used in those days to power the ship, the shipper consequently has a duty to 
comply with the instructions given in preventing overloading of the vessel. If there was 
a known loading sequence, the rule used is known as “first in last out” which basically 
means that the last shipper who had loaded his cargo would be required to unload it if 
the ship was overloaded, followed by the second-last to load and so on until the master 
is satisfied that the vessel is no longer overloaded. This is done by looking at the 
waterline mark along the outer hull of the ship which must not sink below a certain level 
below the water, which is a method resembling that used by the Byzantines.457 If the 
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sequence of loading was unknown, shippers would each be required to unload in an equal 
proportion to the total amount required to unload.458 
Where the rule not to overload is broken by the shipper, there are three possible liabilities 
which the shipper may incur. The first is the shipper responsible would have to be liable 
for the loss and damage to cargo and therefore be required to indemnify the cargo-
owners. The second alternative is to share out the liability among all the shippers in 
proportion according to the rules of general average. The third alternative is for the 
wrongdoing shipper to indemnify the other innocent shippers half the actual value of 
their cargo in damages.459 
The rules on unloading were again similar to the Byzantine maritime law where the 
shipmaster is not required to discharge the cargo unless it was stipulated as such by the 
lessor in the ship-leasing contract or required by custom since in general the shipowner’s 
duty towards the cargo ceases upon the vessel arriving at the destination agreed, 460 but 
this varies depending on the custom of the locality.461 The merchant would be the one 
usually to discharge the cargo. The merchant or his agent has the duty to unload and 
store the cargo in the warehouse, what more other further tasks such as dealing with 
repackaging, transhipment or paying custom duties.462 The merchant would have to pay 
the freight to the shipowner if negligence on its part occurred or it did something which 
could cause damage to the shipment, unless there was bad weather or the goods were 
damaged.463 
If the ship was wrecked, and some of the cargo was damaged at the time of unloading, a 
distinction is made between a merchant whose cargo was saved and those who whose 
cargo was not. The former has to pay freight while the latter was exempted since his 
goods were damaged. Khalilieh argues that due to this, the liability for the cargo rests 
with the lessee since he is involved in the preparation of the cargo for the voyage and in 
the unloading of the cargo upon arrival at its destination. This is supported by the 
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authority that Muslim jurists have held that where sellers attempted to propose 
provisions which purport to assure purchasers that the cargo would arrive safely at the 
destination as illegal since the seller cannot guarantee this risk.464 
The requirement of fault for the contractual liability of the shipper 
Under the common law of contract fault is a non-issue and is hardly to be found 
in literature on the common law of contract in the discussions on whether liability is 
established. This is largely due to the fact that performance of a contractual obligation is 
considered strict and the contracting parties are required to perform their part of the 
bargain as promised. Failure to do so would be a breach regardless of the reasons behind 
the failure and regardless of the fact that the parties may have exerted their best to try to 
comply with their obligations under the contract or have taken reasonable care. The 
parties’ failure may have been due to external factors which are beyond their control 
such the acts of third parties, natural phenomenon or a change of circumstance. In 
general, all these reasons are not considered to be any excuse or a defence for the party 
in breach to not be liable for failure to perform its obligation under the contract. 
This fundamental approach has its basis on a long established principle 
enunciated in the old case of Paradine v Jane465 where a party is bound to make good an 
obligation he has assumed,466 right up to the modern day case of Raineri v Miles467 where 
Lord Edmund-Davies reiterated the immateriality of the reasons for the breach in 
determining liability as well as the defence that the best efforts had been made to avoid 
them.468 
This is the same approach taken by Islamic law on contractual obligations. The 
approach taken by Islamic law as provided by the primary sources being the Quran and 
Hadith is that of a residual nature, in that so long as there is nothing which is expressly 
forbidden to be practised clearly stated in these primary sources, it is taken then that the 
rule on that subject is that it is therefore permissible. This is because the arrival of both 
scriptures did not impose a whole new system to replace the existing one.469 Rather it 
was meant to accommodate existing customary commercial practices which are already 
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functional and operational except where they are considered oppressive or unfair. Such 
wrongful practices would be removed only to the extent necessary as the rest of the 
ordinary commercial practices have been approved by Shariah470 and continue to operate 
and allow trade to take place without the negative aspects which have many harmful 
consequences on the society and economy as a whole. In fact it is forbidden to enter into 
contracts which deny what is permissible. 
There are no provisions to be found neither in the primary sources nor the 
secondary ones to support the idea that as far as contract law is concerned, there must be 
fault in the sense above on the part of the party breaching the contract before liability 
can be imposed. There are only four main rules which any contractual transaction must 
not be imbued with. They are called riba’ which is usury, gharar meaning ambiguities 
in the contract, maysir which means that there must not be any element of gambling, and 
finally in general the contract must not deal with matters which are haram or objects or 
activities forbidden to Muslims. 
There is in fact an express provision in the Quran which commands Muslims to 
fulfil their contractual obligations. In Surah Al-Maidah471 it is provided in the first line, 
“O you who have believed, fulfill all contracts.”472 This verse is understood to mean that 
Muslims are commanded to fulfil both their covenants towards God and all permissible 
contracts with other people. The latter affects the former as a broken promise made to 
another person to perform an obligation would be a breach of the covenant made to God 
to do what He commands and leave what He prohibits. This has been further interpreted 
by Ibn Abbas473 to mean that obligations must be fulfilled without excuses or 
violations.474 There is a duty to commit to the promises made with other people unless it 
was a contract which contained the forbidden elements or denies the permissible as stated 
above. Contracts are therefore seen as a pledge,475 a promise to be fulfilled, and 
disappointments therefore to be made good.  
The rationale for such rules would appear to be in the interest of fairness and 
justice for the parties since the injured would have also committed to the promise by 
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perhaps incurring expenses, employing staff, used time and effort to travel to the required 
location, purchased raw materials or even enter into sub-contracts. It would be unfair to 
this party if his commitment was sacrificed without redemption. The rules also ensure 
certainty in contracts made which would contribute to commercial efficiency as parties 
need to know that the contracts they enter into will be enforced, since a breaching party 
will not be let off the hook. 
In some civil law jurisdictions such as in the Middle East,476 the term ‘fault’ as 
used in the codes refers to the act of breach of the contract rather than the meaning used 
in the preceding paragraph. In the latter fault was meant to connote blameworthiness, 
wrongful act or guilt. In other words, the codes use the term ‘fault’ in the same sense as 
‘default’, which may not be wrongful in the moral sense. For example in the United Arab 
Emirates, the Dubai Court of Cassation held that in order for contractual liability to be 
established under the code,477 one of the elements to be fulfilled is that there must have 
been fault of one of the contracting parties in the sense that his obligation under the 
contract was not fulfilled. 
This meaning given to fault is similar to the one taken in both UK statutes and 
cases.478 For example the definition given by section 61 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
for the term found in sections 7, 9(2) and 20(2) of the Act. Courts of law have also used 
this meaning for the term as in the case of Poussard v Spiers.479 
It has been observed480 however that there have been changes in the trend in 
which the English courts have taken their approach in enforcing the absolute obligation 
of contract. Although in the beginning, as stated above, the courts had taken an absolutist 
approach where no excuse may be accepted for breach, this rule was later relaxed with 
the advent of cases such as Taylor v Caldwell481 and its successors. Such approach 
displayed the courts’ willingness to take into account change of circumstances and 
supervening events which may render the contract frustrated, thus expanding the scope 
of the doctrine. This modern day the courts appear however to have come full circle by 
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returning to their restrictive approach in allowing relief to the party who will suffer 
hardship due to the change in circumstance. 
The way in which parties today overcome this is by including ‘hardship’ or force 
majeure clauses which enable them to renegotiate the terms upon the occurrence of 
triggering events which they have agreed upon without having to depend on the courts 
to decide the fate of the contract, which if held to be frustrated would only result in the 
death of the contract altogether. This is may not be an altogether favourable decision and 
something which the parties themselves would want to avoid. The inclusion of such 
clauses in the contract from the outset therefore allows some degree of flexibility to the 
parties for such contingencies. McKendrick482 has also made an interesting point 
regarding the finer point regarding the rule that the courts will not make adjustments for 
the parties or make the contract fairer or better for them, but they would not stop the 
parties from making such adjustments themselves. This view is interesting and viable 
because it seems to reconcile the sanctity of contract principle with that of the freedom 
of contract. 
 In the literature on theories on contractual liability in the civil law systems 
however, there is a distinction made between three categories of liabilities. For example 
under French law there is first a category for obligations which only require the use of 
reasonable care to perform his contractual obligations,483 which would mean that even if 
that party fails to achieve them he would not be liable because he is only required to do 
the best he can. The second one is known as strict liability484 where reasonable care 
would not be sufficient to excuse the performing party from liability and he would be 
liable for failure to fulfil his obligation unless this failure is attributed to something 
which was beyond his control and beyond what is foreseeable like a force majeur. The 
third is liability which is absolute.485 Here is where fault absolutely plays no part to 
excuse the failure in performance nor does the occurrence of a force majeur.  
The second and the third form may be nominally described in common law as 
indistinguishable, but in civil law theory the former is a form of liability where the 
obligation on the party to perform his part of the bargain is strict subject to very limited 
situations where he may be excused to the reasons he was not responsible for or was not 
                                                          
482 Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law (10th edn Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 258. 
483 Obligation de moyens. 
484 Obligation de résultat. 
485 Obligation de garantie.  
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able to overcome, whereas for the latter there is no excuse available whatsoever for 
failure to perform.486 
According to Nicholas487 a similarity can be found within the common law 
system of these different fault requirements in establishing liability even though 
superficially it does not convey such as appearance. 
Conclusion 
Even if the dominant view regarding the nature of contractual liabilities as far as 
the common law is concerned is that liability is strict, it has been argued488 that fault 
does play a role in the determination of breach as well as the assessment of remedies. In 
relation to the issue of breach, the idea that the nature of a promise to contract is either a 
promise to perform the contract or pay damages for breach of contract goes against the 
expectations of parties that promises are meant to be kept. To some extent the lack of 
morality affects the confidence to the contract institution that parties rely on. There is 
expectation that reasonable efforts should be made to deliver what was promised rather 
than to simply opt for breach of contract as an alternative. In other words, what would 
be the point of entering into a contract if the intention to be bound from beginning to end 
is non-committal. Commitments are certainly needed for good working relationships of 
commercial parties.489 
 It is therefore argued that the pervading element in all systems seems to be that 
of fairness and efficiency. The fairness argument supports the idea that different kinds 
of obligation require different levels of strictness in imposing liability depending on the 
seriousness of the consequences as a whole. The efficiency argument supports the idea 
that what is already in place that is already consistent and works should not be displaced 
with a whole new system that is alien to the industry. Furthermore parties are now more 
inclined to and could include within the contract itself, what they would do in cases of 
changed circumstances. 
 If these different categories are acceptable in both the civil and common law 
systems, it is also possible to apply them to shippers’ contractual liabilities. The next 
                                                          
486 Barry Nicholas, ‘Fault and Breach of Contract’ in Jack Beatson and Daniel Friedman (eds), Good Faith 
and Fault in Contract Law (Clarendon 1997), (Oxford Scholarship Online, March 2012). 
487 ibid 
488 Robert A. Hillman, “The Importance of Fault in Contract Law” (2012), Cornell Law Faculty Working 































CHAPTER 4  
Shipper Liability for Cargo under International Conventions 
Introduction 
The law on shipper liability under international conventions has experienced a 
revolutionary change in both content as well as structure. There are currently four 
competing international conventions on the carriage of goods by sea, and other 
international conventions which relate to, affect or are relevant to this industry, in 
particular to the shipper. While the focus of the three preceding international conventions 
on carriage of goods by sea have focused more on the liability of the carrier towards the 
shipper, the focus on shipper liability has been dramatically changed by the emergence 
of the Rotterdam Rules, the latest convention on the carriage of goods by sea. This 
chapter covers an area which has been more widely discussed and published on 
compared to the topic of shipper liability under national law, perhaps due to the 
widespread effect of international conventions, and therefore the interest as well as 
concern are generated at a more collective level. 
Objective of chapter 
The objective of this chapter is firstly to identify the principal provisions on shipper 
liability in the four international conventions on the carriage of goods by sea as well as 
other international conventions which contain provisions on shipper liability. The second 
objective is to analyse critically the content of these provisions in order to study the 
extent, development and evolution of the content and structure of shipper liability 
provisions in international conventions from the first one until the most recent one today, 
in particular by focusing on the nature of the liability and the mental element required if 
any. The purpose of doing this is to determine what role fault plays in the determination 
of shipper liability. This will be followed by looking at whether the objectives of the 
creation of these provisions have been achieved in their application by the courts, again 
by focusing on whether and how the mental element affected the finding of liability or 
otherwise. Another objective is to consider the practical effects of these provisions in 
decided cases where disputes have arisen in relation to their interpretation which would 
be useful in the determination of whether fault is actually used to determine shipper 
liability. This entails looking at consistency and also the method of their application, and 
how the mental element should therefore be formulated. Finally a conclusion would be 
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made on the requirements for shipper liability in international conventions based on the 
findings made in this chapter, in particular where no such provisions have been made for 
them. 
Research Questions 
The research in this chapter focuses on two main questions. The first is looking 
at to what extent the mental element forms a prerequisite in the establishment of shipper 
liability as provided under international conventions. This will entail looking at the role 
the mental element plays in the determination of shipper liability under international 
convention provisions. Where provisions on the mental element of the shipper in 
determining liability are identified, research will be made as to whether they are actually 
used in the determination of shipper liability. A corresponding question would be where 
the mental element varies from case to case, if there is a connecting factor. A further 
related question to be asked is if the mental element is relied on to determine shipper 
liability, what would be the reasons for relying on such mental elements. If they are not, 
the question is would they even be needed at all? What would warrant a need for the 
mental element in establishing shipper liability?  
The second main question to be asked in this chapter is if it is not the mental 
element, what actually is being relied on to determine shipper liability? This involves 
looking at the ways which have been used to impose liability apart from relying on the 
mental element of the shipper. The corresponding question then is should there be other 
ways to impose liability and should these other ways be used to impose liability on the 
shipper? If it is not the mental element which determines liability, then the question 
would be what is? If the mental element is not used to determine shipper liability, what 
would be the justification for relying on strict liability as opposed to requiring a mental 
element? 
Methodology 
The starting point for this chapter is the first international convention on the 
carriage of goods by sea, the Hague Rules 1924, followed by the other three in 
chronological order in order to first identify provisions which create liability on the 
shipper, and secondly to make observations on the development of shipper liability. The 
reason why the Hague Rules are chosen as the starting point of discussion is because the 
rules were the first international attempt to govern contractual relations between the 
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shipper and the carrier, and so it has affected shipper liability towards the carrier. Prior 
to the Hague Rules, each individual state passed their own laws in order to deal with the 
rising ability of the carrier to insert clauses which limit or exclude their liabilities towards 
the shipper, and this resulted in the proliferation of varying laws around the world on 
resolution of disputes between the shipper and the carrier. This inevitably led to non-
uniformity in the law of cargo claims and was the basis for the promulgation of the Hague 
Rules. Since the position before the Hague Rules dealt with national and regional laws 
on shipper liability, their discussion would be located in chapter 2 on Shipper Liability 
under National Law. 
The research on the shipper’s duties under international conventions in this 
chapter will rely on and is dependent upon the meaning given to the term “shipper”. The 
liability of the shipper can only be fully understood when the correct definition of the 
shipper is used and the context in which the shipper is placed, since as seen in Chapter 
2, there is no one particular definition of the shipper. As such, reference to the definitions 
of the shipper as discussed in Chapter 2 is an important part of the discussion made here. 
Other international conventions which provide for the liability of the shipper such 
as the HNS Convention, the Multimodal Convention and MARPOL will then be looked 
at in order to study other forms of the duty of the shipper. Non-maritime conventions 
which deal with the environment or public safety which impose duties on the shipper 
will also be included. 
The nature of the provisions will then be classified according to its premise of 
liability whether tortious, contractual, fiduciary or criminal in order to assist the 
discussion of the required mental element for each form of liability in the following 
chapters. Provisions with existing mental element requirement will be noted as well as 
those without and the particular mental element required will be critically analysed.  
The travaux preparatoires for each convention will then be studied to understand 
the purpose of the creation of the provisions on shipper liability and to establish the 
original objectives for which the provisions were meant to achieve, in particular whether 
the mental element was considered.  The provisions on shipper liability identified in the 
conventions will then be analysed by studying their application by the courts in decided 
cases. The next stage is therefore to determine whether the purposes of the provisions’ 
creation have been achieved by comparing them with the application of the provisions 
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by the courts in the decided cases, again in particular by focusing on whether the mental 
element played any part.  
Academic discussions on the application of the shipper liability provisions in the 
convention will also be looked at. Finally proposals on the appropriate mental element 
will be made. 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Conventions 
The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating 
to Bills of Lading of 25 August 1924 (The Hague Rules) 
Background 
The Hague Rules was the result of the culmination of years of accumulating pressure on 
shippers worldwide and their claims that the carriers were imposing oppressive and 
unfair terms on them as the party with the higher bargaining power in concluding 
carriage of goods by sea contracts. This in turn, led to individual countries promulgating 
their own unique versions of amendments to the national law to curtail the excessive 
power of the carriers to insert such terms. What followed was the creation of piecemeal 
legislation which differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction which consequently resulted in 
disuniformity at the international level of laws applied to cargo claims made by shippers 
against carriers for loss of or damage to their cargo. 
The international community in particular the International Law Association and the 
Comite Maritime International led the discussions on the proposal of implementing a 
uniform system of rules which parties to a contract of carriage by sea could rely on to 
govern their relationship allowing a clear set of guidelines which applies across the board 
in the industry. 
The Hague Rules were passed in Brussels on the 25th of August 1924 and were signed 
by 27 countries and was considered a breakthrough in the step towards achieving 
international uniformity in the international laws of carriage of goods by sea. 
Bearing in mind the background to the Hague Rules, it follows that the rules thus 
primarily concern the duties and liabilities of the carrier towards the shipper. Very few 
provisions actually concern the shipper’s duties towards the shipper and they are not 
even placed together as a separate and distinct group of articles. In fact the consequence 
of a failure on the part of the shipper to fulfil certain obligations may result in the shipper 
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losing certain rights against the carrier rather than creating a positive cause of action 
which the carrier may bring against the shipper. For example there is possibly a link 
between the last sentence in article III rule 5 which implies the ability of the carrier to 
limit his responsibility and liability under the contract of carriage to the shipper as a 
result of inaccuracies in the information provided by the shipper which is discussed in 
detail later in this chapter, and the provision in article IV rule 2(i). Article IV states that 
the carrier will not be liable and neither will the ship, for loss or damage if such was 
caused by a list of causes one of which is sub-paragraph (i).This sub-paragraph refers to 
the act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his agent or representative. 
The Protocols of 23 February 1968 and 21 December 1979 (The Hague-Visby Rules) 
These rules came about as a result of problems which arose out of the Hague Rules from 
the carriers’ point of view and proposals were brought from their interests to close a 
number of gaps490 that were discovered from the 40 odd years of applying the Hague 
Rules. A draft was produced by a CMI491 Conference at Stockholm and signed at Visby. 
The rules were adopted as a protocol to the 1924 Hague Rules. But for some small but 
important amendments to the Hague Rules, the main part remains exactly the same. As 
far as shipper liability provisions, these have not been changed and are identical to the 
original rules. 
United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (The Hamburg Rules) 
1978  
The Hamburg Rules 1978 only came into force in 1 November 1992 and were ratified 
mostly by developing and so called Third World countries, which are estimated to 
represent only 5 percent of world trade by sea, but no major maritime country has ratified 
it.492 This research looks at cases with application of the relevant provisions by courts in 
the member states and the UK and US courts of law which apply the Hamburg Rules by 
way of the applicable law of the contract agreed by the parties. Research so far have 
found either of these to be a scarce resource and this reflects the lack of support oft cited 
                                                          
490 According to Francis Reynolds, ‘The Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules, and the Hamburg 
Rules’(1990) 7 MLAANZ 16, there are 5 defects in the Hague Rules which the carriers were unhappy 
with. First is the Vita Food gap on clause paramounts, second is the Scruttons v Midlands Silicones case 
on Himalaya clause, third is The Muncaster Castle on due diligence, fourth is the probative effect of 
bills of lading, and lastly the problem with the package or unit limitation. 
491 Comite Maritime International. 
492 Wilson, J.F., Carriage of Goods by Sea (Pearson Education 2008) 214. 
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regarding the Rules by the industry and the avoidance for the provisions of these Rules 
to be applied to it wherever possible. 
In the case of Caresse Navigation Ltd v Office National De L'Electricite and others,493  
although it was argued that article 13 of the Hamburg Rules is substantially the same as 
article IV rule 6, Males J pointed that the Hamburg Rules differ from the Hague-Visby 
Rules since as a whole the former was more favourable to cargo interests and thus not in 
the owners’ interest in this case. This case concerned a time charter trip for bulk cargo 
from Rotterdam to Nador, Morocco where there was a delay for days in the discharge of 
the cargo. This resulted in overheating of the coal and the subsequent dousing with salt 
water due to shortage of fresh water resulted in the cargo being no longer suitable for its 
purpose, namely for use in industrial boilers to produce electricity. The issue was about 
the governing law of the bill of lading as the claim was made under the Hamburg Rules 
which applies in Morocco although the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the charterparty 
provided for English law and court jurisdiction. 
Under the Hamburg Rules there is a dedicated section for shipper liability under Part III 
but it contains only 2 articles, article 12 and 13. In article 12 again the residual approach 
is used to describe the shipper’s liability. There is another provision in a separate Part of 
the Rules which deal with shipper liability, namely Article 17. It is interesting to note 
that despite the claim that the reason why the Hamburg Rules came into existence was 
due to the dissatisfaction of shippers with the provisions of the Hague Rules and the 
Hamburg Rules which were said to be biased against them, there is actually a Part III in 
the Hamburg Rules which is entitled and specifically deals with ‘Liability of the 
shipper’.494 On the other hand, a clearer and dedicated part495 to shipper liability 




                                                          
493 [2013] EWHC 3081 (Comm), 2011 Folio 668, (Transcript). 
494 There is no counterpart in existence within the framework of neither the Hague Rules nor the Hague-
Visby Rules. 
495 Part III is not exactly complete as Article 17 which also deals with shipper liability sits in Part IV which 
covers Transport Documents. This nonetheless is the starting point of increasing recognition given to the 
duties of shippers. 
131 
 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods 
Wholly of Partly by Sea (The Rotterdam Rules) 2008 
 The issue of shipper liability was considered to be one of the particularly 
important items to be considered by the Committee and so was included in the Agenda 
Paper prepared by the Working Group for discussion by the Committee at the Singapore 
meeting of the CMI’s 37th Conference in 2001.496 In general, the issue of whether 
liability should be imposed on the basis of fault or on a more stringent basis, the former 
received overwhelming support.497 Where shipper liability specifically was concerned, 
a number of issues were considered. These are whether there should be a distinction 
between the liability for damage which was caused by goods which are inherently 
dangerous and that which was caused by other types of cargo; whether there should be a 
corresponding provision for limitation of the shipper’s liability as well as a creation of a 
time bar against bringing claims against the shipper. 
 Support was again received for liability of the shipper based on fault and for there 
to be the same liability for both inherently dangerous goods and other goods, even though 
there were some delegates who argued for more stringent liability for the former, as well 
as for a failure to comply with special rules on dangerous goods. It was in this forum 
also that the distinction between the liability of the shipper for a failure to provide 
accurate information and liability of the shipper for damage caused by the goods was 
drawn, from which it was concluded that liability for the former should be more 
stringent. There was also general support for there not to be a limitation of liability 
provision for the shipper but that there would be provision for a time bar to claims against 
the shipper.498 
After three years of consultations within the international shipping community, 
the CMI began work on drafting a new convention for sea carriage in 1999. Their outline 
instrument was passed on in 2001 to a working group of UNCITRAL to be further 
worked on and finally in 2008 the draft convention was approved by UNCITRAL. The 
Legal Committee of the General Assembly adopted the Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea in November 2008. It was 
opened for signing from September 2009 in Rotterdam, and is now commonly referred 
to as the Rotterdam Rules. Since then, it has been signed by 25 countries, including the 
                                                          
496 CMI Yearbook 2001 Annuaire, 182. 
497 ibid 184. 
498 ibid 186. 
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United States of America, representing 25% of the world trade. However, only 3 
countries have ratified it.499 It almost is a complete overhaul in terms of form and 
substance from the three previous international conventions on sea carriage which it was 
intended to replace, but its fate yet remains to be seen. It contains a whopping 96 article 
provision but obviously this chapter will only focus on the obligations of the shipper to 
the carrier; a relatively new area dealt with by the convention. 
Scope of liability 
 The obligations of the shipper towards the carrier in the Rotterdam Rules are 
embodied in Chapter 7 which encompasses 8 articles, article 27-34. They are quite 
extensively described in detail and are divided into numerous obligations regarding 
delivery of the goods for carriage, cooperation to provide information and instructions, 
obligation to provide information, instructions and documents, the basis of the shipper’s 
liability to the carrier, information for compilation of contract particulars, special rules 
on dangerous goods, assumption of shipper’s rights and obligations by the documentary 
shipper, and liability of the shipper for other persons. It is quite clear from the title of 
chapter 7 that the liability of the shipper under this chapter is concerning only with its 
obligations towards the carrier.500 Since the Rotterdam Rules has a specific chapter 
dedicated to provisions on shipper liability, and that the provisions are structured and 
laid down in a detailed manner, there is more certainty and clarity of the regulation of 
shipper liability to the benefit of the industry. 
Provisions on shipper liability 
Duty to deliver cargo ready for carriage 
The duty here is an extension of the duty under the common law to provide cargo. 
The cargo must not only be physically present and ready to be loaded, but also prepared 
in every way required for carriage. According to Schelin501, this is the most important 
obligation that could be imposed on the shipper, apart from the duty to pay freight. 
Indeed this area is of utmost importance for the shipper to be giving attention to, since it 
is at the very beginning of a series of events which, depending on how well or badly it 
                                                          
499 Those countries being Spain, Togo and Congo. 
500 The title of Chapter 7 is “Obligations of the shipper to the carrier”. 
501 Johan Schelin, ‘Obligations of the Shipper to the Carrier’ in Von Ziegler and others (eds), The 
Rotterdam Rules 2008: Commentary to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (Kluwer 2010) 152. 
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is executed, could very well affect the whole chain of causation down the line of 
processes involved in carrying the goods from point of departure to point of destination. 
Unfortunately, it has not been an area largely focused on in or even be a feature of, the 
earlier international conventions on carriage of goods by sea. 
The Hague and Hague-Visby Rules do not have anything expressed or specified 
on cargo preparation but surely this is clearly part of the shipper’s duties since it is a very 
important aspect of the shipper’s obligation as stated above and also as viewed by 
Berlingieri.502 It is only that the way it is incorporated in the Hague and Hague-Visby 
Rules that make it seem as though it is not given the emphasis and attention that it should 
deserve. There is arguably a detailed description of the obligation of the shipper to be 
found albeit in a passive manner in article III Rule 3(a) even though article III Rule 3(a) 
actually provides for the obligation of the carrier rather than the shipper.  
According to article III Rule 3: 
“After receiving the goods into his charge the carrier or the master or agent of 
the carrier shall, on demand of the shipper, issue to the shipper a bill of lading 
showing among other things:  
(a) The leading marks necessary for identification of the goods as the same are 
furnished in writing by the shipper before the loading of such goods starts, 
provided such marks are stamped or otherwise shown clearly upon the goods 
if uncovered, or on the cases or coverings in which such goods are contained, 
in such a manner as should ordinarily remain legible until the end of the 
voyage. 
(b) Either the number of packages or pieces, or the quantity, or weight, as the 
case may be, as furnished in writing by the shipper.” 
This is because although article III Rule 3(a) requires the carrier to issue a bill of 
lading to the shipper containing certain information, the manner in which that 
information is obtained implies the obligation there of the shipper to provide to the 
carrier, in writing prior to the loading, information regarding certain things.  
                                                          
502 Francesco Berlingieri, “A Comparative Analysis of the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and 
the Rotterdam Rules”, paper delivered at the General Assembly of the AMD, Marrakesh, 5 - 6 November 
2009, p 19. Berlingieri  argues that even though the Hague-Visby as well as the Hamburg Rules do not 
specifically mention which obligations are regarded as part of the shipper’s duty for cargo preparation 
unlike the Rotterdam Rules, it is clear that the shipper’s obligation to prepare cargo does exist. 
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These include the leading marks necessary for the identification of the goods, 
which should be stamped or shown clearly on the goods when uncovered, or remain 
legible on the coverings or cases in which the goods are contained throughout the 
journey. Likewise, article III Rule 3(b) also implies in the same manner as above, the 
duty of the shipper to provide to the carrier in writing, either the number of packages or 
pieces, or the quantity or weight depending on the method of numerical description 
chosen by the shipper. This would mean that in terms of cargo preparation, the shipper 
would have the duty to mark or stamp the goods or, its coverings or cases in which the 
goods are contained, in order to be able to provide the identification marks to the carrier. 
Likewise, the shipper has to determine the numerical description and measure the value 
to be submitted to the carrier. 
In relation to the weight of the goods, where containers are used to transport 
cargo, there are requirements that the gross mass of a container containing cargo be 
weighed and verified by the shipper before loading. A recent amendment to the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 adopted by the 
Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organization affects the duty 
of the shipper in this respect. SOLAS regulation VI/2 now provides for a mandatory 
requirement for the verification of the gross mass of packed containers.503 This is 
discussed in further details in the section on other non-carriage of goods by sea 
conventions below. The point here is that weighing the cargo is part of the duty of the 
shipper in preparation for carriage. 
This is because the verified mass of each container will determine its location on 
the vessel, as well as the arrangement and sequence of stowage on the vessel. In making 
stowage decisions which will ensure safety of the vessel, crew and stevedores, as well 
as making use of laytime efficiently, the mass of the cargo is critical knowledge. It would 
prevent inaccurate vessel stowage decisions which could lead to collapse of container 
stacks,504 tipping of the vessel and potential loss of containers overboard. Therefore 
before loading, the shipper has the duty to prepare its cargo for loading by ensuring that 
the verified weight submitted to the master reflects the actual weight of the containerized 
cargo. 
                                                          





Having said that, it is an obligation for the carrier to issue a bill of lading which 
contains such information, only if they have been provided as such by the shipper. This 
is because if the carrier, master or agent of the carrier has reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the information provided does not accurately represent the goods, they 
do not have to state such information in the bill of lading, as the proviso in the last 
paragraph of article III rule 3 provides. Furthermore, the carrier is only required to issue 
a bill of lading when demanded by the shipper after receiving the goods.505 This therefore 
could imply that there is no obligation imposed on the shipper to provide such 
identification marks, number of packages or pieces, quantity or weight of the goods, 
except as a result of the shipper requiring a bill of lading from the carrier. It is only in 
the interest of the shipper himself that such information is given because the shipper has 
to ultimately satisfy the requirements of the buyer and the banks involved in the 
financing of the trade. 
If the shipper chooses to provide this information, the provision which then 
makes the shipper liable in relation to the matters above is article III rule 5. This article 
provides that the shipper is deemed to have guaranteed at the time of shipment the 
accuracy of the information on the above which he has furnished and requires the shipper 
to indemnify the carrier where the information has proved inaccurate and thereby 
causing loss, damages and expenses to the carrier. 
Although the requirements in article III rule 3 of the Hague and Hague-Visby 
Rules indirectly deal with some aspects of cargo preparation, since after demanding for 
a bill of lading the shipper would now have to mark the goods with the appropriate form 
of identification, as well as determine the number, weight or quantity of the goods, the 
liability of the shipper in article III rule 5 is strict. According to article III rule 5: 
5. The shipper shall be deemed to have guaranteed to the carrier the accuracy at 
the time of shipment of the marks, number, quantity and weight, as furnished by 
him, and the shipper shall indemnify the carrier against all loss, damages and 
expenses arising or resulting from inaccuracies in such particulars… 
This provision does not provide for any mental element of the shipper before the 
shipper is required to indemnify the carrier for the losses resulting from inaccuracies in 
the details provided by the shipper. However the provision also employs the term “shall” 
                                                          
505 Article III rule 3 
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in requiring the shipper to indemnify the carrier. This automatic indemnification duty 
imposed on the shipper without any fault required results in a strict liability duty on the 
shipper. 
The strictness of this duty can probably be justified by the objective it seeks to 
achieve. The purpose of the rule relates more to certainty in firstly, the identification of 
goods for the purpose of commercial efficiency in transferring the goods from one party 
to another. Secondly the rule allows the carrier to carry on with issuing a bill of lading 
with all the details required for it to have any commercial value at a commercially 
efficient pace but without the carrier incurring irredeemable liability in the process of 
providing transit. Likewise at the other end of the transit, the guarantee which the shipper 
is deemed to have made ensures that the transferee can be sure that the item described is 
exactly what he is trading for, and that it arrives without delay.  
This is because the information in the bill of lading in practice depends on what 
is provided by the shipper. For the purpose of commercial efficiency, the carrier needs 
assurance that if the details regarding the goods on the bill of lading issued by it turn out 
to be inaccurate, the carrier’s back is covered. The shipper is therefore liable to 
indemnify the carrier regardless of fault if the information on the bill of lading supplied 
by it turns out to be wrong, and the recipient of the goods sues the carrier. Commercial 
efficiency is attained by not requiring the carrier to have to actually inspect the contents 
of the cargo to verify the identity of the goods as described in the bill of lading, but 
merely by acquiring a guarantee from the shipper. The rules therefore ensure that the 
process of shipping flows smoothly without delay. 
The utmost importance given to ensure this result is achieved may have resulted 
in the liability under article III rule 5 be made established without fault being required 
on the part of the shipper. The strictness of this rule supports the need of the industry to 
have and sustain an efficient mechanism which allows transit to be made without delay 
due to the trust and reliance on information and documents provided, and for there to be 
a safety net in the event that mistakes or even fraud of the shipper falls on the carrier to 
face the consequences of. 
The industry’s need to have such a commercially efficient system would 
therefore be supported by having such a strict liability rule in relation to the guarantee 
by the shipper that the details provided by him to the carrier for the purpose of issuing 
the bill of lading is accurate. It would not be in the interest of the commercially efficient 
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running of the shipping industry, if the carrier is required to check for himself the details 
provided by the shipper against the goods. At the same time, if the carrier were to simply 
issue a bill of lading without a guarantee by the shipper that the details provided were 
accurate, he is exposing himself to crippling liability by various recipients of cargo 
should the details prove incorrect. This leads to the need for a strict liability of the shipper 
to indemnify the carrier for such contingencies. If fault in any form is required before 
the shipper can be required to indemnify the carrier, the guarantee deemed to have been 
given by the shipper would be worthless. The carrier would always be in an insecure 
position because there is a chance that he will not be able to prove negligence of the 
shipper for example, in providing accurate details. This will ultimately result in the 
carrier being reluctant to issue a clean bill of lading along with the details as would be 
required by the shipper. 
Apart from this, another indirect duty of the shipper regarding preparation of 
goods is by reference to the excepted perils of insufficiency of packing under article IV 
rule 2(n) where the carrier would not be liable to the shipper for damage or loss of cargo 
due to the shipper not packing its cargo sufficiently.506 Likewise in article IV rule 2(o), 
insufficiency or inadequacy of marks will also allow the carrier to be excluded from 
liability for cargo claims arising from such lack of performance in the shipper’s duty. In 
this way, indirectly the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules do impose on the shipper, duties 
regarding preparation of the cargo which otherwise would create a defence for the carrier 
against the shipper for loss or damage to the cargo. However, unlike the Rotterdam Rules 
which will be discussed below, it is only a shield and not a sword. It does not create a 
cause of action for the carrier to bring against the shipper if the shipper fails to prepare 
the cargo adequately in terms of packing of the goods. For marking of the goods, unless 
it results in the inaccuracy of information in the bill of lading, by itself it too does not 
raise a cause of action for the carrier against the shipper. It creates a liability only if it 
triggers article III rule 5 on the guarantee of the shipper for accuracy of information for 
the purpose of issuing the bill of lading. 
Under the Hamburg Rules again the duty of the shipper to deliver the cargo ready 
for carriage is indirect. Article 15 rule 1 provides for the details which the carrier has to 
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include in the bill of lading issued to the shipper. Article 15 rule 1(a) states that the 
following information must be included in the bill of lading: 
(a) the general nature of the goods, the leading marks necessary for identification 
of the goods, an express statement, if applicable, as to the dangerous character of 
the goods, the number of packages or pieces, and the weight of the goods or their 
quantity otherwise expressed, all such particulars as furnished by the shipper; 
The shipper impliedly therefore has the duty provide all these details in order for 
the carrier to be able to carry out his duty to issue a bill of lading containing them. 
Another duty relevant to preparation of cargo is connected to its duty regarding 
dangerous goods.  Article 13 requires the shipper to mark or label dangerous goods 
which indicates its danger in a manner which is suitable. If this was not done by the 
shipper and the carrier either contractual or actual does not have knowledge about the 
dangerous character of the goods, the shipper is liable to both for the losses resulting507 
from such shipment and the carriers may unload, destroy or render innocuous, whatever 
the circumstances require for safety to be restored, without being liable for compensation 
to the shipper.508 
It can be observed here that the provision relating to the shipper’s duty in cargo 
preparation has started to change its focus from generally all cargo specifically to that of 
dangerous goods. This is probably due to increasing casualties occurring in the time 
leading to the passing of this convention which have resulted from a lack of focus on 
safety, and so explaining the inclusion of provisions which relate to matters of safety in 
particular where dangerous goods are concerned. The approach taken is however similar 
in the sense that the shipper is liable regardless of fault, but simply by the act of shipment 
unless it can be shown that the carrier knew about the dangerous nature of the goods. 
The carrier’s knowledge is deemed to arise simply by the shipper fulfilling its obligation 
to mark or label the dangerous goods. 
The rules do not specifically mention the consequences of not properly marking 
or labelling dangerous goods as such but this may be viewed in two ways. The first is 
since the words ‘must’ is used, it implies that this is a strict liability provision for the 
shipper. Secondly the marking or labelling would be connected to the following duty in 
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paragraph 2 to inform the carrier of the dangerous character of the goods and the 
precautions to be taken. The duty of the shipper regarding dangerous goods has always 
been regarded as a strict one. If the marking or labelling is seen as one of the ways in 
which the carrier is informed, this would imply that both duties are bound as strict. 
The most direct and express provision on the duty of the shipper to prepare cargo 
ready for carriage is made by Article 27 of the Rotterdam Rules (RR) which provides 
that if the parties have not agreed otherwise: 
(1)…the shipper shall deliver the goods ready for carriage… 
The goods must be ready for the carriage and in a condition which is able to 
withstand the intended carriage, loading, handling, stowage, lashing and securing and 
discharge. This provision seems to be broad, wide ranging and covers all aspects of the 
operation. The goods must not cause injury or damage to persons or property, but harm 
is not defined, and so may include non-physical damage for example delay in the 
discharge of the cargo. This obligation also applies where the goods are in or on a 
container or trailer packed by the shipper.509 The shipper has to ensure that the goods are 
properly and carefully stowed, lashed and secured in or on the container or trailer. Under 
‘FIOST’ contracts, both the shipper and the documentary shipper’s obligations must be 
performed properly and carefully, failing which the shipper may be liable for 
detention.510 This means that if the carrier has agreed with the shipper that the 
responsibility for loading, handling, stowing or unloading of the goods is conferred on 
the shipper, the shipper must perform the obligation assumed under this agreement 
properly and carefully. Nevertheless, since article 27 (1) opens with “unless otherwise 
agreed in the contract of carriage”, the provision in this article is not mandatory and the 
parties are free to contract out of it, perhaps in terms of who may take on the 
responsibilities and to what extent that person may be responsible.511 The carrier could 
take advantage of this by incorporating clauses in the bill of lading which causes the 
shipper to take on all the risks of damage or loss caused by the cargo not being fit for the 
intended carriage. However, an alternative view512 is that the freedom to contract out is 
                                                          
509 Paragraph (3) of Article 27. 
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511 See Asariotis, Main obligations and liabilities of the shipper, Proceedings from the International 
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512 See Fujita, Shipper’s Obligations and Liabilities under the Rotterdam Rules, February 2011, 
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only in relation to the first line of article 27 (1) since that line stops before a new sentence 
begins with ‘in any event’, and goes on to describe the specific things which the shipper 
needs to do in order to fulfil its obligations to prepare the goods, should it have been 
agreed that the shipper should be the one in charge of preparing the goods ready for 
carriage. 
Another interpretation to the first line of Article 27513 goes in the way that the 
phrase “ready for carriage” itself is something which the carrier and the shipper can even 
decide for themselves if they so wish. This includes delivering the cargo readily packed 
in a container. Now the container could be supplied by the carrier, or they could though 
rarely, be the shipper’s own containers, or containers supplied by third parties; 
essentially containers which were not supplied by or on behalf of the carrier. According 
to Article 1 paragraph 24, the latter kinds of containers are also defined as “goods”. The 
question is, to what extent are shippers then required to ensure the containers are fit to 
carry the cargo they intend to send?  
The view adopted by Schelin is that because the definition of goods employed 
above in the Rules, coupled with the requirement in paragraph 1 of Article 27 that the 
shipper must deliver the goods in such a condition that they will not cause harm to 
persons and property, the shipper has an obligation not only to ensure that the actual 
goods contained in the container or on the vehicle are properly stowed, lashed and 
secured, but that the container or vehicle themselves can withstand the intended carriage, 
in the sense that they are in good condition and suitable for transport.514 However 
Berlingieri is of the view that since most of the time the containers belong to the carrier, 
it is questionable to interpret this article as imposing a blanket duty on the shipper to 
inspect all kinds of containers involved with their goods and ensure their suitability for 
transport. Rather, he prefers a co-operative duty between the carrier and the shipper 
where, if the carrier agrees to provide the container, the carrier then has a duty to provide 
a container that is fit for the goods intended for carriage subject to what information the 
shipper has provided him. The shipper then should have a corresponding duty to inspect 
the container to ensure that it is suitable for his goods, and to inform the carrier if it was 
otherwise.515 The general duty of the shipper to co-operate with the carrier in providing 
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information and instructions is an existing duty in Article 28 which is stated separately 
from Article 27.  Berlingieri’s argument is therefore extending the principles in Article 
28 to also cover specific situations such as those covered by Article 27. 
A co-operation between the shipper and cargo is perhaps more reflective of the 
evolving nature of shipper carrier relationship today which appears to be translated into 
the increasing role of the shipper in the latest international convention on carriage of 
goods by sea. There seems to be more room for the shipper to be involved in the process 
of shipment, which although comes with responsibility, does entail some benefits to the 
shipper in ensuring a higher level of assurance of safe delivery of its cargo to its 
destination. Nevertheless it may have been better if the Article provision was clearly 
worded to include this implied obligation of co-operation in order for the industry to be 
clearer of what the expectations are of them. 
These two writers however, both agree516 on the interpretation to the rule in 
paragraph 3 of Article 27 which provides that where there is a container or vehicle which 
is used to contain the goods, and the shipper was the person who packed the container 
or loaded the vehicle, the shipper is required to ensure that the contents of the container 
or vehicle is properly and carefully stowed, lashed and secured in the container or on the 
trailer in such a way that they will not cause harm to persons and property. This 
provisions appears to give the impression that any persons who have been injured or 
whose property have been damaged by the failure of the shipper in fulfilling this duty, 
was owed an obligation by the shipper to not harm them such that this rule allows them 
to claim from the shipper directly. However, since Article 30 which deals with the basis 
of the shipper’s liability only provides for the liability towards the carrier, both writers 
agree that there is therefore no basis for a cause of action to any other persons who were 
harmed by a breach of the obligations imposed on the shipper under the Rules. A third 
party would only have recourse under the law of tort under the applicable national law, 
although Berlingieri is of the view that Article 27(3) may be used by the third party in 
arguing his claim under tort. If the third party was in a contractual relationship with the 
carrier, such as a member of crew who was injured in the course of employment due to 
a breach of the obligations imposed on the shipper, the carrier who has had to pay 
compensation to its employee may be indemnified by the shipper on the basis of Article 
27(3). 
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The rules on cargo preparation have obviously become more detailed and clearly 
expressed and encompass a wider range of activities compared to merely providing a 
description or labelling the goods. The word ‘must’ as used in the Rotterdam Rules 
indicate a sense of an obligation on the shipper rather than an option. However, it does 
allow the parties to contract out of this obligation. The obligation on the shipper is clearly 
evolving into something more than just about protecting the carrier’s interests in being 
indemnified in case it was sued by the transferee if the goods do not conform to its 
description in the bill of lading but goes further beyond to ensure safety of the cargo by 
requiring the shipper to participate in the preparation of the cargo for the voyage which 
will actually ensure a higher survival rate since the shipper is more familiar with the 
needs of the cargo it is sending. The safety approach has also evolved to deal with not 
only dangerous cargo but all cargo in general. This is a more preventive measure since 
it seeks to prevent physical damage to the cargo itself as well as other cargo, the ship 
and the crew on board the ship, not to mention other forms of damage such as delay. 
The issue of damage in the form of delay is an interesting area, which seems to 
have taken first priority above indemnity for the carrier as well as even safety of the 
cargo for the shipper. This is because although the preventive measures imposed on the 
shipper to protect the cargo, obviously benefits the shipper, this would therefore result 
in the rules on shipper’s duties to be predominantly for the shipper’s own self-interest. 
Self-interest as a basis arguably, cannot be sufficient to create a duty, much less 
a reason to expect the duty to be complied with as a rule of law.517 If this provision results 
in the safety of the cargo for the benefit of the shipper, this is more of a positive overall 
side effect of the hopefully probable consequence of abiding by the rules. Why should it 
then be worded as a duty imposed against the shipper? After all, if it is solely for the 
shipper’s own benefit, should it not therefore be made voluntary as an agreement in the 
contract of carriage? There should be something more than the appearance of simply 
paternalism to explain the imposition of such duties which goes against the grain of the 
underlying balance of benefits and burdens which such international conventions usually 
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seek to achieve. What could be the possible underlying purpose of or theory for creating 
these duties? In particular, does it affect the carrier and if so, how? 
Delay as a form of damage therefore appears to be a more appealing theory to 
explain to basis for the introduction of such a robust system of preparation and checking 
of cargo, as well as the following rules imposed on the shipper. All these rules point 
towards a more efficient system of cargo handling which demands a higher level 
competency on the part of the shipper yet not only benefits the shipper alone but as a 
preparation stage for an almost flawless system of transporting goods which involve no 
mishaps, problems, setbacks which all sums up to one most costly thing which the carrier 
wishes to avoid, and that is delay. 
How can proper preparation and delivery of goods ready for carriage prevent 
delay? In this age of modern shipping where containerisation dominates all if not most 
general cargo shipping, there is no possibility of discovering if the cargo has fallen off 
the position it was stowed and has shattered into pieces, until the container reaches its 
destination and opened by a disappointed receiver. Branch believes that 90 percent of 
major deep-sea trades are containerized and that the future is looking at long term 
containerization as the sole method of general cargo sea carriage.518  
There are however, still ways in which bad cargo preparation can be discovered 
before or during the journey and cause delay to the carrier. One example is the discovery 
by the crew of a container which is leaking liquid upon inspection before the next 
container is placed above or next to it, perhaps due the carton in which the liquid is 
contained having collapsed to insufficient dunnage. Furthermore, the container may not 
have been sealed properly by the shipper hence explaining the leakage. Upon this 
discovery, the loading process would have to be suspended while the leaking container 
is removed, which is not a simple matter of taking that one container off the vessel. 
Before loading can resume, damage control has to be done in order to clean up as well 
as assess the extent of the damage, for example if the liquid has dispersed and 
contaminated other cargo. Further the carrier has to communicate with the shipper or its 
agents in order to get further instruction. All of these consequences result in delay to the 
carrier which is translated into loss of turnaround time and ultimately profit 
maximisation, time being the most valuable thing in a carrier’s business. 
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Another more real example is illustrated by the case of Transoceanica Societa 
Italiana Di Navigazione v H.S. Shipton & Sons519 where a defective cargo of barley 
which was loaded onto the vessel was of inferior quality and was mixed with sand, dust, 
stones and other rubbish. This had caused delay during the discharge as the pneumatic 
suction that was used to discharge the cargo became choked and caused the machinery 
to disfunction. The carrier suffered not only delay in this case but also had to pay out to 
the port authority the extra payment for the stevedores who demanded extra pay due to 
the condition of the cargo as well as extra costs due to the discharge being retarded. 
As Schelin pointed out,520 Article 27 does not directly deal with delay in terms 
of being late in delivering the cargo to the carrier. There are already mechanisms in place 
within the system in practice to deal with delay. Where the cargo was meant for delivery 
to a liner ship, if it were late, the cargo would simply be left behind and literally miss the 
boat, although freight is still due from the shipper. The shipper would simply have to 
wait for the next available trip. A fixture under a voyage charter party would entail 
demurrage penalties while the risk of delay in a time charter fixture would fall on the 
charterer. However, where the bad cargo preparation does cause delay as envisaged 
above, Schelin is of the view that the carrier would not be denied compensation merely 
because the specific term “delay” was taken out of the text in Article 30 during the 
drafting process.521 
This is in contrast to the view held by Baughen, who doubts that the shipper could 
be liable for delay as a result of a failure in carrying out its obligations under the Rules 
since that kind of liability was omitted from Article 30. Such form of liability may 
instead be governed by national law.522 There is some weight in this argument 
particularly since the provision was specifically removed during the negotiation process 
of the Rules, and where it is meant to be covered, there are specific places in the Rules 
where provision for delay is made in addition to “loss” or “damage”.523 Further as 
already mentioned, there are already built-in remedies for such contingencies in 
charterparties. Nevertheless, as pointed out above, time is a valuable commodity for the 
carrier and for general cargo where there is no charter party between the shipper and the 
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carrier, the theory that explains the existence of such an elaborate duty can only be 
supported by the argument that delay was meant to be penalised against the shipper. 
Duty regarding provision of information and instructions 
Out of 8 articles on shipper liability, there are three distinct articles in the 
Rotterdam Rules which deal with the shipper’s obligation to provide information and 
instructions under Chapter 7. These are articles 28, 29 and 31. This seems to indicate the 
level of recognition given to the importance and growing emphasis on this aspect of the 
shipper’s obligations in modern shipping. Article 28 of the Rotterdam Rules deals with 
requests for information and instructions required for proper handling and carriage of 
the goods which may be made by the carrier and shipper towards each other. This 
provision requires that such requests shall be responded to, subject to the availability of 
the information being in the requested party’s possession or reasonable ability to provide, 
and that the information is also not reasonably available to the requesting party. The duty 
in this article focuses generally on the requirement to cooperate with the carrier when 
there is a request for information and instructions for the proper handling and carriage 
of the goods. The specific kind of information and instructions required is provided for 
separately in article 29 and 31. 
Although article 29 is similar to article 28, it deals not only with specific 
information and instructions but also documents which the shipper is obliged to provide 
and it encompasses two things. First, are those information, instructions and documents 
which are reasonably necessary for the proper handling and carriage of the cargo, 
including precautions which the carrier or performing carrier need to be aware of and 
take.524 Secondly are those information, instructions and documents which are 
reasonably necessary for compliance by the carrier with rules, regulations or other 
requirements of public authorities for the carriage of the cargo to which they relate.525 
The second requirement is however, subject to the carrier giving notice in a timely 
manner the information, instruction and document it requires from the shipper. This 
article also maintains whatever legal requirement there may be in existence as to specific 
obligations of the shipper to provide information, instructions and documents related to 
                                                          
524 Paragraph (1)(a) of Article 29. 
525 Paragraph (1)(b) of Article 29. 
146 
 
the goods in connection with the carriage.526 Therefore information, instructions and 
documents for both aspects must be supplied by the shipper regardless of any request 
made by the carrier if the law requires the shipper to do so.  
 The third provision relating to the duty of the shipper under the Rotterdam Rules 
to provide information is in article 31. According to article 31 of the Rotterdam Rules, 
the shipper must supply to the carrier accurate information for the compilation of the 
contract particulars and the issuance of transport documents or electronic transport 
records, and this information must be provided in a timely manner. The purpose of the 
duty in this article is quite different from the duties in the preceding articles. The 
particulars identified in this article are, but not limited to; the name of the party to be 
identified as the shipper in the contract particulars, the name of the consignee, if there is 
any, and the name of the person to whose order the transport document or the electronic 
transport record is to be issued, if there is any. The shipper also has to provide contract 
particulars described in paragraph 1 of article 36 which are; a description of the goods, 
leading marks necessary for the identification of the goods, number of packages or pieces 
or the quantity of goods, and the weight of the goods, if this is available.  
The important part of article 31 is the second paragraph which provides for a 
guarantee by the shipper. According to article 31 rule 2, the information in the first 
paragraph is deemed to be guaranteed by the shipper to be accurate at the time they are 
issued to the carrier and the shipper has to indemnify the carrier in case of loss or damage 
resulting from inaccuracy of the information. An example for this could be sanctions 
imposed for misdescription of containerised cargo exercised by certain ports, such as the 
US 24 Hours Advanced Manifest Rule.527  
It appears from the existence of these articles that it is not sufficient on the part 
of the shipper to merely have the physical fitness of the cargo for the carriage; the cargo 
must also have documentary fitness enabling it clear passage all the way through to its 
final destination. The provision is also flexible in that it may be that the shipper may 
avoid liability if it can show that the information, instructions and documents which it 
failed to provide, are not reasonably necessary to be given to the carrier528 for neither the 
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proper handling and carriage of the cargo, nor for compliance by the carrier with the 
rules on its carriage. 
In the Hamburg Rules there is no specific provision on the general duty to 
provide information. There are however, provisions which name the particular 
circumstances in which there are duties on the shipper to provide information. The first 
is in relation to carriage of dangerous goods. If the nature of goods which the shipper 
send is sending is dangerous, under article 13 the shipper has the duty to inform the 
carrier or the actual carrier at the time the goods are handed over, the dangerous character 
of the goods as well as the necessary precautions to be taken. If this was not done by the 
shipper and, the carrier, either contractual or actual does not have knowledge about the 
dangerous character of the goods, two consequences follow. Firstly, the shipper is liable 
to both for the losses resulting529 from such shipment and secondly, the carriers may 
unload, destroy or render innocuous, whatever the circumstances require for safety to be 
restored, without being liable for compensation to the shipper.530 However, in contrast if 
knowledge of the dangerous character is known, such measures may not be taken by 
anyone who has during the carriage taken the goods under his charge with such 
knowledge.531 
The duty of the shipper under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules regarding the 
provision of information is not expressed directly, just as the duty to prepare cargo ready 
for carriage above. The duty of the shipper to provide information may be extracted from 
the provision on the obligation of the carrier under article III rule 3(a). This duty requires 
the carrier to issue a bill of lading to the shipper containing certain information, but the 
manner in which that information is obtained implies the obligation there of the shipper 
to provide to the carrier, in writing prior to the loading, information regarding certain 
things. These include the leading marks necessary for the identification of the goods, 
which should be stamped or shown clearly on the goods when uncovered, or remain 
legible on the coverings or cases in which the goods are contained throughout the 
journey. Secondly, the shipper under article III Rule 3(b) has to furnish in writing either 
the number of packages or pieces, or the quantity, or weight of the goods depending on 
how the shipper has packed them or had them packed.  
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The provision which then makes the shipper liable for failing to fulfil the obligations 
mentioned above is article III rule 5. This article provides that the shipper is deemed to 
have guaranteed at the time of shipment the accuracy of the information on the above 
which he has furnished and requires the shipper to indemnify the carrier where the 
information has proved inaccurate and thereby causing loss, damages and expenses to 
the carrier. 
 As discussed in the previous section on the duty of the shipper to prepare the 
cargo ready for carriage, there is a rule in the SOLAS convention which requires 
verification of the gross mass of packed containers. The shipper has a mandatory duty to 
submit information on the verified weight to the master, prior to loading.532 Further 
details on the provision of the SOLAS convention on this matter is discussed in the 
section on non-carriage of goods by sea conventions below.  
Duty regarding dangerous goods 
The meaning of dangerous goods is not defined in any of the carriage of goods 
Conventions. A list of goods of a certain nature is included in the Hague and Hague-
Visby Rules under t of goods which have a dangerous nature. Article 32 of the Rotterdam 
Rules deals specifically with goods which are, or reasonably likely to become, dangerous 
to persons, property or the environment by their nature or character. The shipper has two 
obligations under this article. The first is the duty to inform the carrier of the dangerous 
nature or character of the goods in a timely manner before delivering the goods to the 
carrier or performing party. Failure to do this will result in the shipper being liable to the 
carrier for any damage or loss resulting from such failure to inform. However, if the 
carrier or performing party has knowledge of the dangerous nature or character of the 
goods, the shipper is not liable. Secondly is the duty to mark or label the goods as 
dangerous in accordance with any rules or regulations which may be required at any 
stage of the carriage, and not merely at the port of discharge. Again, if any loss or damage 
ensues as a result of failure to perform this obligation, the shipper has to be liable to the 
carrier. However, ‘danger’ is not specifically described or defined, and so may include 
non-physical danger such as liability incurred as a result of breaching laws on carriage 
of goods which creates a threat to the environment. It has been argued533 however, that 
article 32 does not include liability for inability to unload the goods at the port of 
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discharge due to non-fulfilment of certain legal requirements. This would be covered by 
the general provision in article 29. 
Under the Hamburg Rules Article 13 provides for special rules on dangerous 
goods and there are a few duties imposed on the shipper. The first duty in paragraph 1 
of this article is the duty to mark or label dangerous goods which indicates its danger in 
a manner which is suitable. Secondly in paragraph 2 the shipper has the duty to inform 
the carrier or the actual carrier at the time the goods are handed over, the dangerous 
character of the goods as well as the necessary precautions to be taken. If this was not 
done by the shipper and the carrier either contractual or actual do not have knowledge 
about the dangerous character of the goods, the shipper is liable to both for the losses 
resulting534 from such shipment and the carriers may unload, destroy or render 
innocuous, whatever the circumstances require for safety to be restored, without being 
liable for compensation to the shipper.535 However, in contrast if knowledge of the 
dangerous character is known, such measures may not be taken by anyone who has 
during the carriage taken the goods under his charge with such knowledge.536 Finally, 
notwithstanding any knowledge about the dangerous character of the goods or 
precautions to be taken or any other situation where sub paragraph (b) of article 13(2) 
does not apply, if the goods become an actual danger to life or property, they may still 
be unloaded, destroyed or rendered innocuous, whichever one may be necessary, without 
the carrier being liable for compensation except to general average contributions or the 
carrier’s liability for cargo under article 5. 
In this article there is no mention of the mental element required. It may be 
presumed therefore that the liability here should be strict due to the nature of the risk and 
potential damage caused to the carrier and third parties. This would be consistent with 
the position taken with the previous conventions. 
 
Under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules article IV rule 6 provides for the duty of the 
shipper to not ship dangerous goods without first informing the carrier and obtaining the 
latter’s consent. If the shipper ships goods which are inflammable, explosive or 
dangerous in nature without the informed consent of the carrier, his master or agent as 
to their nature and character, the carrier has the right to land, destroy or render innocuous 
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those goods prior to actual discharge without compensating the shipper. If as a result of 
this remedial action the carrier incurs expenses or suffers damage, the shipper shall 
further be liable to compensate the carrier for these losses whether they were directly or 
indirectly caused by the shipment. Even if the shipper did inform the carrier and obtained 
his consent to carry the dangerous goods, the carrier may still retain the right to take 
those remedial actions if the dangerous goods then posed a danger to the ship and cargo 
without incurring any liability to the carrier except to general average, however the 
shipper would not be required to compensate the carrier for any consequent expenses or 
loss incurred. 
Judging by the type of cases more often brought about in the area of shipper liability, 
article IV rule 6 appears to be the provision which carriers have relied on the most in 
order to bring a cause of action against shippers. The cause of action brought about by 
the carrier may be in the form of a claim against the shipper for causing physical damage 
to the ship, or it may be in the form of an indemnity to the carrier for claims brought 
against it by others. This may include innocent cargo owners who claim for damage to 
or loss of their cargo, personal injury claims by the crew or dependants in the case of 
death of the crew, state authorities which suffered damage to the environment due to 
pollution or waste, or third persons who suffer loss caused by delay or detention of the 
vessel due to it carrying the dangerous cargo.537 
An example is the case of The Atlantic Duchess538 where the charterer had contracted 
with the shipowner under a charterparty which provided for the loading of, among other 
types of oil, crude oil. The cargo was loaded onto the ship, carried to the discharge port 
where it was delivered, and then underwent the ballasting process. Unfortunately during 
the ballasting of the tanks, an explosion and fire occurred killing several crew members, 
injuring some others and damaging the ship and surrounding property. 
The shipowner alleged that the charterer had breached the contract by loading a cargo 
not within the range which was agreed under the charterparty. One of the reasons for the 
alleged breach was that the cargo was a completely different type of cargo than those 
which were allowed to be carried under the charterparty, since what was loaded was, as 
described in the bill of lading by the charterer, butanized crude oil; a mixture of crude 
oil and butane. Butanized crude oil was not specifically described in the charterparty, 
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although crude oil was. The other argument for a breach of contract was that butanized 
crude oil was more dangerous than crude oil alone or any of the other type of cargo 
allowed under the charterparty. Therefore the master ought to have been warned about 
the extra precautions to be taken. This would be a breach of a term implied by common 
law, or of an implied warranty that it is safe to carry and deliver the cargo, or a breach 
of article IV rule 6 of the Hague Rules which the shipowner argued was incorporated 
into the charterparty by way of a clause in the charterparty. In essence, the type of cargo 
loaded was arguably different from what was agreed, and this therefore affected the level 
of knowledge about the risk of danger the cargo presented.  
The other issue in this case was whether the nature of the cargo of butanized crude oil 
fell within the meaning of “inflammable, explosive and dangerous” as required by 
Article IV rule 6 of the Hague Rules.539 The court however did not decide on this since 
the argument that the Hague Rules applied was rejected. 
The shipper charterer on the other hand defended the allegations by arguing that the 
cargo shipped was one of those allowed under the charterparty or that the constitution of 
the cargo at the end of the day is a product which composed of a combination of the 
categories of cargo which were technically allowed under the charterparty on a proper 
construction. Furthermore it was a customarily accepted cargo by shipowners albeit 
normally simply named as crude oil. Also the defendant contended that there was 
negligence by the crew in igniting the inflammable mixture of gas and air produced 
during ballasting and which collected due to negligence again in not closing the ullage 
plug holes, by their act of smoking and using non-flame-proof torches. 
 Pearson MJ held that there was no breach of contract by the charterer since the 
shipowners failed to prove that the cargo shipped fell outside the range of authorised 
cargo as described in the charterparty, nor did they successfully prove that the butanized 
crude oil presented a special risk as compared to crude oil for which the master should 
have been informed, because they could not prove that the vapours from butanized crude 
oil were more persistent than that of crude oil. The learned judge took the view that 
butanized crude oil was basically crude oil since he held that otherwise it would fall 
outside the contractually authorized cargo altogether, as it could not possibly pass as any 
of the other types of oil described in the charterparty. More importantly, it presented the 
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same risk as crude oil and that the additional butane did not cause the explosion. 
Accordingly the charterer did not breach the implied term as regards dangerous goods. 
As regards the clause which purportedly incorporates article IV rule 6 of the 
Hague Rules into the charterparty, this was held to be merely a clause which identifies 
the scope of the respective charterparty and bill of lading terms, and therefore article IV 
rule 6 does not apply to the contract of carriage which as between a shipowner and 
charterer, is to be found only in the charterparty, the bill of lading acting only as a receipt. 
In any case, the judge held that the effect would be equivalent regardless of that since 
the obligation regarding dangerous goods which arose under both article IV rule 6 and 
under the common law are substantially the same. 
 There are a few important principles that could be derived from this case in 
relation to shipper liability under article IV rule 6 of the Hague Rules. The first is that 
although the basic principle is that the shipper has a duty to not ship dangerous goods 
without first informing the carrier of the danger and obtaining consent, the shipper is not 
obliged to inform the carrier if the carrier knew or should have known about the danger. 
This obligation therefore only arises to the extent that the danger from the particular 
cargo is not common knowledge. The extension to this principle from this case seems to 
be that where the carrier is unaware of the danger due to the extra special risk created by 
that cargo, which would not normally arise for a usual cargo of that kind, for the shipper 
to be liable, the cargo has to actually be different in kind. Whether there is an extra 
special risk which requires special precautions to be given by the shipper appears to be 
premised on the basis of whether that cargo is effectively of a different kind than a 
regular cargo of that type. It appears therefore that the underlying theory at work revolves 
around the issue of the risk involved. If the cargo is of the same kind, the risk is the same, 
and there is no liability on the shipper. However if the cargo is of a different kind, the 
risk is increased or is different, and so there may be liability depending on the 
circumstances. 
In the case of Brass v Maitland [1856] 6 E & B 470 the shipper shipped a consignment 
of chloride of lime or commonly known as bleaching powder on board a general ship 
owned by the plaintiffs. This is a substance which is corrosive and could potentially 
damage other cargo if it leaks and comes into contact with other cargo. The nature of the 
cargo was not known to the plaintiff shipowners and they claimed from the defendant 
shippers who defended themselves by arguing that they had received the cargo from a 
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third party in a ready-packed condition. Therefore the shippers do not have knowledge 
that the cargo had insufficient packing, nor a way to find out whether packing was 
sufficient. In other words, the shippers pleaded no negligence. 
This defence was met with disapproval by the majority which held that where the owners 
have undertaken to receive, carry and deliver goods safely, there is a reciprocal duty on 
the shipper to undertake to not deliver packages of goods the dangerous nature of which 
those working on behalf of the shipowners may not reasonably be able to discover on 
inspection of the goods, unless the shippers had prior to delivery expressly informed the 
shipowner the nature of such goods. If the shipper did not give such notice due to lack 
of knowledge on its part as to the dangerous nature of the cargo, the loss that ensues 
must be borne by the shipper. The loss has to be borne by either the shipowner or the 
shipper and since this loss resulted from the lack of notice given to the shipowners which 
they are entitled to receive and arose from the ignorance of the shipper, it should be the 
shipper who bears the brunt. 
However there is an important dissenting view given by Crompton J which deals with 
the knowledge of the shipper as well as its negligence. Crompton J doubted that liability 
can attach to the shipper before there is knowledge or means of obtaining knowledge of 
the dangerous nature of the cargo when it was shipped, or it can be proven that the 
shipper was negligent in not informing the shipowner the dangerous nature of the cargo 
when he had the means of finding out and should have informed the shipowner.540 Where 
no such negligence can be proven, Crompton J was of the view that there should not be 
liability on the shipper.541 
Even if the degree of risk is increased, that alone may not be enough to trigger liability, 
if the type of cargo is still considered to be the same. Only a different kind of cargo 
would produce a different kind of risk sufficient to require special notice to be given by 
the shipper. In the case of The Athanasia Comninos542, some cargo of coal were shipped 
by the seller f.o.b. two time-chartered ships on which the shipping space for consecutive 
voyages were contracted for by the buyer, C.E.G.B. with the charterer. Notwithstanding, 
the seller was named as shippers on the bills of lading whereas the buyer was named as 
consignees. 
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 The casualties occurred on voyages subsequent to uneventful ones, after the 
cargo was loaded and the ship was heading for her destination. Some crew members 
were injured in the first incident but in the second incident on the other ship, damage 
was restricted only to the ship. The first important issue relevant to this thesis is whether 
the shipper had a contractual relationship with the plaintiff shipowner and therefore may 
incur contractual liability, in particular regarding the suitability of the cargo for safe 
carriage. 
 Mustill MJ held that as shippers of the goods and by being named as such in the 
bill of lading, their contractual liability under it was quite clear, despite the consignee 
being the contractual party to the contract of affreightment. The only exception is if the 
shippers were named as such in the bill of lading without their consent. The buyer 
consignee’s contractual relationship on the other hand, was governed by the voyage 
charterparty they entered into with the time charterers, and the bill of lading therefore 
only acts as a receipt in their hands. 
 Another important issue discussed in this case is whether the consignee takes on 
any of the liability for the dangerous goods by way of an implied contract when the 
consignee presents the bill of lading for collection of the goods. The learned judge by 
applying the case of Brandt v Liverpool543 agreed that an implied contract may be found 
but that not all of the obligations thereunder are taken on by the consignee, in particular 
those which do not concern carriage, delivery and payment. A warranty for the fitness 
of the goods for carriage cannot be extended to the consignee since he has nothing to do 
with the goods when they were shipped. 
 Further, according to Mustill MJ, although the transfer of the bill of lading under 
the requirements of section 1 of the Bills of Lading Act 1855 may transfer away some 
of the shipper’s contractual obligations, the Act was not intended to divest the shipper 
from responsibility for the loss resulting from the act of shipping, in particular dangerous 
cargo. 
 Although article IV rule 3 provides in general that the shipper is only liable for 
loss or damage sustained by the carrier or the ship which arose or resulted from the 
shipper’s act, fault or neglect or that of the shipper’s agents or servants, article IV rule 6 
has been held by the House of Lords case of Effort Shipping Co Ltd v Linden 
                                                          




Management SA544 to not be subject to the rule in article IV rule 3. This is due to the fact 
that the liability in article IV rule 6 is considered absolute without proof of fault.  There 
is no justification for this to be found in the travaux preparatoires of the Hague Rules 
but Lord Steyn gathered this to be the case since the prevalent view at the time the Hague 
Rules were drafted was largely reflective of the decision in Brass v Maitland,545 where 
the term implied by law to not ship dangerous goods was held to be absolute. This 
probably had been adopted by countries in the then British Empire as well as the United 
States546 before the Hague Rules was passed. Both countries were major maritime 
powers with trading countries which made up much of the maritime trade. The absolute 
obligation of the shipper to not ship dangerous goods was probably therefore the 
dominant theory at the time the Hague Rules were adopted, and if a contrary view was 
to be taken, it should have been clearly set out in the rules themselves.547 Lord Steyn’s 
view is that article IV rule 6 is a free-standing provision whereas Lord Cooke, who 
viewed that all rules should be integrated preferred to view article IV rule 6 as taking 
priority over article IV rule 3.548 By being subject to the fault requirement in article IV 
rule 3, the strictness of the rule in article IV rule 6 would be diluted. The mental element 
required of the shipper for liability for shipping dangerous goods without the carrier’s 
consent due to this ruling of the court is therefore dispensed with. 
Reference may be found in the interpretation of an equivalent provision to article 4 rule 
6 in the case of Chem One Ltd v MV Rickmers Genoa549. In this case a collision between 
the ship Rickmers Genoa which was carrying a cargo of 600 tons of a magnesium-based 
desulphurisation reagent known as Super-Sul Mg-89 from China to the United States 
and the ship Sun Cross resulted in a breach of the former’s hull. When seawater flooded 
the holds of the Rickmers Genoa and came into contact with the Super-Sul Mg-89, it 
caused a reaction which produced hydrogen which accumulated and got ignited whereby 
an explosion occurred destroying the ship and killing one crew member. The shipowner 
and charterer of the Rickmers Genoa claimed against the owner of Super-Sul MG-89 
which moved for dismissal of the claim and won at the US District Court. The shipowner 
and charterer appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which affirmed 
the decision. According to the Court of Appeal the shipper was not strictly liable under 
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section 4(6) US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.550 The shipper was required to inform 
the carrier regarding the dangerous nature of the cargo but the manner in which this is 
conveyed does not have to be in any specific way. 
 In the case of DG Harmony,551 the defendant shipper PPG manufactured and 
shipped a cargo of calcium hypochlorite hydrated (cal-hypo) contained in drums carried 
in containers aboard the vessel DG Harmony. The vessel caught fire at sea and became 
a constructive total loss. It was allegedly the cargo of cal-hypo decomposed, self-heated, 
exploded and started the fire. Claims were made by the plaintiff shipowner and cargo 
interests that the shippers were strictly liable under section 4(6) of the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea Act 46 USC (hereafter US COGSA). The provision of this section mirrors article 
4 rule 6 of the Hague Rules as the US COGSA is an enactment552 of the latter and so 
provides insight to its interpretation. 
 In Senator Linie GMBH (2d Cir. 2002)553 it was held by the Second Circuit that 
section 4(6) US COGSA554 created a strict liability for the shipper for direct and indirect 
damage that is triggered by the shipment of dangerous goods the nature of which both 
the carrier and shipper do not have actual or constructive knowledge before shipment. 
The court’s reasoning was that: 
“…..a strict-liability construction of § 1304(6) will foster fairness and efficiency 
in the dealings of commercial maritime actors. In contrast to a carrier, which 
typically is in the position of taking aboard its vessel a large quantity and variety 
of cargoes, a shipper can be expected to have greater access to and familiarity 
with goods and their manufacturers before those goods are placed in maritime 
commerce. If an unwitting party must suffer, it should be the one that is in a better 
position to ascertain ahead of time the dangerous nature of the shipped goods. 
That party in many cases will be the shipper.”555 
The District Court in DG Harmony556 held that the former case applied even 
though the vessel interests consented to carrying the cargo because the consent was given 
without full knowledge of the dangers and risks involved. There was a lack of 
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information and lack of proper warning. The basis of liability in the latter case were both 
from theories of negligent failure to warn and strict liability. Chin D.J. stated that the 
defendant shipper has an advantage over the carrier in their ability make enquiries as to 
the actual nature of the cargo well before it was shipped especially since they were not 
only the shipper but also the manufacturer of the cargo. This also gives a stronger reason 
to hold the shipper strictly liable.557 
It is interesting to note that in this case, the court provided a safety net where it 
held that even if the finding of strict liability failed, the defendant shipper could be still 
be liable on the basis of a failure to warn and of negligence, by fault being established 
on the part of the shipper. The court however, did not go further to discuss the sense of 
fault being used here except that it conforms to the concept used in negligence for 
product liability. The judge did also refer to 46 U.S.C. § 1304(3) which is the US 
enactment of article IV rule 3 of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules. This provision 
requires an act, fault or neglect on the part of the shipper, his servants or agents before 
the shipper can be liable to the carrier or the ship for any loss or damage. This case is an 
example where fault in the convention is simply equated with the tort of negligence 
where the question then accordingly revolves around issues of foreseeability of damage, 
the failure to take reasonable care and causation. 
That decision seems to be discussing the failure to warn and negligence as two 
separate liabilities as claimed by the plaintiffs. It is not clear however, how the finding 
of failure to warn was made and whether it was on the basis of negligence, or if 
negligence was a separate liability, for which act or omission. On appeal this is a point 
echoed by the appeal court as it stated that although the defendant was found solely liable 
for the loss of the vessel on the basis of strict liability and negligent failure to warn, it 
was unclear whether the latter judgement was on the basis of general negligence. 
Although there were two separate claims advanced by the plaintiffs being the failure to 
warn and negligence, the district court had relied on one single test to determine both 
claims.558 Because of the lack of clarity in the district court’s reasoning of the finding of 
negligence, the appeal court allowed the appeal made by the defendant shipper on its 
liability on the basis of general negligence.  
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This case demonstrates how the determination of the mental element is an 
important feature of shipper liability. It is not enough to generally refer to fault or 
negligence as being required for there to be liability without actually going into the 
discussion of what is required for there to be such fault or negligence. The appeal court 
also reversed the finding of strict liability for the defendant shipper as although the ship-
owning interest did not have knowledge of the precise characteristics of the cargo, they 
knew that it was vulnerable to heat which could cause combustion. They had allowed it 
to be exposed to general conditions which includes heat and so could not therefore rely 
on strict liability but only negligence.559 In coming to this decision, they had relied on 
the case of Contship Containerlines, Ltd. v. PPG Indus., Inc. 560 where despite general 
awareness of a cargo’s potential danger which requires proper handling, the carrier 
exposed the cargo to general conditions which could trigger combustion. This defeated 
a claim on the basis of strict liability for loss or damage caused by dangerous goods, 
even though the carrier did not have knowledge of the precise characteristics of the 
cargo. 
In the case of The Kapitan Sakharov561 a feeder vessel carried containers belonging 
mostly to DSR and CYL from Khor Fakkan to other ports in the Gulf. A container carried 
on deck exploded and caused a fire which spread below deck. The vessel sank and two 
seamen were killed in this incident. The plaintiff shipower claimed against both shippers 
while the shippers counterclaimed against the shipowner as well as claimed against each 
other. The reason was because both the shippers had shipped dangerous cargo and each 
was trying to blame the other for the cause of the explosion and subsequent fire. Apart 
from suffering its own losses, the plaintiff was also trying to get an indemnity from DSR 
and CYL for claims made against it by the shippers, the dependants of the deceased crew 
and the Iranian authorities for pollution. Likewise DSR and CYL had their own losses 
but needed indemnification for claims by other cargo and container owners. 
It was held by Clarke J at first instance that DSR’s container of undeclared dangerous 
cargo was responsible for the initial explosion. This container was stowed on deck which 
results in the ship becoming unseaworthy. This however, was held to not be due to the 
lack of due diligence by the plaintiff shipowner. The explosion and resulting fire were 
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the causes of damage to part of the ship and cargo and instrumental in bringing about the 
sinking of the ship and loss of cargo. 
However, something happened in between the initial explosion and subsequent fire, and 
the sinking of the ship and loss of cargo. The plaintiff shipowner was held to have not 
exercised due diligence in stowing CYL’s container below deck. CYL’s container 
contained isopentane which required proper ventilation having a low boiling point of 28 
degrees celcius. It was also highly flammable. The initial explosion had cracked open 
the hatch of the hold in which the isopentane were stowed. The fire from above  then 
spread down into the hold. The temperature in the Gulf would cause the isopentane to 
be under pressure and escape as vapours. The lack of mechaical ventilation down there 
increased the risk that the vapours would combust and catch fire. 
Duty to indemnify for guarantees made by shipper 
According to article 31 of the Rotterdam Rules, the shipper must supply to the 
carrier accurate information for the compilation of the contract particulars and the 
issuance of transport documents or electronic transport records, and this information 
must be provided in a timely manner. The particulars identified in this article are, but not 
limited to; the name of the party to be identified as the shipper in the contract particulars, 
the name of the consignee, if there is any, and the name of the person to whose order the 
transport document or the electronic transport record is to be issued, if there is any. The 
shipper also has to provide contract particulars described in paragraph 1 of article 36 
which are; a description of the goods, leading marks necessary for the identification of 
the goods, number of packages or pieces or the quantity of goods, and the weight of the 
goods, if this is available. This information is deemed to be guaranteed by the shipper to 
be accurate at the time they are issued to the carrier and the shipper has to indemnify the 
carrier in case of loss or damage resulting from inaccuracy of the information, for 
example sanctions imposed for misdescription of containerised cargo exercised by 
certain ports, such as the US 24 Hours Advanced Manifest Rule.562  
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Under the Hamburg Rules the provision for this shipper liability is article 17 
which deals with guarantees made by the shipper. Under article 17(1) the shipper is 
deemed to have guaranteed the accuracy of the general nature of the goods, their marks, 
number, weight and quantity which he has supplied to the carrier to be inserted in the 
bill of lading. If these particulars prove to be incorrect the shipper must indemnify the 
carrier for the resulting losses, and remains liable to the carrier even though the bill of 
lading has been transferred. If the shipper provides a letter of guarantee or agreement 
wherein the shipper undertakes to indemnify for the loss resulting from the carrier 
issuing a bill of lading with inaccurate particulars without reservation as to the 
particulars, this letter of guarantee or agreement is void and of no effect against a third 
party or consignee who took the bill of lading transfer.563 It is valid though against the 
shipper unless the carrier used it to defraud a third party or consignee who would be 
relying on the description of the goods in the bill of lading by the carrier omitting the 
reservation mentioned above. The carrier would also not be able to claim indemnity from 
the shipper if the reservation is regarding the particulars furnished by the shipper to be 
inserted in the bill of lading.564 
 Again here there is no mention of the mental element required, so arguably the 
liability should be strict due the severity of the consequences should the shipper fail in 
his duty as well as the way in which it is worded. 
Under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, article III Rule 3(a) requires the carrier 
to issue a bill of lading to the shipper containing certain information, the manner in which 
that information is obtained implies the obligation there of the shipper to provide to the 
carrier, in writing prior to the loading, information regarding certain things. These 
include the leading marks necessary for the identification of the goods, which should be 
stamped or shown clearly on the goods when uncovered, or remain legible on the 
coverings or cases in which the goods are contained throughout the journey. Secondly, 
the shipper under article III Rule 3(b) has to furnish in writing either the number of 
packages or pieces, or the quantity, or weight of the goods depending on how the shipper 
has packed them or had them packed. 
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The provision which then makes the shipper liable for failing to fulfil the obligations 
mentioned above is article III rule 5. This article provides that the shipper is deemed to 
have guaranteed at the time of shipment the accuracy of the information on the above 
which he has furnished and requires the shipper to indemnify the carrier where the 
information has proved inaccurate and thereby causing loss, damages and expenses to 
the carrier. 
 The case of DG Harmony565 concerned a ship which caught fire due to a shipment 
of calcium hypochlorite hydrated (cal-hypo) and became a constructive total loss. The 
carrier defendants had already settled outside the court with the plaintiff vessel owners 
and other cargo interests before the trial and did not become a party to the trial. When 
the decision from the trial held the defendant shipper of the dangerous cargo 100% liable 
for the loss and the carrier defendants 0% liable, the latter tried to claim indemnity from 
the shipper for the settlement it had paid. It was held by the that the carrier defendant 
could not do so as they had decided to settle instead of taking the risk of going to trial 
and being liable for more. Here there was a contractual obligation by the shipper to 
indemnify the carrier for losses but it could not be enforced since the indemnity claims 
had been dismissed in Harmony II.566 The defendants were trying to reinstate their 
indemnity claims but did not have any basis to do so. By allowing such a claim it would 
make the defendant shipper more than 100% liable because it had already been found 
100% liable in the trial. There was no discussion regarding the fault of the shipper as to 
whether the contractual obligation imposed a strict liability to indemnify the carrier. 
Rather the court focused on the sensibility or otherwise of allowing such a claim. 
Liability of the shipper for other persons 
Under the Rotterdam Rules article 34 makes the shipper liable even if the breach 
of any of its obligations under the convention’s provisions was caused by acts or 
omissions of any other persons including his employees, agents or subcontractors to 
which it has delegated the performance of its obligations; but the shipper is not liable if 
its obligations were delegated to the carrier or performing party. The Rotterdam Rules 
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has a provision for vicarious liability separate from the shipper’s own liability unlike the 
Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules. 
Article 12 of the Hamburg Rules talks about the loss sustained by the carrier, 
actual carrier or damage to the ship for which the shipper will not be liable for unless the 
loss or damage was caused by the fault or neglect of the shipper, his servants or agents. 
Even the shipper’s servant or agent’s liability for the loss or damage is dependent on 
there being fault or neglect on their part. This liability therefore clearly requires fault or 
negligence as the mental element in establishing liability under the Hamburg Rules but 
only for the liability of each respective party’s own acts or omissions. 
Article IV rule 3 of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules speaks of the general 
provision for in what circumstances the shipper may be liable to the carrier or the ship. 
The shipper is only liable for the loss or damage caused to the carrier or the ship due to 
the act, fault or neglect of the shipper, his servants or agents. This is similar to article 12 
of the Hamburg Rules except that it also covers acts of the shipper, his servants or agents. 
Although the liability of the shipper’s servants or agents depend on fault, the 
vicarious liability of the shipper for the persons under the shipper’s control seems to be 
strict since it does not depend on the fault of the shipper but simply on the basis that 
there is a relationship of master and servant.  
Nature of liability 
 Generally, all the liabilities incurred by the shipper under chapter 7 of the 
Rotterdam Rules are fault-based except for loss or damage caused by the shipper as a 
result of a breach of its obligations under article 31 (2) and article 32. For all other 
liabilities, article 30 relieves the shipper if the loss or damage was not caused by the 
shipper’s fault or the fault of persons mentioned in article 34 to whom the shipper has 
delegated its obligations under the convention.567 So if the shipper fails to prepare its 
goods ready for carriage as required by the convention, it will be liable if the loss or 
damage sustained by the carrier as a result of a breach of its obligation to deliver the 
goods ready for carriage, was caused by the fault of the shipper or persons to whom it 
has entrusted the task of preparing the goods for carriage. For example, the shipper more 
often than not would engage a freight forwarder who would arrange everything from 
packing, labelling and loading to stowing the goods. If the freight forwarder improperly 
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packed the goods causing them to leak, the shipper bears the burden of any loss which 
may be caused to the carrier as a result of this.  
Similarly, a failure of the shipper to supply the necessary documents, information 
and instructions which causes loss or damage to the carrier, will result in the shipper 
being liable for the loss or damage sustained by the carrier if such loss or damage was 
caused by the fault of the shipper or persons it entrusted to prepare and provide all the 
necessary information, instruction and documents. For example, if the goods required 
certain health certificates before it can be landed at a particular port, the shipper would 
be liable even if it had delegated the task of procuring and supplying to the carrier the 
appropriate health certificates to an agent, if the agent had been negligent in doing so.  
However, for the shipper’s obligations in article 31 to supply information for the 
compilation of the contract particulars and the issuance of the transport documents or 
electronic transport records, liability of the shipper is strict, not only because it is 
excluded from the general fault-based liability in article 30, but perhaps also because the 
provision in article 31 employs the phrase ‘the shipper shall568 indemnify the carrier 
against loss or damage’.569 The shipper is absolutely liable if the information it provided 
to the carrier turned out to be inaccurate and such inaccuracy causes the carrier to suffer 
loss or damage. For example if there was a miscalculation of the number of packages in 
the shipment, or if the goods were misdescribed, the shipper would be liable even though 
it had communicated misinformation which any other reasonable person would also have 
done with the data available to him. The shipper would equally be liable if the inaccuracy 
of the information provided to the carrier was through the fault of other persons to whom 
it has delegated the task of preparing and providing the information for the compilation 
of the contract particulars.570 For a failure of this obligation, whose nature and standard 
is in the form of a guarantee by the shipper, the shape of liability of the shipper takes the 
form of indemnification rather than payment of damages for losses incurred by the 
carrier as a result of being provided with inaccurate information. 
The same basis of liability applies where the shipper breaches its obligation to 
the shipper regarding dangerous goods as provided by article 32. If the shipper fails to 
                                                          
568 Emphasis added. 
569 Jose Vicente Guzman, ‘The Rotterdam Rules – Shipper’s Obligations and Liability’ (2010) 
www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Rotterdam Rules/Rotterdam Rules - Shipper’s Obligations and 
Liability – CMI, 2010 – Jose Vicente Guzman.pdf, 9. 
570 Information which could be misstated includes the description of the goods and its general nature, its 
quantity or number of pieces, weight, or leading marks necessary for identification. 
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inform the carrier in a timely manner before the goods are delivered for carriage that 
what the carrier will be carrying is something which has the potential of becoming 
dangerous to persons, property or the environment, the shipper is strictly liable to the 
carrier regardless of any fault on the part of the shipper, if the failure to inform causes 
the carrier to sustain any loss or damage. For example, if the shipper ships a container of 
chemicals whose dangerous nature if informed would have allowed the carrier’s crew to 
be aware of the hazards should the chemical come into contact with water, the shipper 
would be absolutely liable if the crew was exposed to noxious gases as a result of hosing 
down the box thinking that it was on fire when smoke starts seeping out of the container 
seals, even though the shipper had exercised every care in ensuring that the carrier is 
informed of the nature of the goods.  
Similarly, if the shipper fails to label or mark dangerous goods in accordance 
with the law, regulations or other requirements of public authorities, the shipper is 
strictly liable to the carrier for any loss or damage the latter sustains as a result of the 
omission to label the dangerous goods. For example, if the shipper entrusted an agent to 
prepare the goods for carriage, the shipper would still be absolutely liable if the agent 
omitted to or made a mistake in placing the label of the dangerous goods as required by 
the law. 
The Hague and Hague-Visby provides generally for the carrier to prove fault on 
the part of the shipper, its servants or agents under article IV rule 3 without which the 
shipper cannot be found liable. Special rules however are reserved for the liability for 
shipping dangerous goods without the knowing consent of the carrier as governed by 
article IV rule 6, as well as the guarantee of the shipper as to the accuracy of the particular 
supplied by it regarding the goods and the obligation to indemnify the carrier in case of 
damage caused by such discrepancies. These obligations have been held to be of absolute 
liability where no mental element of the shipper is required to be proven by the carrier 
to establish liability. 
 Under the Hamburg Rules Article 12, the shipper is also generally liable to the 
carrier, actual carrier and to the ship if it can be proven to be at fault or neglect on its 
part or on the part of its servants or agents. The only exception to this is where is concerns 
shipping of dangerous goods without the carrier’s knowing consent and the shipper’s 
guarantee of accuracy of the particulars supplied by the shipper regarding the goods for 
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the purpose of issuing the bill of lading. The liability for these two obligations remains 
strict and so no mental element of the shipper is required to be proven.   
This would mean that for the rest of the obligations enlisted above, fault of the 
shipper is required to be proven. The question now is in what form would fault liability 
take or be required for each kind of duty since fault can amount to negligence, intention 
or malice? In fact, what would be the basis for fault and why is fault required in some 
regimes and not the others? The basis would also be different depending on whether the 
liability in issue is of a contractual, tortious or criminal nature. 
The requirement of fault 
Where liability is based on fault, technically under the law fault is understood to mean 
either an intentional act to cause harm which is better known as malice, an intentional 
act in the sense of voluntariness to perform the act which eventually causes the harm, 
negligence in the sense of efforts made in taking care was inadequate to a reasonable 
standard to prevent the harm from occurring, or recklessness in the sense of not caring 
or indifferent as to whether harm occurs or not despite knowing the likelihood that harm 
will occur. In contractual relationships this could be equivalent to fault of two kinds.  
The first kind is an intentional or wilful breach in order to grab a better deal elsewhere 
or release oneself from an unprofitable bargain or to refuse performance unless the other 
party agrees additional terms. For the second type of fault, the party in breach did not 
take sufficient reasonable care to ensure performance of his part of the contract with the 
consequence that performance either does not happen or can no longer take place due to 
the defaulting party now becoming disabled.571 The notion of fault as a basis for liability 
was created partly as a result of attempts to prevent possibilities of increasing numbers 
of tort claims in the industrial world if strict liability were the sole basis.572 The concept 
of fault is appealing since it conforms to the logical mind that when a person wrongs 
another intentionally or by failing to take care, he should be responsible for the resulting 
harm. This idea is acceptable as the morally right approach hence the widespread 
practice in modern society although whether or not strict liability was the predominant 
approach before the industrial revolution is unclear. In fact the supposedly moral 
                                                          
571 Robert A. Hillman, “The Importance of Fault in Contract Law” (2012), Cornell Law Faculty Working 
Papers, Paper 111, 2. 
572 Mark Lunney and Ken Oliphant, Tort Law Text and Materials (5th edn OUP 2013) 952. 
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standard there has itself been doubted.573 This development resulted in the different 
classifications of liabilities in tort.574 
In contract law however the position is different. One view is that a breach of contract 
may be due to reasons which have nothing to do with the fault of the contracting party, 
yet it attracts liability as a matter of course. Liability depends solely on the determination 
of what was agreed and whether what was agreed was performed regardless of the 
reasons why they were not and regardless of the reasonable efforts made by the breaching 
party in striving to fulfil his promise.575 The other view is that the fault of the party in 
breach does not affect the assessment for the remedy of damages obtainable for breach 
of contract, the objective of which is simply to compensate the innocent party.576 
 The conventions refer to both ideas in promulgating shipper liabilities, fault as 
well as strict liabilities depending on different duties imposed on the shipper. There are 
more fault based liabilities in the Rotterdam Rules then there are strict liability ones. 
This is probably reflective of the modern approach for preferring the fault-based regime 
as the basis of liability as discussed in the preceding paragraph. In the Hague and Hague-
Visby Rules the limited provisions on shipper liability has effectively divided specific 
obligations expressed in the Rules which use strict liability as its basis and those which 
require fault since there are only two clear duties in the Rules which work on the basis 
of strict liability; one on dangerous goods and the other on providing information and 
the indemnity guarantee. For everything else not specifically mentioned, the shipper is 
only liable if at fault.577 This again is reflective of the theorised evolution from strict 
liability to fault based regimes as the acceptable approach in modern society. 
 Specific duties where fault is the basis are clearly identified and expressed in the 
Rotterdam Rules and this allows an analysis of why fault would be required for those 
kinds of duties. The idea of fault as the basis of the shipper’s liability in duties concerning 
the supply of necessary documents, information and instructions, may be a way of 
                                                          
573 P. Cane, Attiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 8th edition, Cambridge University Press 2013, 
pp. 174-181 as referred to by Mark Lunney and Ken Oliphant, Tort Law Text and Materials, Fifth Edition 
2013, Oxford University Press, p 953. 
574 Tort liabilities may be classified into intentional torts, negligence-based torts, and strict liability torts. 
575 Richard A. Posner, ‘Let us Never Blame a Contract Breaker’ (2009) 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1349, 1351 as 
referred to by Robert A. Hillman, “The Importance of Fault in Contract Law” (2012), Cornell Law Faculty 
Working Papers, Paper 111, 1 and 3. 
576 A position refuted by George M. Cohen, ‘The Fault that Lies Within Our Contract Law’ (2009) 107 
Mich. L. Rev, 1445, 1446  as referred to by Robert A. Hillman, “The Importance of Fault in Contract 
Law” (2012), Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper 111, 1 and 3. 
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allocating responsibility to the shipper in areas where access to the documents, 
information and instructions are limited to the shipper. Likewise preparing the goods 
ready for carriage is an act which only the shipper or persons appointed by the shipper 
to carry it out are accessible to. The Rotterdam Rules recognises this limited access and 
thus confers upon the shipper accordingly the responsibility for ensuring it is performed. 
 Fault may also be seen as an indication of a lack of good faith that may be implied 
in the reciprocal duties of the parties. Although good faith is a concept that is not 
commonly understood in the same manner in every kind of legal system, in particular 
the stark contrast in how the concept is utilised in the civil law system as opposed to the 
common law, it has been included in one form or another and has some value in 
explaining the rationale behind certain laws and case decisions especially in the light of 
recent decisions made by Leggatt J in the Yam Seng case.578 Whilst the civil law system 
in general embraces the concept of good faith expressly in almost every aspect of a 
contract from pre-negotiations, formation, to the interpretation of contracts,579 it is not 
taken as an integral requirement or even part of the common law structure of contracts 
in the form of an overall general duty. However it is somewhat recognised there that it 
does have a role to play especially where it has been incorporated as an express term in 
the agreement, or in particular types of contract such as that of employment or those 
involving fiduciary duties.580 
In the recent Court of Appeal decision on shipper liability for container 
demurrage in the case of MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Cottonex Anstalt581 
however, Moore-Bick LJ agreed with the earlier Court of Appeal decision in Mid Essex 
Hospital Services v Compass Group582 that the general duty of good faith is not 
recognised in English law of contract. He acknowledged the reflections of broad 
concepts of fair dealing in construction and implication of terms but prefers caution by 
developing along established lines. Relying on a “general organising principle” drawn 
                                                          
578 Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111(QB). 
579 Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the 
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580Joseph Hale, ‘All in good faith’ 
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from a variety of cases may be dangerous as it may undermine the terms agreed by the 
parties.583 
By looking at the history of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (the CISG), in particular Article 7 which dealt with good 
faith, notwithstanding the differing and opposing views during the drafting negotiations 
on whether and to what extent good faith as a concept should be incorporated in the 
convention, a compromise was finally made where a general reference to good faith in 
international trade has to be observed in interpreting the convention.584 Despite the 
varying views as to whether the provision is harmless585 or has potential in creating 
positive duties on the contracting parties,586 it is one of a few potentially useful concepts 
in explaining the character of obligations imposed on parties to the contract. 
How does good faith explain the requirement of fault in the four carriage of goods 
by sea conventions? When Leggatt J decided that a duty of good faith could be implied 
between parties, the idea for his lordship was that there was an expectation of honesty 
underlying almost all contractual relationships in general, which does not have to spelt 
out explicitly as doing so could backfire and have the reverse effect of damaging the 
trust in the business relationship. The content of the good faith duty is said to be a matter 
of construction. This is done by employing an objective test587 to determine the presumed 
intention of the parties by asking the question what purposes and values would 
reasonable people in their shoes would have intended when concluding such contracts. 
Perhaps the same approach could be made for the fault requirement in the conventions 
for the various duties imposed on the shipper. The expectation is that whatever processes 
including preparing the goods ready for carriage or provision of necessary items such as 
documents, information or instructions which are required in order to facilitate the 
smooth process of the transit and avoid harm whether physically or financially to the 
carrier, the shipper ought to make reasonable efforts to perform them. It is arguably fair 
for the carrier to expect that certain obligations which are within the control of the 
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shipper which could facilitate the transit process should be performed by the shipper as 
a party with interest in ensuring that there are no obstacles in getting his cargo to the 
other side. This is an interest that is shared by both the carrier and the shipper and so 
presumably the intention of the parties is that both sides should do what each respective 
party can, for matters which are under his or her control, to ensure nothing will create a 
problem for the contract to be performed.  
It is as Leggatt J pointed out, not just in terms of purpose but also in terms of 
value to the parties that the performance of the contract is discharged. Certainly this is 
true for both the shipper and the carrier as such a contract of carriage would not have 
been entered into if there was no substantial value in getting was agreed in the contract 
done. To this end, the shipper would need to make reasonable efforts in ensuring that his 
interest in the contract is not jeopardised by providing what is within his ability, access 
and control.  
The shipper is also the person instigating the relationship between himself and 
the carrier, as he is the person with the goods which need carrying. The shipper chooses 
the method of carriage and ultimately the specific carrier. It would not be wrong to say 
that if the shipper does not part with relevant documents or information, or prepare the 
goods accordingly in readiness for the carriage, it is only the shipper to blame as no one 
is forcing the shipper to choose that method of carriage or the carrier.  
The theory of liability under the conventions 
The evolution of the nature of shipper liability from the Hague and Hague-Visby 
Rules to the Rotterdam Rules may be traced by studying the travaux preparatoires of 
the conventions in order to understand and explain the theory for the basis of shipper 
liability as it stands today. According to the Working Group presiding over the issue of 
shipper liability at the outset, by observations made on national laws and business 
practices regarding shipper liability, there are generally only 2 main obligations of the 
shipper. The first is the duty of the shipper to pay freight and this is the primary duty of 
the shipper. The secondary duty is to take the cargo and deliver them to the carrier. This 
basic duty is not a duty to merely provide the cargo but to also to prepare them. The 
shipper needs to make sure that the goods are ready in such a way that they are able to 
withstand the intended carriage. Only then come other obligations such as the duty to 
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inform the carrier regarding the nature of the cargo specifically in the case of dangerous 
cargoes.588 
What is interesting here is that although the general perception would normally 
be that the most important duty for the shipper should be regarding dangerous cargo 
whether in terms of informing the carrier of its nature or the handling and proper stowage 
for them, this does not seem to be the case, even though it is reflected by the making of 
specific provisions in the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules regarding dangerous goods as 
an absolute liability, which in turn reflects the policy of promoting the direct physical 
safety of the vessel, its crew and other cargo, as well as more generally the ports, 
stevedore and the environment. When the primary and secondary obligations of the 
shipper are put in this way physical safety now seems to be of a lesser priority as 
compared to the business aspect of the shipper carrier relationship which as far as 
payment of freight and providing cargo is concerned, seems to be the emphasis. Even 
cases dealing with dangerous cargo have demonstrated that judges are willing to extend 
the scope of the meaning of dangerous cargo in order to include situations where the 
cargo was not in itself dangerous or posing threat of physical danger to others but simply 
causing delay to the vessel or causing the vessel be unable to properly do its work.589 
Both of these consequences have implications of a financial nature and ultimately impact 
the business of the carrier. From this observation, it may be useful as a starting point for 
making sense of the rules in a practical way to see whether the theory behind the 
requirement of fault and strict liability for the shippers duties take into account how they 
serve to accommodate the proper running of the shipping business in avoiding the same 
financial implications to the carrier. 
This points to the possibility that the focus of the rules is not so much about fault 
but more about severity of effect. Fault in general is seen more like doing something 
blameworthy, but when it is placed in the context of shipper liability and all the 
background that the shipper shares in the relationship with the carrier, it seems like the 
liability of the shipper has more to do with the commercial responsibility that the 
shippers have due to the severe consequences they may implicate on the carrier if they 
were not to perform these duties. 
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The issue is also whether the requirement of fault in the conventions is not merely 
about negligence of the shipper in failing to perform its duties but goes beyond that to 
indicate a lack of good faith. The fault of the shipper relates to not about a lack of 
reasonable effort to perform a duty but rather in not having the right kind of spirit or 
attitude in carrying it out. Therefore from this observation, it appears there is a tension 
in the convention between the requirement of fault and the severity of the effects if the 
shipper fails to perform its duty. There is also tension between the contractual nature of 
the shipper-carrier relationship and the fault requirement in the convention.  
It could be argued that the requirement of fault within the convention is a 
rhetorical one since although the conventions requires fault in establishing liability of 
the shipper, the courts almost always decide the issue on the basis of how severe the 
effects of the breach were. Hardly any discussion is made on the issue of what the fault 
of the shipper was apart from the description of the act or omission of the shipper within 
the sequence of events which led to the loss complained off. The actual meaning given 
to fault itself is not dealt with by the courts. Occasionally, the shipper would be described 
as negligent in its failures in performing its duties. This is unsatisfactory since fault is a 
concept is wider than that and could encompass intentional acts, recklessness, malice 
and etc. 
A lack of a clear guidance as to what amounts to fault makes it difficult for both 
the legal practice and the industry to determine what should or should not be done in 
terms of the fault requirement in order to avoid liability. It also becomes unclear when 
fault should be applied since fault is sometimes not even referred to in coming to the 
decision on liability of the shipper. Instead how severe the consequences were for the 
carrier or third party becomes the basis for determining liability. Conversely there are 
many models on contractual liability which do not require fault, but in the decisions of 
the court about the contract, judges do in fact discuss issues of fault. These incoherent 
approaches obviously cause confusion in construing the requirement of fault in the 
conventions. 
So the question now is, if the starting point for shipper liability is a contractual 
one which requires no fault, when should fault then be required? It may be argued that 
fault should be seen as applying only in exceptional circumstances. The first and primary 
reference should be made to the contractual obligations which must be performed 
regardless of fault. However, exceptions could be said to exist in several situations. 
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The first is the long accepted stance that the shipper is almost always considered 
to be the party with a weaker bargaining position as compared to the carrier. The 
discussion earlier on the historical relationship between the shipper and the carrier as 
well as the basis on which the Hague, Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules were 
drafted provide much evidence for this. It could be argued therefore that although the 
requirement that the contract is performed is strict without any requirement of fault, 
concessions should be made to require that something more be proven before any finding 
of liability. This could be in the form of fault of the shipper, his servants or agents as 
required in the conventions. 
Notwithstanding this the Working Group thought that the draft provisions 
particularly supported the issue of protecting the safety of vessels, to the extent that it 
was suggested that reference be made to the HNS convention in relation to the distinction 
between dangerous and non-dangerous goods. 
 Another important point that was mentioned in the preparation of the Rotterdam 
Rules is that the purpose of the rules is partly to balance out the rights and duties between 
the shipper and the carrier which is considered to be an improvement from the status of 
the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, and an expansion from the approach taken in the 
Hamburg Rules. The draft text of the Rotterdam Rules on the shipper’s duty to enable 
the carrier to carry the goods safely provided that it attracted liability that was strict. The 
background of attempting to balance the shipper and carrier’s rights and duties appeared 
to be the basis for the concern that since the carrier had a duty in the draft provisions to 
provide information, the shipper’s duty to deliver the goods in a state ready for carriage 
should not be left to the parties’ will as originally drafted. The shipper should therefore 
also have a reciprocal duty since this complemented the carrier’s duty and allows the 
final result of safety and security of the vessel to be produced. 
 The focus on the non-balanced rights and duties of the shipper and carrier was 
further raised when reference was made to the draft provisions on when the shipper may 
avoid liability. According to the draft article 7.6, the shipper would not be liable by 
showing that due diligence could not prevent the events which caused the goods to inflict 
damage or loss, nor the consequences themselves. The carrier on the other hand had only 
to disprove fault on its part to avoid liability. 
 This concern to balance out the rights and duties of the shipper and carrier may 
have contributed to the final increase in the provisions of specific duties imposed on the 
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shipper since that carrier has always been bearing the brunt of liabilities in the previous 
conventions. In principle it was agreed that there should be a balance of their rights and 
obligations on an overall perspective rather than on detailed corresponding article 
provisions. This was probably the justification for the lack of limitation and defences 
provisions for the shipper unlike that for the carrier.  
Burden of proof 
 Under the Rotterdam Rules, it is quite clear that the burden of proof is on the 
carrier to prove that the cause of the loss or damage was the breach of the shipper’s 
obligations under the convention.590 The carrier has to prove that the shipper breached 
its obligation under the convention and that that breach caused the carrier to suffer loss 
or damage. Thus the hurdle for the carrier in terms of causation of damage is not direct 
but twofold. Even after this, for the general liabilities, the shipper still has a chance at 
defending itself by proving that the cause or one of the causes of the loss or damage is 
not attributable to its fault or to the fault of persons to whom it has delegated the task of 
carrying out its obligations under the convention. It can do this by proving that the loss 
or damage sustained by the carrier was caused or contributed to by someone or 
something else. If it succeeds in doing this, it may be relieved of all or part of its liability 
to the carrier.591 The convention provides for an apportionment mechanism in that if the 
shipper is relieved of part of its liability as provided by the convention, it is only liable 
for that part of the loss or damage suffered by the carrier for which the shipper is at fault 
or which is attributable to the persons it has entrusted performance of its obligations, and 
for whom the shipper is vicariously liable.592 What remains unclear is perhaps the 
situation where the contributory cause of the carrier’s loss or damage is the carrier’s own 
breach of duty. There is nothing in the convention which hints at whether the carrier 
would lose the right to an indemnity if the cause of the loss or damage is a combination 
of both a breach of the shipper’s obligations as well as the carrier’s duties, and where 
the carrier is unable to prove the proportion of loss attributable to the shipper’s breach.593 
For the obligation of the shipper to the carrier to provide information, instructions 
and documents relating to the goods for the purposes of proper handling and carriage of 
the goods as well as for the purpose of compliance by the carrier with rules and 
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regulations in connection with the carriage under article 29, the shipper may also be able 
to avoid liability by proving that the information, instructions and documents were 
reasonably available to the carrier. In particular, the shipper may avoid liability in 
relation to its obligation to fulfil the need of the carrier to comply with carriage law if it 
can adduce evidence to show that the carrier did not notify the shipper in a timely 
manner, that it required such information, instructions and documents. Likewise, the 
shipper may avoid liability for the obligation in article 28 regarding the duty of the 
shipper to provide information and instructions requested by the carrier, if the shipper 
can show that the information and instructions are not in his possession or reasonable 
ability to provide, or that they are reasonably available to the carrier without having to 
procure them from the shipper.  
Unlike the Rotterdam Rules, neither the Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules 
nor the Hamburg Rules make express provisions for the burden of proof in establishing 
shipper liability. However Berlingieri is of the view that the burden of proof is likewise 
on the carrier from the way the relevant provisions are worded.594 
Category of loss or damage 
The title of article 30 only refers to liability of the shipper to the carrier, and not 
any other party such as other cargo owners or even the performing parties. In fact, the 
chapter itself is entitled ‘obligations of the shipper to the carrier’. The words employed 
by article 30 that the ‘shipper is liable for loss or damage suffered by the carrier’595 
connotes that the convention probably does not deal with loss or damage that is caused 
to other parties involved in the carriage, for instance interests of other cargo and the crew 
on board the ship, at least not directly.596 The words ‘loss or damage’ are also general in 
that they do not specify the type of loss or damage which the carrier incurs for which the 
shipper may be liable. However, since this article spells out the basis of liability of the 
shipper to the carrier under the convention, the type of loss or damage would only 
encompass those which are caused by a breach of the obligations spelt out in the 
convention itself. In fact, article 30 makes it a requirement for the carrier to prove that 
the loss or damage it suffers is as a result of a breach of the shipper’s obligations under 
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the Rotterdam Rules”, paper delivered at the General Assembly of the AMD, Marrakesh, 5 - 6 November 
2009, 19. 
595 Emphasis added. 
596 Fujita (n 512) 4. 
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the convention, before the shipper can be liable for it. By looking at the provisions on 
obligations of the shipper to the carrier in articles 27, 28, 29, 31 and 32, some categories 
of loss or damage may be gathered, at least by way of who or what could be harmed. For 
instance, in article 27 the shipper’s goods must not cause harm to persons or property, 
whereas article 32 speaks of danger to persons, property or the environment. Presumably 
this loss or damage would encompass physical damage such as damage to or detention 
of the vessel, as well as third-party liability.  
However, the convention does not specifically deal with delay as a form of 
damage caused by the shipper as a result of breaching its obligations under the 
convention, or delay in actually carrying out its obligations as provided by the 
convention towards the carrier for instance, delay in delivering the goods or delay in 
providing the information or instructions requested by the carrier. However the 
provisions on the obligations of the shipper regarding provision of information, 
instructions and documents for the purpose of proper handling and carriage of the goods, 
as well as for the purpose of compliance with the law by the carrier do stipulate that the 
obligations of the shipper must be performed ‘in a timely manner’. The same wording is 
found in the provision imposing upon the shipper the duty to provide information for the 
compilation of contract particulars, as well as in the provision regarding the obligation 
of the shipper to inform the carrier of the dangerous nature or character of the goods 
before they are delivered to the carrier or performing party. It may be that this issue is 
meant to be left for determination by national law.597 Moreover, it has also been argued598 
that the words ‘loss or damage’ does not cover delay because it was purposely left out 
by the drafters of the convention even though it was discussed at great length and 
proposed by Working Group III of the UNCITRAL.599 Moreover, article 79 of the 
convention stipulates that any attempt to place a term in the contract of carriage which 
increases the liability of the shipper for breach of any of its obligations under the 
convention whether directly or indirectly is fruitless as the term will be deemed void by 
the convention.600 
Looking at article 27 and the conjunction used, the goods delivered by the shipper 
must ‘withstand the intended carriage…..and that they will not cause harm to persons 
                                                          
597 Guzman (n 569) 9. 
598 Baughen (n 562) 163. 
599 According to reports of Working Group III. 
600 Paragraph (2)(b) of Article 79. 
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and property’.601 There may be a concern that the interpretation given to this provision 
is that the two are different and separate types of damage or loss to the carrier, since if 
they are not, clearly the shipper is liable only for damage or loss suffered by the carrier 
as a result of the goods not being able to withstand the intended carriage, which is the 
normal kind of risk borne by a shipper. However, if they are meant to be different and 
separate, then this creates a different risk altogether. As a stand-alone phrase, a disability 
to withstand the intended carriage would mean a kind of damage to the cargo itself. This 
would normally be the basis of a claim by the shipper against the carrier, but since this 
article provides for liability of the shipper towards the carrier, it may seem as though the 
risk of damage or loss to the cargo caused by inability of the goods to withstand the 
intended carriage is to be borne by the shipper itself. However, a commentary on this602 
suggests that this would only be the case if the provision on the basis of the shipper’s 
liability and burden of proof was worded in such a way as to reverse the burden of proof 
upon the shipper, and if article 30 specifically worded the liability of the shipper for 
breaching its obligations under the convention separately from the liability of the shipper 
for loss or damage sustained by the carrier.603 However, since article 30 is worded as 
‘the shipper is liable for loss or damage sustained by the carrier if the carrier proves 
that such loss or damage was caused by a breach of the shipper’s obligations under this 
convention’, it not only sets out the shipper’s liability in positive terms, it also clearly 
singles out liability of the shipper for the carrier’s loss or damage, it is the carrier who 
has the burden of proof, and that such loss or damage are those which was caused by a 
breach of the shipper’s obligations.  Furthermore, it would be difficult to reconcile the 
former interpretation of article 30 with the obligations of the carrier towards the shipper 
contained in the convention.  
The provision of the convention also does not deal with other primary obligations 
of the shipper towards the carrier, for instance the payment of freight. Although during 
the discussions of the draft convention there were some articles proposed which deal 
with this, in the end they were abandoned altogether. It would seem thus that the liability 
of the shipper to pay freight is left to national law and the terms of the contract between 
the parties. 
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 Liability of the shipper is also no longer confined to merely loss or damage as a 
result of dangerous goods since the conventions creates a general scheme of liability for 
all goods across the board. Although there still remains the specific provision on 
dangerous goods, this has also been expanded to include contemporary issues of danger 
to the environment. Therefore, the convention has greatly relieved the burden in the past 
of making a distinction between dangerous and non-dangerous goods, and the 
determination of the proper definition of dangerous goods. The liability of the shipper 
may be broadened since the scope of article 32 does not limit the meaning given to 
dangerous goods by giving a list of homogenous danger. Further, since the article 
employs the phrase ‘reasonably appear likely to become, a danger’, liability of the 
shipper under this provision is not only limited to situations where the cargo already is a 
danger, but also extends to situations where there is potential danger. Nevertheless, the 
shipper may avoid liability if it can show that the carrier or performing party was aware 
of the dangerous nature or character of the goods. 
Limitation 
 Article 62 provides for a time bar against which the carrier has to beat in order 
to pursue the liability of the shipper. Just as any other provision in the past on time bars, 
it acts as an effective tool to limit the shipper from liability for breach of any of its 
obligations under the convention should the carrier delay in commencing a course of 
action against the shipper. The time bar set by the Rotterdam Rules is 2 years which is a 
relatively long window of opportunity for the carrier to act, since some of the previous 
carriage by sea conventions only provided for a time bar of one year, albeit available 
only in the context of causes of action commenced against the carrier.  
 There is however, no provision on limitation of liability for the shipper akin to 
provisions available to the carrier’s benefit in the preceding sea carriage conventions. 
This paves a potentially dangerous path into the extent of shipper liability as it leaves 
the possibility of crushing liability against the shipper from devastating amounts of 
damages claimed by the carrier. To what extent this may in reality be a thorn in the 
shipper’s side may be mitigated by the likelihood that damages for pure economic loss 
caused by delay could well be a floodgate which by far the law has not been willing to 





 The Rotterdam Rules is an ambitious attempt at clearly setting and detailing out 
the liability of the shipper in specific provisions dedicated just for this. Although not 
comprehensive, they do spell out what probably may already be a custom practice of the 
trade and thus galvanise the obligations which a shipper is expected to perform. To what 
extent it changes the sum of the shipper’s liabilities has been the subject of many 
commentaries, but the real practical effect will only be felt when the convention comes 
into force, one year after the 20th ratification by a UN Member state. With only three 
ratifications in 7 years so far, there is still a lot of waiting to do. 
Non-carriage of goods by sea international conventions 
Maritime conventions on carriage of goods by sea which were discussed above take 
effect in one of two ways. They could be either incorporated by way of contract whether 
as an express or implied term, or applicable by the force of law as a statutory provision.604 
International conventions which provide for public law duties which will be discussed 
below, on the other hand apply more directly to individual persons. 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 
The SOLAS Convention was first created in 1914 as a result of the Titanic 
disaster and is regarded as the most important international treaty relating to safety of 
ships.605 Four versions have been adopted before the latest one in 1974. Since then the 
concept of ‘tacit acceptance procedure’ is used in order to allow amendments and entry 
into force to be made more speedily. This procedure basically allows amendments to 
enter into force on a specified date606 rather than waiting for a specified majority of 
Parties to accept the amendments. 
The SOLAS Convention specifies minimum standards in the construction, 
equipment and operation of ships for the purpose of safety. There are thirteen chapters 
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in the Annex but for the purpose of shipper liability, the relevant ones are chapter VI on 
Carriage of Cargoes and chapter VII on Carriage of Dangerous Goods. 
Chapter VI on Carriage of Cargoes 
This chapter is concerned with general requirements for stowage and securing of 
all kinds of cargo except bulk liquids and gases which require special precautions due to 
their hazardous nature. The most recent amendment involved adding three new 
paragraphs in Regulation 2 on Cargo Information. Paragraph 4 provides that the gross 
mass of cargo carried in a container shall be verified by the shipper. This may be done 
either by one of two ways which are specified in the two sub paragraphs which follow.  
The first is by weighing the packed container using calibrated and certified 
equipment.607 The second method is by weighing separately all the cargo and package 
items including pallets, dunnage and any other materials used to secure the cargo in the 
container. The tare mass of the container is then added to the sum of masses using a 
certified method approved by a competent authority of the State where the container was 
packed.608 
The United Kingdom has adopted the first method by the use of weighbridges or 
lifting equipment fitted with load cells, or other approved weighing equipment. The 
second method allows shippers to use existing procedures but with minimum 
bureaucracies. It was developed with the aid of an industry working group. In the United 
Kingdom the shipper has to apply to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) to get 
approval for Method 2.609 Method 1 does not require registration with the MCA but the 
shipper must be able to provide to the MCA if and when required, two things. The first 
is evidence that the weighing equipment has been supplied and maintained for the 
purpose of weight verification so that the shipper is able to fulfil its duty to verify gross 
mass of containerised cargo.610 The second is that the shipper must be able to show a 
                                                          
607 SOLAS 1974, Reg 2.4.1 Chp VI as amended. 
608 ibid Reg 2.4.2. 
609 This is in line with the requirement of Regulation 2.4.2 in Chapter VI SOLAS 1974 where the certified 
method must be approved by the competent authority of the State where packing of the container was 
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610 The implementation of Method 1 in the United Kingdom requires that the data produced by the 
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electronically must be capable of itemization and printable for audit purposes. 
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record of maintenance and verification procedures, including any necessary corrective 
or remedial measures taken.611 
The amendment to Regulation 2 of Chapter VI does not introduce the duty of the 
shipper to submit the gross mass of cargo carried in a container. This is an existing duty 
under SOLAS Chapter VI Regulation 2 on cargo information.612 The amendment 
requires shippers to verify the gross mass as accurate by way of one of two specified 
methods which the shipper has the option to choose. 
The second amendment in Regulation 2 is paragraph 5 which deals with the duty 
of the shipper to ensure that the verified gross mass is stated in the shipping document.  
The shipping document then shall be signed by a person authorized by the shipper613 and 
then submitted to the master or his representative, and the terminal representative. 
Submission has to be made in advance of loading in order for the stowage plan to be 
prepared.614  
The provisions in these particular regulations use the word “shall” in requiring 
the shipper to fulfil its obligations under SOLAS. This indicates that the liability is strict 
and that it does not matter what the mental state of the shipper is when he conforms or 
rather, lacks in conformity with the regulations. The mandatory nature of the regulations 
is obvious from the purpose they were adopted by the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO). Safety issues and recognised problems from incidents associated 
with among others freight containers, structural issues, packing, mis-declared cargo 
weights and securing of the cargo onto the ship have brought about discussions between 
stakeholders and the adoption of these changes. 
The amendments to SOLAS Chapter VI Regulation 2 will enter into force on 1 
July 2016. Already the shipping industry is predicting that by adding one extra regulated 
step in the process of shipping, many unwarranted consequences would follow. These 
would no doubt include delays not only due to another process in the operational chain 
being added, but also if problems arose in the process itself. This is because the 
Regulation provides that the cargo cannot be loaded if the shipper fails to provide the 
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612 SOLAS, (n 607) Reg 2.2.1. 
613 ibid Reg 2.5.1. 
614 ibid Reg 2.5.2. 
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verified gross mass of the containerised cargo. This information must be in the shipping 
document and submitted to the master or his representative.615 
The International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in 
Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea 1996 
(The HNS Convention) and the 2010 Protocol 
The shipper is not directly liable under the HNS Convention as such since the main 
parties liable under the convention are the shipowner, followed by the companies and 
entities who are receivers of HNS by way of a collective fund under a 2-tier system of 
liability. This is also made clear by article 20 which provides that the owner of the HNS 
cargo involved in the incident will not be made liable by the convention. The shipowner 
however, may be able to escape strict liability under the Convention for four reasons, 
one of which is connected to the shipper. Under article 18(d) of the HNS 2010 protocol, 
if the shipper fails to inform the shipowner regarding the hazardous and noxious nature 
of the cargo and has either caused the damage which ensues,616 or lead to the carrier to 
not obtain the appropriate insurance cover,617 the shipowner is exempt from liability 
under the HNS Convention. This comes with a proviso that the shipowner, his servants 
or agents must not have known or ought reasonably to have known that the cargo was 
hazardous or noxious. 
This would mean that the shipowner at risk of being liable under this convention will 
have interest in trying to prove that the shipper had failed in this aspect. From this it can 
be derived that a duty is imposed on the shipper to inform the shipowner the hazardous 
or noxious nature of the cargo it ships. The provision on the shipper’s duty does not 
mention anything regarding the mental element. It simply states the fact of non-
disclosure of the hazardous or noxious nature of the cargo to the shipowner automatically 
allows the shipowner to be exempted from liability. 
The 1996 convention makes the titleholder of LNG contribute to the fund. Under the 
2010 protocol it burden is shifted to the receiver unless the titleholder agrees to take 
responsibility. 
During the drafting stage, one of the proposals was that there should be shared liability 
between the carrier and the owner of the HNS cargo. The role of the shipper’s liability 
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was to supplement that of the carrier where compensation from the latter’s liability was 
inadequate to fully cover the damage. However, the problem was that a wider definition 
of the shipper could also include the charterer and this would therefore allow the latter 
to invoke the provisions of the LLMC 1976 in the same way that a shipowner could, 
defeating the objective of such a scheme. Although theoretically the contribution of the 
shipper would ensure that the damage could be fully compensated, the idea of making 
the shipper jointly liable with the carrier was abandoned.618 
UN Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods 1980 and 
UNCTAD/ICC Rules for Multimodal Transport Documents 
The provisions of the Multimodal Convention may create liabilities for the shipper if the 
shipper falls within the definition of consignor as discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis.619 
The Multimodal Convention’s provisions on consignor liability mirrors the provisions 
on shipper liability which are found in carriage of goods by sea conventions.   
There are three provisions which deal with consignor liability namely Article 12,620 
article 22 and article 23. They are not placed together nor sit within the same Part. Article 
12 deals with the guarantee by the consignor to the multimodal transport operator as to 
the accuracy of particulars furnished by the consignor for insertion into the multimodal 
transport document.621 The particulars concerned relate to the general nature of the 
goods, their marks, number, weight and quantity. If the goods were dangerous, this 
article also provides for the duty of the consignor to provide particulars of such 
dangerous character of the goods. The consignor is deemed to guarantee the accuracy of 
all these particulars at the time the goods are were taken in charge by the multimodal 
transport operator. 
If the particulars furnished by the consignor turn out to be inaccurate or inadequate and 
this causes the multimodal transport operator to suffer loss, the consignor shall 
indemnify the multimodal transport operator.622  
                                                          
618 Magnus Gӧransson, ‘The HNS Convention’ (1997) 2 Issue 2 Uniform Law Review 249 at 250. 
619 The Multimodal Convention employs the term “consignor” rather than the “shipper”. However, the 
consignor’s role as described in the Convention resembles the role played by the shipper, the term used in 
all four of the carriage of goods by sea conventions, namely the Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules, the 
Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam Rules. 
620 Article 12 is found under Part II which deals with Documentation. 
621 Multimodal Convention 1980, art 12(1). 
622 ibid, art 12(2). Paragraph 2 also maintains the liability of the consignor to indemnify despite any transfer 
of the multimodal transport document. 
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The other two provisions on consignor liability sits in Part IV which deals exclusively 
and is in fact entitled ‘Liability of the Consignor’.623 Article 22 provides for the general 
rule that the liability of the consignor towards the multimodal transport operator is based 
on the fault or neglect of the consignor, his servants or agents.624However, this article 
also provides for the liability of the servant or agent of the consignor for their fault or 
neglect which causes loss to the multimodal transport operator. 
Article 23 provides for special rules on dangerous goods. The first duty of the consignor 
under this article is the duty to mark or label the goods as dangerous in a suitable manner 
to indicate the dangerous nature of the goods. The second duty is for the consignor to 
inform the multimodal transport operator or any person acting on his behalf, the 
dangerous character of the goods as well as the precautions to be taken. This must be 
done at the time the goods are handed over to the multimodal transport operator or the 
person acting on his behalf. There are two consequences which follow if the consignor 
fails to inform, unless the multimodal transport operator has knowledge of the dangerous 
character of the goods. 
The first is that the consignor will bear the liability for all the losses incurred by the 
multimodal transport operator which results from the shipment of the dangerous 
goods.625 Secondly, the dangerous goods can be unloaded, destroyed or rendered 
innocuous, whichever is required, and the consignor will not be compensated if this 
happens.626 Article 23(3) then extends the provision made in article 2(2) that if the 
multimodal transport operator has knowledge about the dangerous character of the 
goods, none of the two consequences may be invoked, to other persons.627 
The final paragraph of article 23628 provides for a situation when article 23(2)(b) does 
not apply or may not be invoked. This indirectly refers to a situation where the consignor 
                                                          
623 Glass is of the view that these provisions are in addition to the one in Article 12. David Glass, Freight 
Forwarding and Multi Modal Transport Contracts (Informa 2013) 330.  
624 The fault or neglect of the consignor’s servants or agents can only be relied on by the multimodal 
transport operator if the fault or neglect occurred when the servants or agents were acting within the scope 
of their employment. 
625 Multimodal Convention 1980, art 23(2)(a) (MC). 
626 ibid art 23(2)(b). 
627 Article 23(3) of the Multimodal Convention 1980 prevents anyone else from invoking the two 
consequences of Article 23(2)(a) and (b) if they have knowledge about the dangerous character of the 
goods . ‘Any person’ in article 23(3) could include the multimodal transport operator himself or the person 
acting on his behalf, to whom the consignor had handed over the goods. The residual meaning of ‘does 
not otherwise have knowledge’ in Article 23(2) indicates that if the multimodal transport does have 
knowledge about the dangerous character of the goods, he is not entitled to invoke the two consequences 
of article 23(2)(a) and (b). 
628 MC, art 23(4). 
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had informed the multimodal transport operator or the person acting on his behalf, or 
that they have knowledge about the dangerous character of the goods. In such a situation, 
if the goods do become an actual danger to life or property, they may nevertheless be 
unloaded, destroyed or rendered innocuous. The consignor would similarly not be 
compensated except under general average,629 but he would not be liable for losses 
suffered by the multimodal transport operator. 
Liability of the shipper towards forwarding agent 
The shipper shall be responsible to the forwarding agent for the accuracy and adequacy 
of the particulars given in the transport document that are mentioned in article 10, 
paragraph 1, of convention when responsibility for the goods is transferred to the 
forwarding agent. 
Period of responsibility 
The responsibility of the forwarding agent for the goods shall start at the time when he 
or the performing party has received the goods from the shipper and shall end at the time 
when the forwarding agent delivers the goods to the consignee. 
Liability of the Shipper and Consignee 
The shipper shall be liable for paying the freight charge and other fees incidental to the 
transport of the goods, unless otherwise agreed in the transport contract. 
Conclusion 
The international conventions make the mental element a distinguishing factor within 
certain types of duties. In general the shipper would not be liable if there was no fault on 
the part of the shipper, its servants or agents. This has been expressly provided by the 
rules. However there are some specific duties where strict liability is imposed. It is 
notable that that being the case, no such express provisions are made to say that the 
shipper is strictly liable for any particular duty. It is only derived by way of interpretation 
of the words used in the rules or by the decision of the courts as to how the certain rules 
should be applied. Notwithstanding the application of strict liability for certain specific 
duties of the shipper, it appears from the reasoning given that liability of the shipper is 
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found not on the basis of the duty carrying with it an inherent strict liability or 
requirement of fault as interpreted, but liability is found on other grounds.  
One of the reasons seems to be that the shipper has the greater level of access to the 
goods in terms of having the first encounter whether physically or documentation. 
Therefore the assumption is that the shipper would have better opportunities to find out 
about the nature of the goods, preparation of the goods and information on the care which 
the goods require. The shipper could be said to have access to the primary sources being 
the seller or manufacturer, or the third party from whom the goods were obtained. This 
is in contrast to the carrier’s position who relies on the shipper to provide the necessary 
details together with general awareness of goods known and listed to be dangerous, all 
of which would be secondary sources. Furthermore, in some cases, the carrier has to deal 
with multiple shippers having a multitude of variety in the type of goods which they 
ship. It would be too onerous to place the risk on the carrier to be responsible for 
unwarranted consequences resulting from the nature, packing or stowing of goods which 
the carrier could have inspected beforehand. This is connected to the following 
reasoning. 
Another plausible explanation relates to commercial efficacy and severity of 
consequence. When liability is strict, parties can straightaway know if there is liability 
when the duties are not fulfilled. This allows them to make decisions and move on. The 
strict liability provisions in the international conventions have something in common 
and that is they apply to duties the breach of which has the severest consequence to the 
carrier and third party. The consequences could result in casualties, delays and many 
other costly consequences which interrupt the flow of shipping operations. When these 
duties are expressed as strict, it shows that that nothing less than full performance of the 









CHAPTER 5  
Conclusion 
Introduction 
In this concluding chapter, the theoretical findings made during the course of the 
research as presented in the preceding chapters will be laid down. This involves referring 
to each chapter and summing up the findings that were made there and making the 
connection between each chapter as it flows from start to finish. The theoretical findings 
will indicate possible areas for reform which will be indicated in the following section. 
This will also be presented in sequential reflection of each chapter as it flows from the 
preceding theoretical findings outlined. 
Further, a summary of all the findings will be made in order to tie up and explain the 
essence of what has been found in this research. The goes to the very core of the findings 
of this research which explains the answer to the research questions asked at the 
beginning of the thesis. This will be then used to explain whether what was set out to be 
proved by this research has been so achieved. Along with this, the constraints in seeking 
to make that achievable will be highlighted in order to serve as a signpost for future 
research in the same area so that a different way around the constraints or a different 
approach could better deal with those constraints. 
In coming to that point this naturally brings into discussion the possible areas for future 
research which is connected to this area of the law, but was beyond the scope of this 
research. There were certain areas in the research which gave rise to other research 
questions which could form the basis of a whole new research on its own, that builds 
onto the findings made here, and identifies further gaps in the knowledge which could 
be filled in the future by studies related to the subject of shipper liability for cargo. 
Finally some mention must be made on the success or otherwise of the methodology 
employed in this research in order to shed some light on the viability of further research 







From chapter 2 on the concept or definition of the shipper in the context of the carriage 
of goods by sea, it appears that the legal definition of shipper does not always correspond 
with the meaning given to the term “shipper” in practice.630 This is partly also due to the 
problem that even within the legal definition itself, the meaning given to the term is not 
always consistent.631 It follows from there that the difficulty in giving it a consistent legal 
definition stems from the fact that there are various contexts and roles within which the 
shipper plays. This seems to create a vicious circle within which the problem subsists. 
In order to put a stop to this or rather, to make changes, a good place to start is to make 
the legal definitions of the shipper more certain and consistent. When the law is certain, 
practice will follow through since they would want to avoid disputes and disputes being 
inevitable, they would want to be on the correct side of the law. A consistent legal 
definition is thus crucial in ensuring certainty and ultimately commercial efficiency. This 
would be consistent with the objectives behind the very rules on shipper liability for 
cargo as demonstrated in the findings of this research. 
In chapter 3 on shipper liability under national or domestic law, this research explains 
the existence of both fault-based rules as well as strict liability rules on shipper liability. 
In the civil law system, fault has a role to play in the determination of contractual liability 
whereas the common law does not recognize it. The strictness of the common law on the 
obligation of the shipper is justified by two possible theories. The first is the assumption 
of risk by the shipper as a charterer in a charterparty fixture, to ensure performance of 
his obligations.632 Despite any fault on the shipper’s part, the law makes him bear the 
burden of the cargo not being arrived and ready for loading. Secondly, in order to ensure 
the smooth running of shipping operations, certain obligations of the shipper is made 
strict. This allows focusing on whether performance of the shipper’s duty is complete 
and the consequences if there is a breach. Such certainty in consequences ensures 
efficiency in economic and commercial efficiency of the shipping operation.  
Chapter 4 on shipper liability for cargo under international conventions explores further 
express provisions on shipper liability, some of which require fault before the finding of 
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liability and some which do not. This reflects the convergence of national law systems 
which offer both concepts in the determination of liability.  
The mental element of the shipper seems to be part of the requirements of certain 
liabilities of the shipper in the international conventions. There are both fault-based as 
well as strict liability duties of the shipper. This is a reflection of what is found at the 
national level which also employs the two different approaches. The common law 
systems adopt the strict liability approach to contractual obligations of the shipper 
whereas the civil law systems adopt the fault-based approach. 
In the strict liability approach, liability of the shipper appears to not have been found on 
the basis of the fault of the shipper, but by looking at the construction of the contract and 
determining whether the shipper has performed his obligations as what was agreed, for 
the purpose of giving effect to what the intention of the parties were. If the shipper has 
failed to perform, the extent of his liability will depend on an assessment of the effects 
of the breach, much like the approach taken with innominate terms. This gives an 
outward appearance of the strict nature of contractual liability, leaving no room for the 
consideration of the underlying reasons for causing the breach which point to the fault 
of the shipper in the form of which could be malicious, intentional, negligent or reckless. 
The remedies awarded also reflect the reluctance of the courts to consider whether the 
shipper who breached his obligations should be penalized for either willfully committing 
the breach or failing to adequately take action to prevent performance from being 
unfulfilled. 
It is often advocated that the civil law systems incorporate both the fault-based and the 
strict liability concepts in the determination of contractual liability whereas the common 
law system rejects the idea of fault in determining breach of contract. The view that 
concepts used in the common law such as frustration and implied terms are ways in 
which fault of the party in breach is actually taken into account633 can also be used to 
support the idea of an indirect application of fault for the determination of the liability 
of the shipper. 
However, it has been argued that where the perception given is that the contractual 
liability of the shipper seems to manifest strict liability, the concept behind the breach 
and the award of remedies actually takes into consideration the issue of fault. This would 
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Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Clarendon 1997) (Oxford Scholarship Online 2012). 
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mean that fault always has a role to play in the determination of the shipper’s liability, 
whether as an express provision, as the nature of contractual liability in civil law systems, 
or as the underlying factor in common law contractual liability. 
As a conclusion even if there are rules which make liability of the shipper deemed to be 
strict, decisions made on issues of shipper liability however indicate that the finding of 
liability is not simply on the basis of deciding whether the shipper’s obligations have 
been performed in accordance with what was agreed by the parties, but goes on to assess 
the effects of the breach on the innocent party. This shows that indirectly, the fault of the 
shipper is taken into account. These rules must as a matter of principal be provided as 
being strict in order to provide certainty to the parties as to the consequences of a breach. 
This also explains the minimal existence of laws which expressly provide for the liability 
of the shipper to be based on fault. Most of the rules whether at national level or in the 
international conventions rely on the strict liability of the shipper. This would be 
consistent with the contractual liability of the shipper and is in line with the needs of the 
shipping industry to have rules which are economically and commercially efficient. For 
this reason, it is very important to be clear and consistent as to the meaning given to the 
shipper, and also the basis for which their liability is determined. 
Areas for reform 
In relation to the first theoretical finding above, a possible area for reform would be to 
have a more consistent legal definition given to shippers according to the context and 
role it is in, which gives recognition to what extent and in what form their liability should 
take. This is needed not just for the sake of having a consistent definition.634 There has 
to be consistency between the law and practice as a mismatch would lead to economic 
inefficiency. When there is a common understanding as to the legal meaning given to 
the term “shipper”, parties could conduct their business with more expediency.  
Clarity in the meaning given to the term also gives guidance to enable relations which 
people respect. There would be less room for dispute in the law and parties can focus on 
their business because they have confidence that the law will support their course of 
conduct. In order to achieve economic efficiency, the law needs to reflect the reality and 
the facts. A legal definition which reflects the reality and the facts would achieve better 
                                                          
634 Chapter 2 on The Concept or Definition of the Shipper in the Carriage of Goods by Sea, page 44. 
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economic efficiency. Also, the parties have a sense of fairness635 because the law reflects 
what they believe in. 
Secondly, if there are other elements which have been used to determine the liability of 
the shipper, these must be made clear. Otherwise it would be unfair to carry on assuming 
that when liability is said to be strict, the breach is the only other part of the determining 
factor. It would also lead to uncertainty in the law. 
Although the laws on shipper liability seem to be reliant on some form of mental element 
or the other, the application of these laws seem to indicate that there are other reasons in 
play which affect the final finding of whether there is liability or otherwise of the shipper. 
Decisions of the courts when applying the rules seem to rely on rationales such as 
severity of the effects of not performing certain duties, or an implied undertaking to do 
what was impliedly part of the deal or assumed expectations based on the position of the 
shipper being more likely to be in the know of their own cargo which was in their 
possession first before being passed on to the carrier. 
Whether successful at what was set out to be proven and constraints 
At the beginning of the research, it was acknowledged that the mental element seem to 
play a role in the determination of shipper liability from the very fact of its existence 
within shipper liability provisions. However the objective of this research was to test 
whether it actually does determine the shipper’s liability by being one of the elements to 
be proven. This has been successfully done to some extent, however a more holistic 
research would require looking at certain civil law provisions as well as court decisions 
which were unfortunately, not available in languages which the researcher is fluent in. 
This is a constraint which the researcher has tried to overcome by looking at secondary 
sources, but whether this is adequate remains to be seen. 
The methodology used for this research requires a comprehensive study of various legal 
systems and so access to the substantive law of these systems becomes a crucial issue. 
Although there have been numerous efforts made in making the required materials more 
accessible, there are still many which are beyond reach during the course of the research 
due not just to language barriers but also geographical and technical limitations. 
                                                          
635 Unfair in the sense that if the law expressly provides certain requirements which when fulfilled creates 
liability, persons would act in reliance of those requirements in order to avoid liability. When liability is 
then found by way of other criterias or reasons not mentioned in the law, it catches people off-guard and 
allows liability to be created through the back door. 
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Areas for further research related to subject of study but fall outside scope 
As mentioned in Chapter 4 on shipper liability for cargo under international conventions, 
there are several duties which have been expressly provided for in the most recent 
international convention relating to the carriage of goods by sea, the Rotterdam Rules. 
Although these specific duties were not expressly provided in the preceding conventions 
on the carriage of goods by sea, it has been argued that those duties nonetheless exist 
whether by custom of the trade or by implication from existing rules. It is a possible area 
of research that could be done to determine whether in the likelihood that the coming 
into force of the Rotterdam Rules is further delayed or never takes place, these duties 
could be enforced under the existing conventions which already are in force.636 
Since there are many duties of the shipper which are not documented or provided for, it 
is possible that there are further duties which have not been codified in any national law 
or convention. The question is, should they be? 
Customary shipping practices established over the years can become a source of 
authority of its own. It could be worth looking into the extent to which customs of the 
trade in relation to obligations of the shipper is aligned with the doctrinal rules of shipper 
liability, in particular the rising expectations of the industry towards the shipper’s roles 
and obligations. 
Finally, it is said that the Rotterdam Rules were drafted on the basis of the modern 
practice of shipping. It remains to be seen however, whether by laying out the express 
provisions on shipper liability, and all the kinds of obligations which the shipper is 
expected to fulfil, that it actually makes the practice of shipping more efficient, or 
actually places more obstacles on the shipper, and ultimately the efficiency of shipping. 
If the Rotterdam Rules never come into force, it may be worthwhile considering whether 
a new convention which is more acceptable generally could also take on board the areas 
for reform suggested above as far as shipper liability is concerned. 
 
 
                                                          
636 This was suggested by Francesco Berlingieri, ‘A comparative analysis of the Hague-Visby Rules, the 




Success of methodology 
This research is doctrinal and so focuses on looking at the place of relevant laws in 
existing contexts and legal systems. By starting with the study of what the term “shipper” 
could mean in the law as compared to practice, the research is more appreciative of the 
need to address different duties in different contexts and that not all duties apply to all 
shippers equally, since there are different kinds of shippers.    
Following this, the study of national laws provisions gives a good foundation for 
understanding the background from where the law on shipper liability originated. The 
next step was to build on this knowledge by studying the formulation of international 
conventions. Conventions provisions which expressly and also impliedly reflect ideas 
injected from nations all over the world are a reflection of national laws. Most of the 
theoretical questions can be answered by using this method.  
The practical effects of the rules however, can only be fully understood by looking at the 
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